CGL POLICIES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF COUCHING THE CLAIM TO THE INSURER

UnknownContractors and subcontractors that work on construction projects should, and generally do, maintain commercial general liability policies (“CGL Policies”).  Owners absolutely want their contractor and the subcontractors to be sufficiently insured in the event a claim is made either against them or damages or defects occur to their project.  Likewise, the contractor wants its subcontractors to be sufficiently insured for the same reasons.   Contractors and subcontractors, jointly, want CGL Policies so that if a claim is made or they are sued the insurer defends their interests and, hopefully, pays insurance proceeds to resolve the claim.

 

Insurers, however, are not always keen on paying claims and rely on various exclusions in policies that are applicable to the circumstances of the claim.  In other words, if there is no coverage for the claim based on an exclusion, the insurer will appropriately rely on an exclusion in the CGL policy.  As it pertains to CGL Policies, there are two important exclusions insurers rely on when a claim is asserted against a contractor or subcontractor for construction defects.  These exclusions are known as the j(5) and J(6) exclusions and exclude damage to:

 

j(5)   That particular part of real property on which you…are performing operations, if the property damage arises out of those operations; or

 

j(6)   That particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because your work was incorrectly performed on it.

 

A contractor or subcontractor that reviews their CGL Policies will find the j(5) and j(6) exclusions to be substantially similar to the above.  While contractors typically do not self-perform work, subcontractors typically do  self-perform all or a substantial part of the work.

 

A recent case, Wilshire Insurance Co. v. Birch Crest Apartments, Inc., 2011 WL 3586228 (4th DCA 2011), bolsters insurers’ arguments to exclude coverage under a self-performing subcontractor’s  CGL Policy under the (j)5 and j(6) exclusions.  In this case, a painter performing work on an apartment project spattered paint on glass doors and windows.  The painter tried to remove the paint spatter, and in the process of doing so, damaged the glass doors and windows.  The owner sued the painter and the painter consented to a judgment and assigned its rights under its CGL Policy to the owner. This allowed the owner to sue the insurer directly and assert certain claims against it.

 

The issue in this case was whether the painter’s damage to the glass windows and doors were covered under the policy, or, conversely, whether coverage was excluded pursuant to the j(5) and j(6) exclusions under the policy.  The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that these exclusions barred coverage for all of the owner’s damages:

 

“[T]he record here shows that cleaning paint spatter from windows and doors was within the natural and intended scope of work undertaken by the contractor as part of the painting operations on Birch’s [owner] property if in fact such paint spatter occurred.

***

[T]he scope of the contractor’s operations were intended to include the apartments which were being painted and would, if required, involve cleaning up surfaces which were spattered with paint.  There is no genuine issue of material fact that the property damage in this case was to the apartment upon which H&H [painter] was performing its operations, and that it arose out of the insured’s operations within the meaning of (j)5Additionally, there is no genuine issue of material fact that the underlying claim resulted from the insured’s incorrect work on the glass doors and windows of the apartments within the meaning of exclusion j(6).

Wilshire Insurance Company, 2011 WL at *2.

 

In this case, it appears that the owner hired the painter directly and that the painter self-performed the work.  This is noteworthy because had the owner hired the general contractor and the general contractor hired the painter, or had the painter hired sub-subcontractors to perform all of its work, there could have been certain arguments raised to maximize insurance coverage.  These arguments, however, will not be discussed in this specific post.  What is also noteworthy is that the Fourth District focused on what fell within the “natural and intended scope of work” of the self-performing painter.  Since the damage or activity of cleaning up paint on glass fell within the natural and intended scope of the painter’s work, the Fourth District found that the painter essentially damaged  property it was performing work on (the j(5) exclusion)  and, thus, required repairs to the painter’s own work (the j(6) exclusion).

 

It is imperative that when an owner, etc. submits a claim to a contractor or subcontractor’s CGL Policy, the owner consults with a lawyer in furtherance of couching the claim to optimize insurance recovery.  Furthermore, and equally important, when a contractor or subcontractor receives a claim, especially a claim for defects or damage, that they too should consult with a lawyer to best present the claim to optimize the insurer protecting their interests and paying proceeds to resolve the claim.

  

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

ASSERTING NEGLIGENCE AGAINST A CONSTRUCTION-MANAGER OR OWNER’S REPRESENTATIVE


Unknown-1Cannon v. Fournier, 57 So.3d 875 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) is an interesting personal injury case that touches upon whether a contractor’s qualifying agent can be individually liable for acts and omissions of the limited liability construction company he/she qualifies and whether a construction company can be held liable for negligence to a third party.

