DIFFERING SITE CONDITIONS: TYPE I & TYPE II CLAIMS

imagesIt is not uncommon for contractors, especially foundation and civil contractors, to encounter unanticipated site conditions.  These conditions are known as “differing site conditions.”    In government contracting, there is a differing site conditions clause (F.A.R. 52.236-2 shown at the bottom of this posting that is routinely incorporated into prime contracts and subcontracts through flow-down provisions) that identifies two types of differing site conditions.

 

Type I differing site conditions are “subsurface or latent physical conditions at the site which differ materially from those indicated in the contract.”  F.A.R. 52.236-2.  Type II differing site conditions, on the other hand, are “unknown physical conditions at the site, of an unusual nature, which differ materially from those ordinarily encountered and generally recognized as inhering in work of the character provided for in the contract.”  Id.

 

If a contractor complies with the differing site conditions clause and proves the differing site condition, it should be entitled to an equitable adjustment from the government.  The objective behind the differing site conditions clause is to prevent contractors from including fluff in their prices to account for contingencies and unknown conditions since the government will equitably adjust the contract based on these conditions.  In reality, though, the contractor still bears the burden of proving the differing site condition which is oftentimes more challenging than it sounds.  It is important for contractors to understand the difference between Type I and Type II differing site conditions so that they know what is necessary to support an appropriate adjustment to their contract (from a dollar and time standpoint).

 

 

I. Type I Differing Site Condition (subsurface or latent conditions differing materially from contract):

 

There are six elements to a Type I differing site conditions claim that a contractor must prove:

 

(1) that the contract affirmatively indicated subsurface conditions upon which the contractor’s claims are based; (2) that the plaintiff acted as a reasonably prudent contractor in interpreting the contract documents; (3) that the contractor reasonably relied on the indications of subsurface conditions in the contract; (4) that the subsurface conditions actually encountered differed materially from subsurface conditions indicated in the contract; (5) that the subsurface conditions encountered were reasonably unforeseeable; and (6) that the contractor’s claimed excess costs were solely attributable to the materially different subsurface conditions.”

Weston/Bean Joint Venture v. U.S., 115 Fed.Cl. 215, 218 (Fed.Cl. 2014).

 

These conditions are in addition to the initial notice requirement that the contractor must give the contracting officer before proceeding with the alleged additional work.  See Id. at 218, n.2 citing F.A.R. 52.236-2.  Timely notice should always be given, especially notice before the work commences, to take away any argument that notice was not properly or timely provided to the government.

 

The contractor should also submit any request for equitable adjustment or claim based on the six elements.  This means the contractor needs to point out the subsurface or latent conditions that were indicated in the contract documents and the reasoning / factual basis supporting the different subsurface conditions that the contractor encountered.  This is important because a contractor will not succeed with its Type I differing site conditions claim without showing what the contract indicated. As the United States Court of Federal Claims explained:

 

A contractor cannot prevail on a claim for a Type I differing site condition unless the contract indicated what that condition would be.  However, the indication in the contract need not be explicit or specific if it provide[s] sufficient grounds to justify a bidder’s expectation of latent conditions materially different from those actually encountered. There must be reasonably plain or positive indications in the bid information or contract documents that such subsurface conditions would be otherwise than actually found in contract performance ….  Determining what the contract indicated requires contract interpretation performed by stepping into the shoes of a reasonable and prudent contractor and decid[ing] how such a contractor would act in interpreting the contract documents.”

All Power, Inc. v. U.S., 60 Fed.Cl. 679, 684 (Fed.Cl. 2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

 

The contractor should also endeavor to separately cost code and track its costs (manpower, equipment, subcontractor(s), etc.) solely relating to the differing site condition.

 

 

 

 II. Type II Differing Site Condition (unknown physical conditions at the site differing materially from those ordinarily encountered and generally recognized): 

 

There are three elements to a Type II differing site conditions claim that a contractor must prove: “(1) the condition must be unknown to the contractor; (2) unusual; and (3) materially different from comparable work.”  All Power, 60 Fed.Cl. at 685.  Type II claims are harder to prove because the contractor carries a heavier burden “since there is a greater duty to conduct pre-bid inquiries or reasonable site inspections inasmuch as recovery is available only if the condition is unknown, which means it would not have been revealed upon inquiry or during a reasonable site investigation.”  Totem Construction, ASBCA 35985, 1990 WL 224243 (1990).

