SUING FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON A CONTRACT CLAIM; EQUITABLE SUBROGATION CLAIM BY LIABILITY INSURER AGAINST GOVERNMENT NOT ALLOWED

imagesEquitable subrogation is a doctrine that liability insurers rely on when paying a claim on behalf of an insured.  Under this doctrine, the insurer equitably subrogates—steps in the shoes—to the rights of the insured and sues as an equitable subrogee of the insured in order to seek reimbursement for the claim it paid.

 

What if the liability insurer tried to pursue an equitable subrogation claim against the federal government?  In other words, what if the insurer paid out insurance proceeds on behalf of its insured-prime contractor and then tried to recoup the insurance proceeds from the federal government as an equitable subrogee of the prime contractor?  The United States Court of Federal Claims in Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters v. U.S., 2014 WL 6491835 (Fed.Cl. 2014) explained that a liability insurer CANNOT sue the federal government as an equitable subrogee of the prime contractor in order to recoup insurance proceeds paid out on a claim.

 

In this case, the government hired a prime contractor to abate asbestos at a post office.  The prime contractor was having difficulty obtaining CGL liability insurance to specifically cover asbestos removal for a reasonable premium and the government, through the contracting officer, agreed to execute an addendum to the prime contract that required the government to save harmless and indemnify the contractor from personal injury claims attributable to the asbestos removal work.

 

More than ten years later, a former government employee sued the prime contractor claiming he contracted cancer from his exposure to asbestos while it was being removed and abated at the project.  The prime contractor demanded that the government defend and indemnify it for this claim; however, the government refused.  The prime contractor then tendered the claim to its CGL liability insurer and its insurer settled the claim.  After the settlement, the prime contractor once again demanded that the government reimburse it by honoring the indemnification language in the addendum; again, the government refused.

 

The prime contractor’s liability insurer then filed suit against the federal government as the equitable subrogee of the prime contractor in order to recoup the insurance proceeds it paid to the former government employee.  The thrust of the claim was that the government breached the indemnification provision.  The government moved to dismiss the lawsuit contending that the Court of Federal Claims does not have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the lawsuit because the liability insurer is not in privity with the government and, therefore, cannot sue the government.  The Court of Federal Claims agreed and dismissed the lawsuit.  Why? Because a plaintiff suing the federal government on a contract claim must be in privity of contract with the federal government with limited exceptions to this rule:

 

The Federal Circuit has recognized limited exceptions to the requirement that parties seeking relief for breach of contract against the government under the Tucker Act must be in privity of contract with the United States. These limited exceptions include (1) actions against the United States by an intended third-party beneficiary; (2) pass-through suits by a subcontractor where the prime contractor is liable to the subcontractor for the subcontractor’s damages; and (3) actions by a Miller Act surety for funds that the government improperly disbursed to a prime contractor [after the surety financed completion of a defaulted subcontractor]. As the court of appeals has observed, the common thread that unites these exceptions is that the party standing outside of privity by contractual obligation stands in the shoes of a party within privity.

Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, supra(internal quotations and citations omitted).

 

Since none of the limited exceptions applied to allow a liability insurer to sue the government as an equitable subrogee of its insured-prime contractor, the Court of Federal Claims lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

 

This ruling does not prevent the prime contractor from suing the government directly for breaching the indemnification provision; it simply prevents the liability insurer from suing as an equitable subrogee of the prime contractor. Even though the insurer paid the claim, perhaps it can enter into an agreement with the prime contractor whereby the prime contractor sues the government directly for breach of contract.

 

 

The case demonstrates the limited exceptions available to a claimant on a construction project that wants to pursue a claim directly against the government when the claimant is not the prime contractor hired by the government.  While prime contractors can sue the government for breach of contract, subcontractors, in particular, that want to pursue a claim against the government can only do so as a pass-through claim, meaning they are suing in the name of the prime contractor and will require the cooperation of the prime contractor.

 

Also, as an aside, the indemnification provision from the government and the prime contractor required the government to save harmless and indemnify the prime contractor.  I always like to include the word “defend” in an indemnification provision so it is crystal clear that the indemnitor’s indemnification obligations extend to its contractual obligation to defend the indemnitees for any claim.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

THE ALL MIGHTY GENERAL AGREEMENT OF INDEMNITY WITH THE SURETY

images-2Sureties do not issue bonds (e.g., payment or performance bonds) unless the principal and the principal’s personal guarantors execute a General Agreement of Indemnity (“Indemnity Agreement”).  The Indemnity Agreement routinely requires that the principal / guarantors: (1) defend and indemnify the surety for all losses, liability, claims, attorney’s fees, and expenses that the surety may incur and (2) post collateral security into a reserve account set up by the surety to cover any claim on the bond; the surety may seek an injunction to compel such collateral if the principal / guarantors refuse.  Yes, these are powerful provisions in favor of the surety if a claim is asserted against the principal’s bond (especially a performance bond claim) or if the surety, to offset liability or exposure, pays a claimant on behalf of the principal.  The leverage lies with the surety with respect to the provisions in the Indemnity Agreement and the worst thing a bond principal can do when a claim is asserted against the bond is to outright refuse to work with and cooperate with the surety (based on the powerful provisions in the Indemnity Agreement).