 

In this case, an owner wanted to build a new house. The owner hired a licensed construction company to essentially serve as a construction manager-agency (not-at-risk), although this case does not use this term. In other words, the owner would contract directly with all of the trade subcontractors, but it was the construction company that helped the owner obtain a residential permit, referred trade subcontractors directly to the owner, and supervised, consulted, and coordinated the trade subcontractor’s work, and assisted with inspections at the project. The construction company undertook many of the tasks a general contractor would ordinarily undertake except for obtaining the residential permit and contracting directly with the trade subcontractors.

 

One of the trade subcontractors the owner hired was a framer. This happened to be the only, or one of the only, subcontractors that did not come referred to the owner by the construction company. During construction, it was discovered that a beam had been incorrectly installed on the second floor. The construction company (through its qualifying agent) met with the framer to discuss a solution to this issue, and it was during the correction of this issue that a carpenter working for the framer fell from the second floor severely injuring himself.

 

The injured worker sued the construction company and its qualifying agent under a negligence theory saying, among other things, they had a duty to perform all work in a competent, safe and workmanlike manner and they breached this duty which resulted in the injured worker falling. The construction company and its qualifying agent moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the qualifying agent dismissing him from the lawsuit, but declined to enter summary judgment in favor of the construction company.

 

On appeal, the Second District held that the trial court denying summary judgment in favor of the construction company but granting it in favor of its qualifying agent was inconsistent. The Second District held that:

 

[O]fficers or agents of corporations may be individually liable in tort if they commit or participate in a tort, even if their acts are within the course and scope of their employment. The same rule applies to limited liability companies. Thus, to the extent that the LLC could be held liable for its acts or omissions in connection with the construction of the Hoffmans’ [owner] residence, Mr. Fournier [qualifying agent] may be held liable as well.” Cannon, 875 So.2d at 881 (internal citations omitted).

 

Under the Second District’s rationale, if the construction company owed a duty of care to the plaintiff injured worker, then presumably, so did the qualifying agent. To determine whether the company owed a duty of care, the Second District focused on whether the construction company was serving in the role of the general contractor. The Court focused on many of the facts previously mentioned that a construction manager-agency would undertake, specifically, the coordination, communication, and supervising of construction workers and activities at the job site (despite not contracting with any of the trade subcontractors). To that end, the Court expressed:

 

“The circuit court continued by correctly identifying the critical point as the extent of the LLC’s control over and supervision of the job site. A person or entity that controls a supervises the job site has a duty to provide workers on the job with a safe place to work. If the LLC assumed such a duty voluntarily or by contract, it may be held liable to workers who sustain injuries on the job caused by a breach of that duty without regard to whether the LLC was acting as a general contractor.” Cannon, 875 So.3d at 882.

 

Accordingly, the Second District reversed the summary judgment entered in favor of the qualifying agent (because if his construction company could be negligent, then so could he under the Court’s rationale.)

 

Outside of the personal injury context, this case can be used to support a negligence argument against an owner’s representative or construction manager-agency by a non-privity subcontractor, etc. The duty owed would be that the entity is essentially acting as a general contractor (or has similar job-related functions), but just without the title. Therefore, the entity owes a duty to ensure that construction is properly supervised, coordinated, and managed in a competent, safe and workmanlike manner.

 

Furthermore, this case can be used to support an argument against a qualifying agent to hold that the qualifying agent should be held individually liable for the torts of the construction company he/she qualifies. This argument would carry more weight if the company, similar to the company in Cannon, was a sole-owned company with the qualifying agent serving in the role of the owner, qualifying agent, and lone employee of the company. However, even if this were not the case, if the qualifying agent is the one overseeing construction activities, then arguably, if their company commits a tort, they too can be held liable for participating in the tort, especially considering companies can only act through people.

 

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

THE DIFFICULTY IN PREVAILING IN A BID PROTEST

imagesThe difficulty in prevailing in a bid protest is illustrated in the non-construction case of Charlotte County v. Grant Medical Transportation, Inc., 36 Fla. L. Weekly D173a (2d DCA 2011).   In this case, Charlotte County solicited bids to provide the County with bus drivers and washers for a transit program for disabled persons. An unsuccessful bidder sued the County arguing that the winning bidder’s bid was nonresponsive because it failed to comply with requirements of the solicitation. In particular, the unsuccessful bidder argued that the bid solicitation required all bidders to acknowledge receipt of any addenda to the bidding documents prior to the close of the bids, i.e., bid opening, and the winning bidder failed to comply with this requirement making its bid nonresponsive. (A bid is nonrespnsive if it materially fails to comply with the solicitation. While minor irregularities can be waived by the public entity, material irregularities cannot in that they impact the integrity of the public procurement process which requires all bidders to be on an equal playing field.) After the bid opening, the County required the winning bidder to confirm its receipt of all addenda to the bid documents. (Notably, material portions of a bid should never be able to be changed after bid opening.)