 

Similar to a Type I claim, the contractor must provide timely notice and endeavor to separately cost code and track the additional work it incurs in furtherance of supporting a request for equitable adjustment or claim.

 

 

52.236-2 Differing Site Conditions.-                                                                                                                                                                                               
(a) The Contractor shall promptly, and before the conditions
are disturbed, give a written notice to the Contracting
Officer of—
(1) Subsurface or latent physical conditions at the site
which differ materially from those indicated in this contract;
or
(2) Unknown physical conditions at the site, of an
unusual nature, which differ materially from those ordinarily

encountered and generally recognized as inhering in work of
the character provided for in the contract.

(b) The Contracting Officer shall investigate the site conditions
promptly after receiving the notice. If the conditions
do materially so differ and cause an increase or decrease in the
Contractor’s cost of, or the time required for, performing any
part of the work under this contract, whether or not changed
as a result of the conditions, an equitable adjustment shall be
made under this clause and the contract modified in writing
accordingly.
(c) No request by the Contractor for an equitable adjustment
to the contract under this clause shall be allowed, unless
the Contractor has given the written notice required; provided,
that the time prescribed in paragraph (a) of this clause for

giving written notice may be extended by the Contracting Officer.

(d) No request by the Contractor for an equitable adjustment
to the contract for differing site conditions shall be
allowed if made after final payment under this contract.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

FEDERAL CONTRACTING AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT

images-1Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.233-1 (48 CFR 52.233-1) contains a dispute clause that is incorporated into prime contracts for federal construction projects.  This regulation is set forth at the bottom of this article and provides that the prime contract is subject to the Contract Disputes Act (41 U.S.C. s. 7101 en seq.).  The Contract Disputes Act is a vital part of federal contracting.

 

The Contact Disputes Act—containing similar language to FAR 52.233-1—requires prime contractors to submit claims relating to the prime contract in writing to the contracting officer for a decision within six years after the accrual of the claim.  41 USC s. 7103 (a).  Claims of more than $100,000 need to contain a certification that:

 

“(A) the claim is made in good faith;

(B) the supporting data are accurate and complete to the best of the contractor’s knowledge and belief;

(C) the amount requested accurately reflects the contract adjustment for which the contractor believes the Federal Government is liable; and

(D) the certifier is authorized to certify the claim on behalf of the contractor.”

41 USC s. 7103(b). 

 

(It is imperative that the prime contractor not misrepresent or fraudulently submit a certified claim as it could expose the contractor to liability.  41 USC s. 7103(c).)

 

The contracting officer will then render a decision for claims of $100,000 or less within “sixty days from the contracting officer’s receipt of a written request from the contractor that a decision be rendered within that period.”  41 USC s. 7103(f)(1).  With respect to claims of more than $100,000, the contracting officer “shall, within 60 days of receipt of a submitted certified claim…(A) issue a decision; or (B) notify the contractor of the time within which a decision will be issued.”  41 USC s. 7103(f)(2). If the contracting officer notifies the prime contractor that it needs more time to render a decision, which is not uncommon, he/she is simply required to issue a decision within a reasonable period of time factoring in the size and complexity of the claim with the back-up information submitted by the prime contractor.  41 USC s.7103(f)(3).  “Failure by a contracting officer to issue a decision on a claim within the required time is deemed to be a decision by the contracting officer denying the claim and authorizes an appeal or action on the claim….However, the tribunal concerned may, at its option, stay the proceedings of the appeal or action to obtain a decision by the contracting officer.” 41 USC s. 7103(f)(5).

 

Once the contracting officer renders a decision on the claim, this decision is final unless the prime contractor (i) appeals the decision to the applicable agency board within 90 days from the date of receipt of the contracting officer’s decision or (ii) initiate an action in the United States Court of Federal Claims within twelve months from the date of receipt of the contracting officer’s decision. 41 USC s. 7104.

 

 

The opinion in The Hanover Insurance Company v. U.S., 2014 WL 2192148 (Fed.Cl. 2014), illustrates the importance for prime contractors to comply with the Contract Disputes Act and corresponding Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.233-1 (governing disputes and incorporated into the prime contracts) prior to instituting litigation against the federal government.