 

 

The opinion in Developers Surety and Indemnity Co. v. Hansel Innovations, Inc., 2014 WL 2968138 (M.D.Fla. 2014), exemplifies what can happen if a bond principal refuses to cooperate with a surety even if the principal has potentially meritorious arguments.  In this case, a surety issued a performance bond to a fire protection subcontractor.  During the course of construction (and, arguably due to the general contractor’s nonpayment), the subcontractor experienced cash flow problems.  The general contractor expressed concerns as to the subcontractor’s financial wherewithal to complete the contract work and made demand on the surety.  The subcontractor requested financial assistance from its performance bond surety and the surety agreed to pay the subcontractor and its vendors in excess of $100,000 provided the subcontractor execute a separate financing and collateral agreement (as the surety expected to recoup its “loan”).  Subsequently, the general contractor advised the surety and subcontractor of performance issues with the subcontractor’s work.  The subcontractor, however, refused to complete its work and address the performance issues unless the surety continued to fund the subcontractor’s work, released the guarantors from personal liability, and pursued claims against the general contractor.  Based on the subcontractor’s stance, the surety retained another subcontractor to complete the work and incurred additional costs.  The surety filed a lawsuit to, among other rights afforded under the Indemnity Agreement, require the subcontractor and guarantors to post $200,000 in collateral security into a reserve account.  The subcontractor and guarantor failed to post collateral upon demand.

 

 

The surety, as it customarily will do, moved for a preliminary injunction in accordance with the Indemnity Agreement for the court to order the subcontractor and guarantors to post collateral.   One of the requirements for a court to order a preliminary injunction is for the surety to establish that it is substantially likely to succeed on the merits.  This is not a challenging hurdle for a surety given the powerful provisions in the Indemnity Agreement. (Please see the following articles for more information on a surety’s right to demand collateral security and the requirements for a preliminary injunction in federal court: https://floridaconstru.wpengine.com/a-suretys-right-to-demand-collateral-security/ and https://floridaconstru.wpengine.com/a-suretys-right-to-demand-collateral-security/.)

 

 

The subcontractor argued that bad faith or unclean hands, evidenced by an improper motive, extinguished the surety’s substantial likelihood that it would succeed on its claim.  The subcontractor argued this because it did not want to post collateral.  In support of bad faith, the subcontractor contended that when the general contractor raised performance issues the subcontractor was 99% done with its work with the remaining work simply commissioning the fire sprinkler system and completing as-built drawings.  It further argued that the general contractor placed it in a dire financial position because the general contractor did not pay it for over one year and did not pay it for change order work that was performed at the general contractor’s direction.  (Not an uncommon subcontractor argument!)  The subcontractor also stated that it only signed the financing and collateral agreement because the surety assured it that the surety would assist the subcontractor in collection efforts against the general contractor if the subcontractor signed the agreement and continued with the work.  Then, the surety discontinued funding the subcontractor at the eleventh hour to help the subcontractor complete the work while contemporaneously failing to assist the subcontractor in collecting any money from the general contractor.  The Magistrate, though, was not persuaded by the subcontractor’s bad faith argument taking the position that it cannot be bad faith for the subcontractor to be induced into completing its work on a project it was hired to complete.

 

 

The subcontractor may have very strong arguments that it was truly placed in a cash flow crunch because the general contractor refused to pay for contract work plus additional work.  Thus, the subcontractor was forced to finance a job that it was never in a financial position to finance.  Then, when it agreed to complete its work with the surety’s assistance, it did so with the understanding that the surety would assist the subcontractor in recovering monies that the subcontractor should have been paid all along for contract and change order work that would also be used to reimburse the surety.  But, as shown in this case, truly establishing bad faith is very, very difficult and should not be sugarcoated with the sentiment that the provisions in the Indemnity Agreement do not have any teeth, because they do!

 

 

Keep in mind that a performance bond guarantees performance under a contract.  Once a bond is furnished, it is rarely advisable to abandon a job or refuse to perform because it puts the surety in a compromising position where it will likely need to complete the subcontractor’s performance in order to mitigate its exposure and liability.  Here, the subcontractor’s surety was willing to finance the subcontractor’s work until the subcontractor was virtually complete.  All the subcontractor had to do was complete its work when it was 99% complete and work with and cooperate with the surety since the best course of action in the long run may have been for these entities to work together to recover monies that the general contractor owed the subcontractor and/or figure out how the subcontractor would reimburse the surety.  However, based on what the surety may have construed as an obstinate position by the subcontractor, the surety incurred additional expenses and elected to pursue its options against the subcontractor and guarantors under the all mighty Indemnity Agreement.