 

The unsuccessful bidder moved for a temporary injunction preventing the County from awarding the contract at-issue to the winning bidder. The trial court granted the temporary injunction and the County appealed. At the time the trial court granted the injunction, the County had already contracted with the winning bidder and services had been provided in accordance with the contract.

 

The Second District relied on the following standard for granting injunctive relief:

 

To obtain temporary injunctive relief, the movant must satisfy each of the following elements: (1) the movant has a clear legal right to the requested relief or, in other words, it has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the movant will suffer irreparable harm if the trial court refuses to grant the injunction; (3) the movant does not have available another adequate remedy at law; and (4) a public interest will be served by the imposition of the injunction.Grant Medical citing Snibbe v. Napoleonic Soc’y of Am., Inc., 682 So.2d 568, 570 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).

 

The Second District reversed the granting of the temporary injunction primarily because the unsuccessful bidder offered no evidence at the noticed and contested hearing (to determine whether an injunction should be entered) to support any of the above-mentioned elements. Although the Second District noted that the winning bidder failed to confirm its receipt of all addenda prior to bid opening,  at the injunction hearing, the Senior Division Manager of the County’s Purchasing Department testified that the winning bidder’s failure to confirm receipt was simply a minor deficiency or irregularity. The Second District also noted that at the time the trial court entered the injunction, the contract between the County and the winning bidder had been finalized, with services starting to be performed pursuant to the contract.

 

It is exceedingly difficult to satisfy each of the above-mentioned elements for the entry of a temporary injunction, especially in the bid protest arena. This case exemplifies the uphill battle an unsuccessful bidder has to prevent the public entity from awarding the contract to the winning bidder.

 

First, when a public entity waives a known irregularity with a winning bidder’s bid, it will always claim the irregularity is minor and, thus, waiveable at their discretion. This is the reason the County offered testimony at the injunction hearing to basically acknowledge the deficiency with the winning bidder’s bid but to say “it was not big deal.” Well, if it was not a big deal, then why did the County require the winning bidder to confirm receipt of the addenda AFTER bid opening? From a logical standpoint, it would seem that if it is important enough for the County to require that the winning bidder confirm in writing that it received all addenda to the solicitation after the bids were already opened and they knew who the winning bidder was, then it was a material component of the bid solicitation.

 

Second, unless something totally egregious transpires during the solicitation process, how can a unsuccessful bidder truly establish each and every element to the entry of injunctive relief at what is ultimately an early stage in the lawsuit when discovery should be ongoing? In other words, unless the movant can establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits or a public interest will be served by the imposition of the injunction, an injunction should not be entered. In Grant Medical, the trial court actually granted the injunction, but the Second District found reasons to reverse the entry of the injunction.

 

Finally, if the movant does not act quickly in getting the hearing on a temporary injunction, which should mean little discovery, if any, has been conducted, then the movant risks the public body finalizing and entering into the contract with the winning bidder and the winning bidder starting to perform services pursuant to the contract. A no-win situation for an unsuccessful bidder.

 

While unsuccessful bidders should certainly explore the possibility of protesting, it is important to consider the uphill battle that will be encountered. If the trial court will consider having a hearing and entering injunctive relief in a an ex parte (and, thus, uncontested hearing), that should be explored to avoid the undesirable situation of the contract being entered and services performed by the winning bidder. For this to take place, legal arguments and factual arguments need to be well framed to establish entitlement to the entry of injunctive relief. If a noticed and contested hearing is required, legal and factual arguments still need to be very well framed, but it is important to offer evidence at the hearing. Specifically, if your protest is based on the argument that the winning bidder’s bid was nonrespnsive, you need to know that the public body will argue that the deficiency was minor so that you are prepared to rebut this argument in order to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. You should also offer evidence to show that the deviation is material in that it affects the public interest by detrimentally impacting the competitive procurement process (i.e., it would affect some material component of your bid such as price or scope, etc.).

 

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

DO NOT BANK ON RECOVERING YOUR ATTORNEYS’ FEES IN A CONSTRUCTION LIEN FORECLOSURE ACTION

untitledA party should never bank on recovering their attorneys’ fees when prosecuting or defending a construction lien foreclosure action.