 

imagesIn this case, the United States Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) engaged a prime contractor to perform work for an Everglades upgrade project.  The Corps default terminated the prime contractor due to issues pertaining to the prime contractor’s dewatering plan.   The Corps made a demand on the prime contractor’s performance bond surety to either complete the balance of the unperformed contract work or tender a new contractor to complete the contract work.  The Corps also denied claims the prime contractor submitted for additional costs relating to the dispute over the dewatering plan (that ultimately led to the default termination).  The performance bond surety tendered a completion contractor and executed a tender and release agreement with the Corps that obligated the surety to pay the Corps many millions of dollars which represented the difference between the amount to be paid to the completion contractor to complete the contract work minus the unpaid balance of the original prime contractor’s contract. The tender and release agreement provided that the prime contractor and surety could ultimately challenge the Corps’ default termination.

 

Subsequently, the prime contractor and its surety filed separate complaints against the federal government in the Court of Federal Claims challenging the default termination.  Ultimately, the prime contractor wanted the Corps’ default termination converted into a termination for convenience; this would, in turn, result in the federal government reimbursing the surety the many millions the surety tendered plus other related costs incurred by the contractor in the performance of the project.  (The prime contractor also sued the federal government to recover its costs tied to the claims it submitted to the Corps relating to the dewatering dispute that the Corps denied.)  These lawsuits were all consolidated.

 

The federal government moved to dismiss the claims for monetary damages asserted by the prime contractor and surety challenging the default termination.  The federal government’s motion was based on the prime contractor and surety’s failure to comply with the Contract Disputes Act. The Court of Federal Claims explained:

 

The CDA [Contract Disputes Act] provides that in the event of a dispute between a contractor and the government ‘relating to a contract,’ all contractor claims are to be submitted in writing to the contracting officer for decision and all government claims are to be the subject of a contracting officer decision.  A claim [under Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.233-1(c)] is ‘a written demand or written assertion by one of the contracting parties seeking, as a matter of right, the payment of money in a sum certain, the adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, or other relief arising under or relating to [the] contract.’  Upon receipt of a claim, the contracting officer must issue a written decision containing his or her reasoning for the outcome and advising the contractor of its right to appeal.  If a contracting officer fails to issue a decision ‘within the period required’ by the statute, the failure is deemed to be a decision denying the claim.  The decision of the contracting officer is final unless the contractor makes an authorized appeal.  A valid claim, a contracting officer’s decision or deemed denial, and a proper appeal are all jurisdictional requirements under the CDA [to file a complaint in the Court of Federal Claims].”

The Hanover Insurance Company, supra, at *4 (internal citations omitted).

 

Neither the prime contractor nor its performance bond surety submitted a claim to the contracting officer due to the default termination in accordance with the Contract Disputes Act.  Based on this failure, the federal government argued that the Court of Federal Claims did not have proper jurisdiction to hear the merits of the dispute.  The Court of Federal Claims agreed and dismissed the claims for lack of jurisdiction stating:

 

In the absence of a final contracting officer decision regarding termination for convenience costs or other money damages related to the default termination,

whether premised on a contractor claim or on a government claim, the court must dismiss the claims for money damages…. This ruling, however, does not foreclose Hanover and Lodge from pursuing these claims. To the contrary, by dismissing these claims for lack of jurisdiction, the court is removing the obstacle preventing the contracting officer from entertaining plaintiffs’ claims for default termination-related money damages.”

The Hanover Insurance Company, supra, at *7.

 

In other words, the prime contractor and surety will need to submit a written claim, await the contracting officer’s obvious denial of the claim, and then re-institute the action in the Court of Federal Claims based on the denial.

 

Since the contracting officer’s decision converting a default termination into a termination for convenience seems fairly transparent, the prime contractor and surety argued, as they should, that it would be futile to comply with the Contract Disputes Act when the contracting officer is going to obviously deny the claim.  Notwithstanding this transparent fact, the Court of Federal Claims relied on case law where a prime contractor sitting in a similar default termination situation was required to submit a claim pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act challenging the default termination in order for the Court of Federal Claims to have jurisdiction.

  

48 CFR 52.233-1

(a) This contract is subject to 41 U.S.C. chapter 71, Contract Disputes.

(b) Except as provided in 41 U.S.C. chapter 71, all disputes arising under or relating to this contract shall be resolved under this clause.