 

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

MAKE SURE INDEMNIFICATION PROVISIONS CLEARLY REFLECT THE REQUIRED SCOPE OF THE INDEMNIFICATION

imagesIndemnification provisions are a vital component of construction contracts. Every construction contract (whether a prime contract, subcontract, professional services contract, etc.) should absolutely require that the party receiving compensation for performing a service to indemnify the party paying for that service (referred to as the indemnitee). No exception! Moreover, it is crucial that indemnification provisions are carefully drafted to not only comply with Florida law, but to eliminate any uncertainty regarding the scope of the indemnification. In other words, make sure the indemnification provision unequivocally reflects the scope of the indemnification that is sought and that the scope complies with Florida law.

 

In Florida, indemnification provisions for construction contracts are governed by Florida Statute s. 725.06, which is recited below. Also, please see https://floridaconstru.wpengine.com/buttoning-up-contractual-indemnification-language/ and https://floridaconstru.wpengine.com/the-scope-of-a-release-in-a-settlement-and-contractual-indemnification/ for more information on the application of this statute to ensure the indemnification provision, whether for a private or public project, complies with Florida law.

 

The recent Third District Court of Appeal decision in Royal Palm Hotel Property, LLC v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, Inc., 2014 WL 444150 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014), albeit a non-construction dispute, exemplifies the significance of making sure the indemnification provision accurately reflects the scope of indemnification that the party receiving the indemnification (the indemnitee) truly wants or requires.

 

In this case, the indemnification provision read: “The Hotel agrees to indemnify and hold Lufthansa harmless from all liabilities, including damage to property or injury or death of persons, including Lufthansa property and Lufthansa personnel that may result from the negligence or wilful (sic) misconduct of the Hotel.”

 

The indemnification provision was between a hotel and an airline which had its employees stay at the hotel. In this personal injury action, the hotel was sued for negligence when a window fell out of a frame and injured a guest. Also, the airline was sued under the theory that it was vicariously liable for the negligence of its employee staying at the hotel. The issue was whether the hotel was required to indemnify the airline for the negligence of the airline and its employees staying at the hotel. However, a look at the indemnification clause above does not articulate that the hotel will be responsible for indemnifying and holding the airline harmless for the negligence of the airline or the airline’s employees. Rather, it says the hotel will indemnify the airline for its negligence or willful misconduct. This is a huge difference as the indemnification written is much narrower than the indemnification that the airline perhaps wanted.

 

Again, the airline was never sued for the hotel’s negligence. It was sued for the negligence of its employee staying at the hotel under a vicarious liability (respondeat superior) theory. While the airline prevailed in the underlying personal injury action, it wanted to recoup its defense costs against the hotel. The Third District construing the indemnification provision held that the provision was never kicked into effect because the hotel was not required to indemnify the airline for the negligence of the airline or its employee and the basis of the underlying claims against the airline related to the negligence of the airline’s employee.

 

The reason this case is worth discussing is because if an indemnitee wants an indemnification provision to cover its own negligence, the provision needs to clearly reflect this intent. Now, for construction contracts, an indemnitee should never negotiate an indemnification that covers it for its negligence without making sure the provision undoubtedly complies with Florida Statute s. 725.06. Otherwise, the indemnitee risks an unenforceable indemnification provision!  In a nutshell, s. 725.06 provides that if an indemnification provision is going to indemnify an indemnitee for its negligence, the contract must contain a “monetary limitation on the extent of the indemnification that bears a reasonable commercial relationship to the contract and its part of the project specifications or bid documents, if any.”

 

 

Section 725.06

(1) Any portion of any agreement or contract for or in connection with, or any guarantee of or in connection with, any construction, alteration, repair, or demolition of a building, structure, appurtenance, or appliance, including moving and excavating associated therewith, between an owner of real property and an architect, engineer, general contractor, subcontractor, sub-subcontractor, or materialman or any combination thereof wherein any party referred to herein promises to indemnify or hold harmless the other party to the agreement, contract, or guarantee for liability for damages to persons or property caused in whole or in part by any act, omission, or default of the indemnitee arising from the contract or its performance, shall be void and unenforceable unless the contract contains a monetary limitation on the extent of the indemnification that bears a reasonable commercial relationship to the contract and is part of the project specifications or bid documents, if any. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the monetary limitation on the extent of the indemnification provided to the owner of real property by any party in privity of contract with such owner shall not be less than $1 million per occurrence, unless otherwise agreed by the parties. Indemnification provisions in any such agreements, contracts, or guarantees may not require that the indemnitor indemnify the indemnitee for damages to persons or property caused in whole or in part by any act, omission, or default of a party other than:

(a) The indemnitor;

(b) Any of the indemnitor’s contractors, subcontractors, sub-subcontractors, materialmen, or agents of any tier or their respective employees; or

(c) The indemnitee or its officers, directors, agents, or employees. However, such indemnification shall not include claims of, or damages resulting from, gross negligence, or willful, wanton or intentional misconduct of the indemnitee or its officers, directors, agents or employees, or for statutory violation or punitive damages except and to the extent the statutory violation or punitive damages are caused by or result from the acts or omissions of the indemnitor or any of the indemnitor’s contractors, subcontractors, sub-subcontractors, materialmen, or agents of any tier or their respective employees.