 

In a construction lien action, the prevailing party has been statutorily entitled to recover their reasonable attorneys’ fees. Fla.Stat. §713.29.   This is important since a party can only recover their attorneys’ fees if there is a statutory or contractual basis to do so.

 

 

The Florida Supreme Court in Trytek v. Gale Indus., Inc., 3 So.3d 1194 (Fla. 2009), analyzed what it meant to be a prevailing party for purposes of attorneys’ fees in a construction lien action and held that that the significant issues test is the test to determine the prevailing party. Under this test, the prevailing party is not necessarily the party that wins a sum of money at trial, but, rather, the party that wins the significant issues in the case. Hence, it is more than possible that the party that wins the significant issues based on the circumstances of the case is not the party that wins money. The Florida Supreme Court further held that a court can rule that no party is the prevailing party in this case.

 

The decision in Trytek has led to confusion, as well as consternation, because there is no objective or qualitative standard to determine the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys’ fees under the significant issues test. Instead, a pure subjective standard is used to determine the prevailing party that is not necessarily tied to the outcome of the case; and, importantly, this decision permits the trial court to find no prevailing party. This is noteworthy because the recovery of attorneys’ fees oftentimes drives the outcome of a case because the fees can be more than the amount in controversy.   Now, with a subjective test used to determine whether a party can recover their attorneys’ fees, a party must consider that they may not be entitled to their attorneys’ fees when deciding how to pursue or defend a construction lien foreclosure action.

 

The recent case of Sheppard v. M&R Plumbing, Inc., 36 Fla. L. Weekly D1697b (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), elaborates on the confusion of the significant issues test and the reason why a party should not bank on recovering their attorneys’ fees in a construction lien foreclosure action. In this case, a plumber installed a water treatment system in a house. Apparently, there was no written contract and there was no meeting of minds with respect to the costs to install this water treatment system. The plumber recorded a construction lien and foreclosed the lien and, as an alternative cause of action, sued the owner for quantum meruit (unjust enrichment) for the reasonable value of labor, services, and materials it provided to the owner.

 

The reason the plumber sued the owner to foreclose a construction lien and for quantum meruit is because there was uncertainty as to whether a contract existed between the owner and the plumber. A construction lien, however, can only arise if there is a contract (oral or written)—no contract means no lien rights. Under a quantum meruit action, there is an acknowledgment that a contract does not exist, but because value was allegedly provided, the party should be entitled to the reasonable cost of that value.

 

Whether the plumber prevailed on its construction lien action or alternative quantum meruit action should have been crucial for a determination of which party should be deemed a prevailing party for purposes of recovering its attorney fees. The reason being that a party does not have any legal basis to recover their attorneys’ fees in a quantum meruit action since there is no statutory or contractual basis to recover fees in this type of action.

 

At trial, a jury decided that a contract did not exist between the plumber and the owner. Because a contract did not exist, the plumber could not prevail on its construction lien action. However, the jury did decide that the plumber did provide value to the owner of approximately $13,000 and ruled in favor of the plumber on its alternative quantum meruit action.

 

The issue on appeal to the First District was whether the owner or the plumber should be deemed the prevailing party for purposes of fees. From a practical standpoint, it would make sense that the owner prevailed on the significant issues test because the owner prevailed in entirety on the construction lien foreclosure action, importantly, the only count that entitled a party to recover attorneys’ fees. But, this rationale is not the rationale employed by the First District. Instead, the First District maintained:

 

“While we agree the Shephards [owner] must now be deemed the prevailing parties on the lien foreclosure count, entry of the money judgment in favor of M&R [plumber] on the quantum meruit count made M&R, not the Shephards, the prevailing party in the litigation, viewing the entire ‘action brought’ as a whole.”

 

Neither party was deemed the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys’ fees. This ruling, unfortunately, leads to further confusion and frustration on when a party will be deemed the prevailing party in a construction lien action. Here, the plumber lost in entirety its lien action despite being awarded some money in its quantum meruit action (again, an equity action that does not afford the prevailing party to attorneys’ fees). This was overlooked by the First District leaving an owner that prevailed on the significant issues of the lien action to bear all of its attorneys’ fees. The only conclusion that can be reached from this decision is that, again, there is no objective or qualitative way to determine the prevailing party in a construction lien foreclosure action, especially given the ruling in this case where a party can win the lien action but lose an alternative equity action and still not be deemed the prevailing party.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.