(c) Claim, as used in this clause, means a written demand or written assertion by one of the contracting parties seeking, as a matter of right, the payment of money in a sum certain, the adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, or other relief arising under or relating to this contract. However, a written demand or written assertion by the Contractor seeking the payment of money exceeding $100,000 is not a claim under 41 U.S.C. chapter 71 until certified. A voucher, invoice, or other routine request for payment that is not in dispute when submitted is not a claim under 41 U.S.C. chapter 71. The submission may be converted to a claim under 41 U.S.C. chapter 71, by complying with the submission and certification requirements of this clause, if it is disputed either as to liability or amount or is not acted upon in a reasonable time.

(d)(1) A claim by the Contractor shall be made in writing and, unless otherwise stated in this contract, submitted within 6 years after accrual of the claim to the Contracting Officer for a written decision. A claim by the Government against the Contractor shall be subject to a written decision by the Contracting Officer.

(d)(2)(i) The Contractor shall provide the certification specified in paragraph (d)(2)(iii) of this clause when submitting any claim exceeding $100,000.

(ii) The certification requirement does not apply to issues in controversy that have not been submitted as all or part of a claim.

(iii) The certification shall state as follows: “I certify that the claim is made in good faith; that the supporting data are accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief; that the amount requested accurately reflects the contract adjustment for which the Contractor believes the Government is liable; and that I am authorized to certify the claim on behalf of the Contractor.”

(3) The certification may be executed by any person authorized to bind the Contractor with respect to the claim.

(e) For Contractor claims of $100,000 or less, the Contracting Officer must, if requested in writing by the Contractor, render a decision within 60 days of the request. For Contractor-certified claims over $100,000, the Contracting Officer must, within 60 days, decide the claim or notify the Contractor of the date by which the decision will be made.

(f) The Contracting Officer’s decision shall be final unless the Contractor appeals or files a suit as provided in 41 U.S.C. chapter 71.

(g) If the claim by the Contractor is submitted to the Contracting Officer or a claim by the Government is presented to the Contractor, the parties, by mutual consent, may agree to use alternative dispute resolution (ADR). If the Contractor refuses an offer for ADR, the Contractor shall inform the Contracting Officer, in writing, of the Contractor’s specific reasons for rejecting the offer.

(h) The Government shall pay interest on the amount found due and unpaid from (1) the date that the Contracting Officer receives the claim (certified, if required); or (2) the date that payment otherwise would be due, if that date is later, until the date of payment. With regard to claims having defective certifications, as defined in (FAR) 48 CFR 33.201, interest shall be paid from the date that the Contracting Officer initially receives the claim. Simple interest on claims shall be paid at the rate, fixed by the Secretary of the Treasury as provided in the Act, which is applicable to the period during which the Contracting Officer receives the claim and then at the rate applicable for each 6–month period as fixed by the Treasury Secretary during the pendency of the claim.

(i) The Contractor shall proceed diligently with performance of this contract, pending final resolution of any request for relief, claim, appeal, or action arising under the contract, and comply with any decision of the Contracting Officer.

 

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

 

 

 

LIQUIDATED DAMAGES PROVISIONS IN SUBCONTRACTS (PARTICULARLY SUBCONTRACTS FOR PUBLIC PROJECTS)

imagesThe assessment of liquidated damages should be a consideration to contractors on all projects, specifically public (federal and state) projects where the prime contract routinely contains a liquidated damages provision for delays to the completion of the project.  Many times, the subcontract will contain a provision that will allow the prime contractor to pass-through liquidated damages assessed by the government (owner) to the responsible subcontractor.  Well, what if the government did not assess liquidated damages?  Can the prime contractor still assess liquidated damages against a responsible subcontractor in accordance with the subcontract?  The opinion in U.S. f/u/b/o James B. Donahey, Inc. v. Dick Corp., 2010 WL 4666747 (N.D.Fla. 2010), would allow a prime contractor to assess liquidated damages against a subcontractor even if the government did not assess liquidated damages against the prime contractor.