(2) A construction contract for a public agency or in connection with a public agency’s project may require a party to that contract to indemnify and hold harmless the other party to the contract, their officers and employees, from liabilities, damages, losses and costs, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorney’s fees, to the extent caused by the negligence, recklessness, or intentional wrongful misconduct of the indemnifying party and persons employed or utilized by the indemnifying party in the performance of the construction contract.

(3) Except as specifically provided in subsection (2), a construction contract for a public agency or in connection with a public agency’s project may not require one party to indemnify, defend, or hold harmless the other party, its employees, officers, directors, or agents from any liability, damage, loss, claim, action, or proceeding, and any such contract provision is void as against public policy of this state.

(4) This section does not affect any contracts, agreements, or guarantees entered into before the effective date of this section or any renewals thereof.

 

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

THE SCOPE OF A RELEASE IN A SETTLEMENT AND CONTRACTUAL INDEMNIFICATION

imagesCALGH4ZOPilot Construction Services, Inc. v. Babe’s Plumbing, Inc., 111 So.3d 955 (Fla. 2d 2013) is a case that touches on two relevant issues. The first issue pertains to the scope of a release in a settlement agreement. The second issue pertains to contractual indemnification—an issue of importance to all in construction.

 

I. Scope of Release

 

In Pilot Construction, a private college hired a general contractor to renovate a residence hall. After completion, the college discovered deficiencies in bathrooms and showers that resulted in leaks and water damage. The college sued the general contractor for breach of contract and breach of express warranty. The college also sued the plumber (subcontractor) for breach of express warranty due to plumbing deficiencies that caused water damage.

 

The plumber settled directly with the college and a settlement and release agreement was executed. The college, however, continued to pursue claims against the general contractor including defects and damage that arose out of the plumber’s work. The general contractor then settled with the college, but instead of this dispute being dismissed, the general contractor pursued cross-claims against the plumber for indemnity, breach of warranty, and equitable subrogation.

 

The issue on summary judgment was whether the general contractor could pursue claims (such as indemnity) against the plumber when the plumber settled with the college and was released by the college. The trial court found that the general contractor could not pursue such claims and entered summary judgment in favor of the plumber.

 

On appeal, the Second District analyzed the scope of the release which provided in two portions:

 

First Portion: “Nothing within this Release is intended to be nor shall it be construed as any kind of waiver, limitation, or compromise to any claim or defense New College has or may have against any party or entity other than Babe’s Plumbing, Inc.” Pilot Construction, 111 So.3d at 958.

 

Clearly, the college wanted this reservation in the settlement so that it could continue to pursue claims against the general contractor inclusive of damage that arose out of the subcontractor’s work.

 

Second Portion: The settlement also included a release of the plumber for everything (known and unknown damages) in connection with the plumber’s work at the college.

 

Clearly, the plumber wanted this provision so that it would be released by the college (owner) for its scope of work at the project.

 

So, what was the problem? The Second District found that the release to the plumber actually conflicted with the reservation language since the settlement was not limiting claims against other parties, especially as it relates to the subcontractor’s scope of work. Based on the conflicting portions, the court held as follows:

 

  1. the general contractor could pursue its claims against the plumber because it was not an intended-third-party beneficiary of the college and plumber’s settlement as demonstrated by the fact that the settlement allowed the college to pursue damages (arising from the plumber’s work) against the general contractor;
  2. the fact that the plumber settled with the college does not release the plumber from the general contractor’s claim for indemnification since the general contractor could still be liable to the college for the plumber’s scope of work; and
  3. nothing in the release would prevent the general contractor from pursuing a breach of warranty claim against the plumber.

 

As the court explained, “Because the language of the release does not apply to bar Pilot’s [general contractor] claims against Babe’s [plumber], the trial court erred in granting summary judgment….” Pilot Construction, 111 So.3d at 959.

 

This decision is important to any party participating in a multi-party construction defect case. If a subcontractor is getting sued directly by the owner, its best bet is to effectuate a settlement directly with the owner and general contractor whereby the owner and general contractor both release the subcontractor relating to the project. Due to the subcontractor’s indemnification obligations and requirement to identify the general contractor as an additional insured, it will ideally want a release ending it and its insurance carrier’s involvement in the dispute. Or, if that is not possible, make certain that the settlement does not have reservation language that allows the owner to pursue any defects and damage arising from the subcontractor’s scope of work against the general contractor. Better language would reflect that the owner is not pursuing any defects or damage arising from the subcontractor’s scope of work against the general contractor pursuant to this settlement (i.e., a release of the general contractor relating to the subcontractor’s scope of work). The general contractor may still be able to pursue claims against the subcontractor; but, if the owner is releasing the general contractor for the subcontractor’s work, such claims could be tenuous since the owner cannot pursue such damage against the general contractor. (Although, the general contractor’s insurer could still pursue an additional insured claim to recoup defense costs associated with defending the general contractor.)