 

In this case, a prime contractor entered into a contract to design and build four buildings at the Pensacola Navy Station and provided a Miller Act payment bond.  The prime contractor hired a subcontractor to perform the plumbing and mechanical work.   Due to delays the general contractor believed were caused by the subcontractor, it withheld substantial payment from the subcontractor.  The prime contractor contended that the subcontractor caused 63 days of delay to the occupancy of the Visitors Quarters building and 32 days of delay to the Aviation Rescue Swimmers School building.  The subcontract provided that in the event of delays, liquidated damages would be assessed in the amount of $5,400 per day for delay to the Aviation Rescue Swimmers School and $24,898 per day for delay to the Visitors Quarters.

 

 

The subcontractor filed a Miller Act lawsuit against the prime contractor and its surety (amongst other causes of actions).  The prime contractor filed a counterclaim based on the liquidated damages that it assessed against the subcontractor, an amount in excess of what it was withholding.  The subcontractor moved for summary judgment arguing that the liquidated damages provision was unenforceable (and the prime contractor could not assess liquidated damages) because the provision was a pass-through provision; thus, because the government did not assess liquidated damages against the prime contractor, the prime contractor could not assess liquidated damages against the subcontractor.  The subcontractor further argued that the liquidated damages provision is unenforceable because it is being treated as a penalty because the subcontractor is not being provided the benefit of extensions of time granted by the government to the prime contractor that would negate delays.   The prime contractor countered that nothing in the subcontract stated that liquidated damages could only operate as a pass-through claim, that being that the government had to assess liquidated damages before the prime contractor could assess liquidated damages against the subcontractor.  The prime contractor further countered that the extensions of time granted by the government were irrelevant since they did not pertain to the subcontractor’s scope of work or affect the subcontractor’s milestone completion dates.

 

 

The Northern District of Florida agreed with the prime contractor and denied the subcontractor’s motion for summary judgment because it found the liquidated damages provision enforceable.  The Northern District explained as it pertained to the subcontractor’s Miller Act payment bond claim:

 

In considering a Miller Act claim, the trier of fact must thus look to the subcontract to determine the amount due. ‘[I]f the subcontract provides for a condition precedent to payment, or a part thereof, which is not fulfilled, the subcontractor cannot recover labor and material expenditures against the surety on the payment bond.’ In other words, if there has been a default by the subcontractor, the general contractor may assert recoupment or setoff as a defense. Because there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the timeliness of Donaghey’s [subcontractor] performance and, therefore, Donaghey’s entitlement to the amounts withheld by Dick [prime contractor], summary judgment is inappropriate as to Donaghey’s Miller Act claim.”

Dick Corporation, 2010 WL at *3 quoting U.S. f/u/b/o Harrington v. Trione, 97 F.Supp. 522, 527 (D.C.Colo. 1951).

 

Stated differently, the Miller Act payment bond surety was entitled to rely on the prime contractor’s assessment of liquidated damages as a set-off  / recoupment defense  to the subcontractor’s Miller Act claim.  Also, if there were other conditions precedent that the subcontractor failed to comply with, the Miller Act surety would be entitled to many of these defenses as well.

 

 

Unknown-1The Northern District further maintained that a liquidated damages provision under Florida law will be enforceable if the provision does not operate as a penalty, meaning damages upon a breach must not be readily ascertainable at the time of the contract and must not be grossly disproportionate to any damages reasonably expected to follow from the breachDick Corporation, 2010 WL at *4 quoting Mineo v. Lakeside Village of Davie, LLC, 983 So.2d 20, 21 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). The Court held that the liquidated damages provision did not operate as a penalty and it was not intended to operate only as a pass-through mechanism.  See, e.g., U.S. f/u/b/o Sunbeam Equip. Corp.  v. Commercial Constr. Corp., 741 F.2d 326, 328 (11th Cir. 1984) (“The fact that the Navy did not assess liquidated damages as such against Commercial [prime contractor], would not foreclose recovery of delay damages, if Commercial could demonstrate that damages arising out of the subcontract with Sunbeam [subcontractor] were not otherwise compensated.”)

 

There are three important take-aways from this opinion:

 

  • Liquidated damages provisions in subcontracts can operate as more than a pass-through provision for liquidated damages assessed by the government (owner).  These provisions can operate as a mechanism to assess liquidated damages against the subcontractor even if the government / owner has not assessed liquidated damages against the prime contractor.  Prime contractors and subcontractors need to keep this in mind when drafting and negotiating liquidated damages provisions.  If the intent is for the provision to only operate as a pass-through provision, this intent should be clearly stated in the subcontract.  If the intent is for it to operate more than as a pass-through provision, then this risk needs to be considered by the subcontractor.

 

  • Liquidated damages are typically going to be deemed enforceable if they are not intended to operate as a penalty.

 

  • A Miller Act payment bond surety will be entitled to rely on set-off / recoupment affirmative defenses contained within the subcontract including, without limitation, the prime contractor’s assessment of liquidated damages or other delay damages against the subcontractor pursuant to the subcontract.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

TERMINATION FOR CONVENIENCE IN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS

imagesCAT7YPFETermination for convenience clauses are standard (and required) contractual clauses in federal government contracts and will be read into the contract even if not specifically incorporated. See G.L. Christian and Assocs. v. U.S., 160 Ct.Cl. 1 (Ct.Cl. 1963).  The clause allows the government to terminate the contract at its discretion if it is in the government’s interest to do so.  Yet, even though the government (through the contracting officer) has discretion to exercise the termination for convenience provision, it cannot do so with “bad faith” or with an “abuse of discretion”, although proving that that the government acted in bad faith or abused its discretion is extremely challenging because government officials are presumed to act in good faith. See T&M Distributors, Inc. v. U.S., 185 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  The Court of Federal Claims explained this challenging legal standard to establish that the government improperly exercised its termination for convenience provision:

 

 

The Federal Circuit—and the former Court of Claims—have recognized that an improper termination for convenience may give rise to a breach of contract claim when the agency (1) terminates the contract in bad faith or (2) abuses its discretion in its decision to terminate the contract. If a contractor can demonstrate that the agency’s termination for convenience was improper, the contractor will not be limited to damages identified in the termination for convenience clause. In such a case, traditional common law damages for breach of contract will be available to the contractor.

***

Contractors face a high burden of proof for demonstrating an agency acted in “bad faith” by terminating the contract for convenience. To establish a breach based on bad faith in this context, the contractor must present clear and convincing evidence that the government’s termination was made with the “intent to injure” the contractor.

***

In determining whether the CO clearly “abused its discretion” in terminating a contract for convenience, the court will consider four factors: (1) the CO’s bad faith, (2) the reasonableness of the decision, (3) the amount of discretion delegated to the CO, and (4) any violations of an applicable statute or regulation.”  TigerSwan, Inc. v. U.S., 110 Fed.Cl. 336, 345 (Fed.Cl. 2013) (internal citations omitted).

 

One instance of bad faith / abuse of discretion could arise if the government terminates the contractor simply to acquire a better bargain or price from another contractor.  See Krygoski Const. Co., Inc. v. U.S., 94 F.3d 1537, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A contracting officer may not terminate for convenience in bad faith, for example, simply to acquire a better bargain from another source.”).  Another instance of bad faith / abuse of discretion may exist if the government contracts with a party knowing full well that it has no intent to honor the terms of the contract. See Torncello v. U.S., 231 Ct.Cl. 20 (Ct.Cl. 1982).

 

This bad faith / abuse of discretion component to the exercise of termination of convenience provisions may also be applied if a prime contractor terminates a subcontractor on a federal project.  See Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 1999) (explaining that if subcontractor proved termination was in bad faith it could have recovered breach of contract damages).

 

 

An example of standard termination for convenience language for fixed sum contracts is included in the Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 CFR 52.249-2:

 

“(a) The Government may terminate performance of work under this contract in whole or, from time to time, in part if the Contracting Officer determines that a termination is in the Government’s interest. The Contracting Officer shall terminate by delivering to the Contractor a Notice of Termination specifying the extent of termination and the effective date.” (See also 48 CFR 52.249-6 which provides for standard termination for convenience language for cost-reimbursement contracts).

 

The termination for convenience language in the Federal Acquisition Regulations is substantially longer than what was provided above, but the point is that the government can simply terminate for convenience if it is in its interest.