 

If a subcontractor is being sued by the general contractor only, some of the same rationale applies. The general contractor can settle directly with the subcontractor; however, it assumes the risk associated with the subcontractor’s work since the owner is still pursuing claims against the general contractor arising from the subcontractor’s work. This isn’t always a bad thing based on the dollar amount of the settlement and the ultimate settlement with the owner. In other scenarios, the general contractor only wants to settle with a subcontractor if it can contemporaneously settle with the owner so that it is getting a release from the owner for the subcontractor’s scope of work. An owner will likely not want to do this, nor should it, if damages cannot necessarily be isolated to that subcontractor’s scope of work (such as a water intrusion dispute where multiple scopes contribute to water intrusion and damage). Other times, the general contractor will not settle with subcontractors independent of a global settlement with the owner in perhaps an effort to minimize its contribution to the settlement.

 

Ultimately, there are numerous strategies that come into play when negotiating settlements and releases based on the party. There really is no one-size-fits-all model as it is dependent on the nature of the dispute.  It is important to understand what is being released, what is not being released, and the scope of the release when entering into a settlement so that any risks can be appreciated.

 

II. Contractual Indemnification – Florida Statute s. 725.06

 

The plumber in Pilot Construction also argued that Florida Statute s. 725.06 barred the general contractor’s claims because the general contractor was seeking indemnification for its OWN negligence. The Second District dismissed this argument because the general contractor was only seeking indemnification for the subcontractor’s negligence:

 

“Section 725.06 would only bar Pilot’s claims for indemnification if Pilot’s claims were based on Pilot’s own negligence. A plain reading of Pilot’s claims against Babe’s shows that Pilot’s suit against Babe’s was based on Babe’s failures to correctly install shower pans and drains in the residence hall bathrooms. “
Pilot, 111 So.3d at 959.

 

The Second District’s ruling is interesting because it does not discuss the contractual indemnification language in the contract. Section 725.06 is a statute that essentially says that the first party cannot require the second party to indemnify it for its own negligence unless there is a “monetary limitation on the extent of the indemnification that bears a reasonable commercial relationship to the contract and is part of the project specifications or bid documents, if any.” See Fla. Stat. s. 725.06. Without compliance with this section, the indemnification provision is unenforceable. This is why it is always good practice to include a monetary limitation and identify it is part of the bid documents because most indemnifications are drafted in broad form that would require the second party to indemnify the first party for any and all damage caused wholly or partly by the second party. However, the Second District appears to focus less on the indemnification language in the subcontract and more on the actual claims that were asserted by the general contractor. Thus, if there is a concern with the enforceability of the indemnification provision, this case could support an argument for the general contractor that because the contractual indemnification claim being asserted is confined to the subcontractor’s (or second party) own negligence, the claim should be entitled to proceed.

 

For more information on contractual indemnification please see: https://floridaconstru.wpengine.com/buttoning-up-contractual-indemnification-language/

 

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

A SURETY’S RIGHT TO DEMAND COLLATERAL SECURITY

power plantBefore payment and performance bonds are issued by a surety, the bond principal-contractor is required to execute an indemnity agreement with the surety that is often personally guaranteed. The indemnity agreement is naturally written in favor of and for the benefit of the surety that is issuing bonds that are typically in the amount of the contracts that are awarded to the contractor. Contractors that execute indemnity agreements need to understand what the surety’s rights and remedies are in the event performance and/or payment bond claims are made that raise a concern to the surety. Not understanding these rights could put the contractor in a losing situation with the surety.

 
The recent Southern District of Florida opinion in Developers Surety and Indemnity Co. v. Bi-Tech Construction, Inc., 2013 WL 4563657 (S.D.Fla. 2013), exemplifies a surety’s options against its bond principal-contractor. In this case, the contractor was awarded a contract by a public owner to install a new generator system. The contractor was required to obtain public performance and payment bonds. Shortly after construction commenced, a payment dispute arose between the contractor and the public owner. The public owner refused to pay the first full payment application amount because it originally over-estimated the amount of trenching that the contract would require. The contractor contended that it bid its work on its own assessment of the trenching and needed to be paid in full to cover project costs. The contractor further argued that it could not complete the project without full payment; the public entity therefore elected to terminate the contractor from the project.

 
The public owner and the contractor’s surety entered into discussions as the public owner must have submitted a performance bond claim to the surety. They agreed that the public owner would pay the contractor in full and the contractor would be reinstated to complete the work. The surety then issued the contractor a memorandum of understanding that outlined the terms of its agreement with the public owner and needed the contractor to sign off on the memorandum of understanding. The contractor, however, refused because it objected to certain provisions in the memorandum of understanding that would have, among other things, required the public owner’s payments to the contractor to be held in a third party trust account until the surety authorized the disbursement of the funds.