 

When a fixed sum contract is terminated for convenience, the contract “is essentially converted into a cost reimbursement contract.”  White Buffalo Const., Inc. v. U.S., 52 Fed.Cl. 1, 3 (Fed.Cl. 2002).   The Federal Acquisition Regulations–sections noted above–govern what costs a contractor is entitled to recover when the contract is terminated for convenience.  Basically, “[t]he clause limits the contractor’s recovery to costs incurred prior to the termination, a reasonable profit on the work performed, and certain additional costs associated with the termination. Anticipatory profits and consequential damages are not recoverable.” Best Foam Fabricators, Inc. v. U.S., 38 Fed.Cl. 627, 637-38 (Fed.Cl. 197).  Thus, when a contact is terminated for convenience, the contractor cannot recover anticipated profits on the balance or unperformed part of the construction work.  To recover these damages, the contractor will need to argue that the government breached the contract by exercising the termination for convenience provision in bad faith or with an abuse of discretion. These damages are a major reason why a contractor would argue that the government wrongly exercised the termination for convenience provision.  See TigerSwan, 110 Fed.Cl. at 345.

 

If a contractor on a federal project is terminated for convenience or believes it will be terminated for convenience in the immediate future, it is imperative for that contractor to seek counsel to determine its rights.  These rights can include assistance in determining the recoverable costs under the Federal Acquisition Regulations and whether to pursue breach of contract damages for a wrongful termination for convenience for damages that would not be covered under the Federal Acquisition Regulations.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

 

 

TIME EXTENSIONS FOR “UNUSUALLY SEVERE WEATHER” ON FEDERAL PROJECTS

imagesWhat do you do if you encounter unusually severe weather? A time extension for unusually severe weather conditions is set forth under the default clause (such as 48 CFR 52.249-10) included in federal government construction contracts.

 

The clause typically provides in pertinent part:

 

“(a) If the Contractor refuses or fails to prosecute the work or any separable part, with the diligence that will insure its completion within the time specified in this contract including any extension, or fails to complete the work within this time, the Government may, by written notice to the Contractor, terminate the right to proceed with the work (or the separable part of the work) that has been delayed. In this event, the Government may take over the work and complete it by contract or otherwise, and may take possession of and use any materials, appliances, and plant on the work site necessary for completing the work. The Contractor and its sureties shall be liable for any damage to the Government resulting from the Contractor’s refusal or failure to complete the work within the specified time, whether or not the Contractor’s right to proceed with the work is terminated. This liability includes any increased costs incurred by the Government in completing the work.

(b) The Contractor’s right to proceed shall not be terminated nor the Contractor charged with damages under this clause, if

(1) The delay in completing the work arises from unforeseeable causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the Contractor. Examples of such causes include (i) acts of God or of the public enemy, (ii) acts of the Government in either its sovereign or contractual capacity, (iii) acts of another Contractor in the performance of a contract with the Government, (iv) fires, (v) floods, (vi) epidemics, (vii) quarantine restrictions, (viii) strikes, (ix) freight embargoes, (x) unusually severe weather, or (xi) delays of subcontractors or suppliers at any tier arising from unforeseeable causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of both the Contractor and the subcontractors or suppliers; and

(2) The Contractor, within 10 days from the beginning of any delay (unless extended by the Contracting Officer), notifies the Contracting Officer in writing of the causes of delay. The Contracting Officer shall ascertain the facts and the extent of delay. If, in the judgment of the Contracting Officer, the findings of fact warrant such action, the time for completing the work shall be extended. The findings of the Contracting Officer shall be final and conclusive on the parties, but subject to appeal under the Disputes clause.” 

48 CFR 52.249-10; see also 48 CFR 52.249-14 (regarding unusually severe weather as an excusable delay).

 

As reflected above, unusually severe weather is an excusable delay that will entitle the contractor to additional time to peform, but not additional compensation. However, not every weather event amounts to unusually severe weather. In order to be entitled to an extension of time for weather conditions, the contractor must produce evidence of the unusually severe weather event that it contends entitles it to additional time to perform. Edge Const. Co., Inc. v. U.S., 95 Fed. Cl. 407, 420 (Fed.Cl. 2010). “Unusually severe weather must be construed to mean adverse weather which at the time of year in which it occurred is unusual for the place in which it occurred. This condition is not established simply because weather charts may indicate that on a certain day the precipitation is greater than on some other days in some other year, since variance in weather patters is to be expected.” Broome Const., Inc. v. U.S., 492 F.2d 829, 835 (Ct.Cl. 1974). “Thus, unusually severe weather is determined based on a comparison of the conditions experienced by the contractor and the weather conditions of prior years.” Edge Const., 95 Fed.Cl. at 420.  Without proving that unusually severe weather impacted performance, the “delay was anticipated and agreed to by the parties…the Government [owner] is not obligated to anticipate acts of God and abnormal conditions that might interfere with contract performance. It is supposed that bidders allow for this in their bids.” Broome Const., 492 F.2d at 835.