 
Meanwhile, subcontractors to the contractor remained unpaid. The electrical subcontractor was owed approximately $172,000 and filed a suit against the contractor’s payment bond. Additionally, another subcontractor was owed approximately $8,000. The surety decided to create a reserve account and deposited $205,000 into that account. The surety demanded that the contractor also deposit $205,000 into the reserve account as collateral security. The contractor refused prompting the surety to file suit against the contractor.

 

 

While the surety’s lawsuit against the contractor was pending, the surety immediately moved for a preliminary injunction asking the Court to order the contractor to provide the surety $205,000 as collateral security to be deposited into the reserve account.
“In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff [surety] must establish [the following elements:] (1) a substantial likelihood that it will prevail on the merits of the underlying cause of action; (2) a substantial threat that it will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm the injunction may have on the defendant; and (4) that the public interest will not be adversely affected by granting the preliminary injunction.” Bi-Tech, 2013 WL at *3. If the Court decides that an injunction is appropriate, it has the discretion to determine the amount of the bond the plaintiff (in this case, the surety) will have to post as security to cover damages in the event the injunction is wrongfully issued. Id. at *5 quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 65.
The Court, in determining whether the elements for injunctive relief were satisfied, analyzed the terms of the indemnity agreement. (The Court would also do this when determining whether the contractor breached the terms of the indemnity agreement.) The indemnity agreement contained few applicable provisions:

 

 

“-Indemnitor [contractor and guarantors]…shall indemnify and hold harmless Surety from and against any and all liability…which Surety may sustain or incur by reason of or in consequence of the execution and delivery by Surety of any Bond on behalf of Principal [contractor].
-Indemnitor shall, immediately upon demand and whether or not Surety shall have made any payment therefor, deposit with Surety a sum of money equal to such reserve account and any increase thereof as collateral security on such Bond…If Indemnitor shall fail, neglect or refuse to deposit with Surety the collateral demanded by Surety, Surety may seek a mandatory injunction to compel the deposit of such collateral together with any other remedy at law or in equity the Surety may have.
-Principal and Indemnitor…agree to hold all money and all other proceeds for the Obligation, however received, in trust for the benefit of Surety and to use such money and other proceeds for the purposes of performing the Obligation and for discharging the obligations under the Bond, and for no other purpose until the liability of the Surety under the Bond is completely exonerated.”
Bi-Tech Construction, 2013 WL at *1.

 

 

 

Based on these provisions, the Court maintained that the surety has the contractual right to create the reserve account and demand for the contractor to post collateral security in the reserve account equal to the amount deposited by the surety. This contractual right exists irrespective of whether the contractor disputes the legitimacy of claims made against the surety’s bond. Once the Court recognized this contractual right, it recognized that the surety could suffer irreparable injury because it would be unsecured against claims (hence, the reason why the indemnity agreement allows the surety to request collateral security). Finally, finding that an injunction was appropriate, the Court did not require the surety to post a bond.

 

 

Indemnity agreements with sureties contain very similar provisions as the ones referenced above. The provisions applicable for purposes of the preliminary injunction are contained in many indemnity agreements which, among other things, give the surety the right to request collateral security. It is important to understand rights and remedies in connection with the indemnity agreement to hopefully avoid any situation or dispute where the surety pursues recourse against the bond principal-contractor and the guarantors that executed the indemnity agreement.

 

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

UNDERSTANDING COMMON LAW INDEMNITY

SHOWERDOOR4Common law indemnification is a “common” third party claim in multi-party litigation, particularly construction defect litigation. For instance, if a general contractor is sued by an owner for defects, the contractor may third party in the applicable subcontractors and assert a common law indemnification theory against the subcontractors to flow through liability. However, common law indemnity does not have to be asserted as a third party claim, but can be asserted as an affirmative claim after a judgment is entered against a party.

 

For example, in Diplomat Resorts Limited Partnership v. Tecnoglass, LLC, 38 Fla. L. Weekly D1126a (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), a hotel owner hired a contractor to furnish and install glass shower doors in hotel rooms. The subcontractor, naturally, purchased the glass doors from a fabricator / manufacturer and then installed the doors at the hotel. Unfortunately, many of the glass shower doors spontaneously fractured. The hotel owner obtained a judgment against the contractor in arbitration for the damages it incurred in replacing the doors. However, because the contractor was likely not collectible, the hotel owner took an assignment of the contractor’s claims against the fabricator / manufacturer because the thought was the glass fractured due to a defect in the fabrication process.

 

The hotel owner, standing in the shoes of its contractor through the assignment, sued the fabricator / manufacturer and asserted a common law indemnification claim which was dismissed with prejudice by the trial court. On appeal, the Fourth District reversed finding that the hotel owner (standing in the shoes as the contractor) properly asserted the following elements of common law indemnification: 1) that the contractor is wholly without fault, 2) the fabricator / manufacturer is at fault, and 3) the fabricator / manufacturer is liable to the contractor because the contractor was vicariously, constructively, derivatively, or technically liable to the hotel owner for the wrongful acts of the fabricator / manufacturer.