 

Proving that there was unusually severe weather oftentimes requires providing weather data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”) (sometimes in conjunction with expert testimony). NOAA is a federal agency that maintains past weather data and generates future weather forecasts. Sometimes there is an actual weather clause in the contract that provides baseline weather conditions for the project location obtained from NOAA to be used as a baseline for weather time evaluations.

 

The key is that if a contractor experiences an unusually severe weather condition that impacts its performance, it has the burden to support this weather condition (again, typically with data from NOAA) and timely notify the government / owner of the weather condition. A major reason to do this is that the contractor will want the time extension in order to extend the substantial completion date of the project which is the date that triggers the government’s assessment of liquidated damages if the contract is not substantially completed / performed by a specified date.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

THE CARDINAL CHANGE DOCTRINE

imagesThe cardinal change doctrine is a doctrine that originated from government contract work in the United States Court of Federal Claims and, until recently, was not really discussed or applied in a Florida case. This changed when the Southern District of Florida in Hartford Casualty Insurance Co. v. City of Marathon, 825 F.Supp.2d 1276 (S.D. Fla. 2011), applying Florida law, discussed the cardinal change doctrine and used it to relieve a performance bond surety of obligations under a performance bond. While the specific facts of this case will not be discussed in detail, the Court’s discussion of the cardinal change doctrine will be because it is a doctrine that contractors on very difficult projects (i.e., completed project is substantially different than original plans, there were never-ending or wholesale, material changes, and the completed project cost substantially more than original contract amount) may want to argue under.

 

In this case, the Court held:

 

To determine whether a change order is outside the general scope of the underlying construction contract so as to qualify as a cardinal change, courts look to the following factors:

 

(i) whether there is a significant change in the magnitude of work to be performed; (ii) whether the change is designed to procure a totally different item or drastically alter the quality, character, nature or type of work contemplated by the original contract; and (iii) whether the cost of the work ordered greatly exceeds the original contract cost.”

 

City of Marathon, 825 F.Supp.2d at 1286 citing Becho, Inc. v. United States, 47 Fed.Cl. 595, 601 (Fed.Cl.2000).

 

The Court expressed that these factors are all fact-intensive analyzed on a case-by-case basis and the party utilizing this doctrine must prove the factors with particularity. Id. citing PCL Const. Serv., Inc. v. United States, 47 Fed.Cl. 745, 804 (Fed.Cl. 2000).

 

Regarding the first factor—whether there is a significant change in the magnitude of work to be performed—the Court will look to see whether the completed project is substantially different than the project called for in the original plans and specifications. Id. citing Wunderlich Contracting Co. v. United States, 173 Ct.Cl. 180 (1965). For instance, in City of Marathon, the Court found this factor applied because the government gave the contractor a change order that added a new water treatment plant to the contract that was to be built on a separate location with different plans and specifications. Additionally, the cost of the new water treatment plant was more than 100% of the contract amount.

 

Regarding the second factor—whether the change is designed to procure a totally different item or drastically alter the quality, character, nature or type of work contemplated by the original contract—the Court will look to see whether the change is contemplated by the contract. City of Marathon, supra, citing Becho, 47, Fed.Cl. at 601. In City of Marathon, the Court found that while the contract contemplated changes (as most construction contracts do), the magnitude of the change from both a scope and cost standpoint was not contemplated.

 

And, regarding the third and last factor—whether the cost of the work ordered greatly exceeds the original contract cost—the Court will look to see the total increase of the original contract amount due to the change or changes. In this regard, the Court noted that increases of the original contract amount of 100% or more tend to suggest a cardinal change whereas increases less than this percentage tend not to. In City of Marathon, as previously stated, the change increased the original contact amount by more than 100%, thus satisfying this factor.

 

Although the application of this doctrine carries a heavy burden, there are certain projects where it may apply. Contractors that end up constructing a project substantially different then the plans and specifications their contract is based on which results in extensive change orders / wholesale, material changes and massive cost increases may, depending on the circumstance, want to argue under this doctrine in order to circumvent harsh contractual provisions to recoup their costs, etc. for performing additional work.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.