 

One of the challenges with common law indemnification is that there are court decisions that require the party seeking indemnification to be in a “special relationship” with the party it is seeking indemnification from. The Fourth District, however, maintained that a party does not need to specifically plead the existence of a special relationship because this “merely describes a relationship which makes a faultless party ‘only vicariously, constructively, derivatively, or technically liable for the wrongful acts” of the party at fault.”  Diplomat Resorts Limited Partnership.

 

Although the Fourth District’s decision in Diplomat Resorts appears to make a common law indemnification claim easier to prevail on a motion to dismiss, it is still a challenging claim to prove because it requires the party seeking indemnity to be wholly without fault. In other words, if that party is slightly at fault, there is no common law indemnity. Putting this in context, if the contractor is slightly at fault regarding installing the shower doors, it will not prevail on its common law indemnification claim.

 

In fact, the fabricator / installer in Diplomat Resorts argued that the contractor failed to properly install the glass doors for this very reason; however, there was no finding by the arbitrator that the contractor improperly installed the glass doors. Had there been a specific finding, there likely would be no common law indemnification claim because “a former adjudication against an indemnitee [e.g., contractor], finding the indemnitee’s acts to be wrongful, is binding against the indemnitee and precludes indemnification.” Diplomat Resorts Limited Partnership.

 

Notably, there are times in arbitration or litigation where parties do not want specific findings of fact. One of those is in a situation where a defendant may look to another for a common law indemnification claim (such as against a manufacturer) because that party does not want a finding that it did anything wrong that would be contradictory to its position that its liability flows 100% from the party it is pursuing the common law indemnification claim against.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

UNDERSTANDING YOUR RIGHTS AS AN ADDITIONAL INSURED

iso-endorsement-cg-20-10-11-85Being an additional insured is a topic discussed, and it absolutely should be, in the negotiation of construction contracts. It is an important part of risk management in construction. An owner wants its contractor and consultants to name it as an additional insured under their liability policies. A contractor, likewise, wants its subcontractors, etc. to name it as an additional insured under their liability policies.

 

Let’s say a general contractor wants its window/glazing subcontractor to name it as an additional insured under the subcontractor’s commercial general liability (CGL) policy. The window subcontractor would be the primary or named insured under its CGL policy. The general contractor, smartly, wants the window subcontractor’s CGL policy to have an endorsement that identifies the general contractor as an additional insured under that policy (ideally, for both ongoing and completed operations). By adding the general contractor as an additional insured, the window subcontractor is protecting / providing coverage to the general contractor for the window subcontractor’s negligence. It is not designed to protect the general contractor for its negligence — so the general contractor will still need its own liability insurance; rather, it is again designed to provide coverage to the general contractor for the window subcontractor’s negligence.

 

Let’s also say that during the subcontractor’s operations or after, an incorrectly installed window simply fell and caused an injury to a person or damage to property other than the window. (Yes, an extreme example!) As a result of the injury / damage, both the general contractor and the window subcontractor get sued. The general contractor will seek indemnification from the window subcontractor and the subcontractor’s CGL policy as an additional insured under the subcontractor’s policy. The reason being is that the general contractor wants to be indemnified by the subcontractor and have the subcontractor’s insurer provide it a defense and coverage because the window fell out due to the subcontractor’s negligence.

 

In this situation, either the window subcontractor’s CGL insurer should provide (pay for) a defense for both the window subcontractor (named insured) and the general contractor (additional insured) subject to the insurer’s reservation of rights. This can be done by the insurer retaining counsel for both the named insured or additional insured or, which may be the case in a multi-party litigation such as a multi-party construction defect case, contributing to the general contractor’s defense.

 

Importantly, in the recent decision of University of Miami v. Great American Insurance Co., 38 Fla. Law Weekly D392a (Fla. 3d DCA 2013), the Third District maintained that where both the named insured and additional insured have been sued in negligence with allegations that both caused the injury / damage to the plaintiff, the insurer (for the named insurer) is required to provide separate defense counsel for each in order to avoid conflicts of interest with one defense counsel. This is done to ensure that the additional insured has independent counsel to represent its interests.

 
Understanding rights of an additional insured is a must for any construction project in order to maximize insurance coverage and indemnification rights.

 

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN A SURETY AND ITS BOND PRINCIPAL

UnknownSureties that issue contractors payment and/or performance bonds obtain indemnity agreements with the contractor, or bond principal, prior to issuing such bonds. These indemnity agreements, besides requiring the bond-principal contractor to indemnify, defend, and hold harmless the surety in the event a claim is submitted on the bonds, are designed to fully protect the surety in the event the contractor fails to do so.

 

There are situations where a surety needs to protect its own interests and comply with the terms of the bond and pay a claim on a performance or payment bond (such as if the contractor gets into financial trouble, walks off a project, is not paying subcontractors, etc.). If the surety pays a claim, they typically assert a claim against the bond-principal contractor for breach of the indemnity agreement along with any person that personally guaranteed the agreement (which is often the case). The indemnity agreement will include a provision that provides that the bond-principal assigns certain collateral to the surety in the event the principal is in default of the agreement. Among those rights that are collaterally assigned to the surety would be all of the principal’s contract rights and causes of action for accounts receivable.

 

The case of Guarantee Co. of North America v. Mercon Construction Co., 2012 WL 1232104 (M.D.Fla 2012), exemplifies a surety’s rights under the indemnity agreement. This case involved a situation where a surety paid a performance bond claim on behalf of its principal contractor and sued the contractor, as well as others, under the indemnity agreement. The surety also exercised its right under the indemnity agreement and settled a claim the contractor had against another payment bond (issued by a different surety). In other words, the surety’s position was that the claim for an account receivable under the other payment bond was collaterally assigned to the surety due to the contractor’s default. The contractor asserted a counterclaim arguing, among other things, that the surety did not have the authority to settle its account receivable payment bond claim. The Middle District disagreed and dismissed the contractor’s counterclaim with prejudice!

 

If a bonded contractor is involved in a situation where its surety either paid a claim or will pay a claim, it is important for the contractor to consult an attorney to understand the surety’s rights under the indemnity agreement. Again, surety’s oftentimes have the indemnity agreement personally guaranteed so that the obligations under the agreement could not only impact the bond-principal contractor but also the guarantors to the agreement.

 

 

 

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

BUTTONING-UP CONTRACTUAL INDEMNIFICATION LANGUAGE

imagesA contractual indemnification provision is one of the most important provisions in construction contracts.   Owners want to be indemnified from the general contractor to the extent a person or entity performing a scope of the general contractor’s work asserts a claim against the owner or a person is injured on the owner’s property.   Likewise, general contractors want their subcontractors to indemnify them to the extent the owner asserts a claim against them arising out of the general contractor’s work or a person or entity performing a scope of the subcontractor’s work asserts a claim against the general contractor.

 

Indemnification (hold harmless) provisions need to be carefully drafted because Florida Statute §725.06 includes a limitation on indemnification for construction contracts.   In short, this statute provides in material part that if a contract requires an indemnitor (such as a subcontractor required to indemnify a general contractor) to indemnify and hold harmless the indemnitee (such as the general contractor receiving the indemnification) “for liability for damages to persons or property caused in whole or in part by any act, omission, or default of the indemnitee…[the indemnification provision] shall be void and unenforceable unless the contract contains a monetary limitation on the extent of the indemnification that bears a reasonable commercial relationship to the contract and is part of the project specifications or bid documents, if any.”   Stated simply, if the indemnification provision does not comply with Florida law, it may be unenforceable – a very bad thing for a party expecting to be indemnified!

 

Recently, the First District Court of Appeal in Griswold Ready Mix Concrete, Inc. v. Reddick, 2012 WL 1216268 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), dealt with the enforceability of an indemnification provision.   In this case, a concrete supplier leased a pump truck (to facilitate pouring concrete). The lease agreement provided that the concrete supplier was to:

 

“(g) To assume all risks and liabilities for and to indemnify Lessor [of the pump truck]…and Lessor’s agents against all claims, actions, suits, penalties, expenses and liabilities, including attorneys fees, whether or not covered by insurance, for (i) loss or damage to the Equipment; (ii) injuries or deaths of any persons; and (ii)[sic] damage to any property, howsoever arising or incurred from or incident to the use, operation or possession of the Equipment, unless such claims, actions, suits, penalties, expenses or liabilities are caused solely by the intentional conduct of the Lessor or its agents.”

 

When concrete was being poured, a construction worker was injured and asserted a claim against the concrete supplier and the lessor of the pump truck. The lessor settled the claim and asserted a claim for contractual indemnification against the concrete supplier based on the contractual language above. Among other arguments, the concrete supplier argued that the indemnification provision was unenforceable under Florida Statute §725.06 because it contained no monetary limitation.

 

Although the trial court found the indemnification provision to be enforceable, the First District disagreed, maintaining, “The indemnity provision at issue in this case does not contain a dollar limit to Griswold’s [concrete supplier] potential liability. For that reason, it is void and unenforceable as provided in section 725.06, and the trial court erred in ruling otherwise.”

 

While this case does not contain a lengthy discussion with respect to the language of the indemnification provision between the concrete supplier and the lessor of the pump truck, it appears clear that the provision required the concrete supplier to indemnify the lessor for the lessor’s potential negligence (i.e., damage or injury caused in whole or in part by any act, omission, or default of the lessor). For this reason, the indemnification provision needed to include a monetary limitation and should have under the law also expressed that it was part of the bid documents or project specifications.

 

This case illustrates the importance of making sure an indemnification provision is properly worded and drafted in accordance with Florida law, especially if you are a contractor or an owner where the indemnification provision is a material portion of the contract. As you can see, not doing so can have the harsh effect of having the indemnification provision declared unenforceable.

 

 

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.