When drafting agreements, the language matters. This is because agreements are not intended to be construed in a vacuum. Sections of an agreement are not to be interpreted in isolation. Agreements are intended to be constructed in the context of the ENTIRE agreement. This is why there is tremendous value in the drafting of the agreement and the negotiation of the agreement. Neglecting this value can bring a large number of headaches, headaches that cost money and lead to undesirable consequences.
When drafting agreements, it has become routine to include prefatory clauses. Sometimes, these are known as the “Wherefore clauses,” that setup up the stage of the agreement before the numbered sections or paragraphs kick in. These Wherefore clauses show up in contracts and settlement agreements, and they matter.
In a recent case, City of Gainesville v. Parkwood Alachua Land Investments, Inc., 2025 WL 2792459 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025), the issue on appeal was contract interpretation, and particularly the Wherefore clauses. Indeed, this is how the First Ditrict began its opinion:
This is a breach-of-contract case. When we are called to assess a trial court’s enforcement of a contract’s terms, as we are here, the supreme court tells us that we are “bound by the plain meaning of the contract’s text.” One or more provisions in a contract’s text, however, “cannot be viewed in isolation from the full textual context of which they are a part.” Rather, “proper interpretation requires consideration of ‘the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts.’ ” This is so because “the goal of interpretation is to arrive at a fair reading of the text by determining the application of the text to given facts on the basis of how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood the text at the time it was issued.” “Context is a primary determinant of meaning.”
At issue here is whether initial paragraphs in the parties’ contract—paragraphs that do not define either party’s rights or obligations—can still be used to provide context governing the meaning of otherwise plain text appearing under the City of Gainesville’s (as the going concern known as Gainesville Regional Utilities, or “GRU”) specified obligation to pay rebate fees to the developer Parkwood Alachua Land Investments, Inc. (“Parkwood”), when certain conditions precedent occur. There was a bench trial, after which the judge applied the operative text literally, without considering the prefatory language for context, and rendered judgment against GRU for money due under the contract. GRU argues a different plain meaning of the text, basing its reading on the clear purpose of the whole contract, which is spelled out by introductory (or prefatory) language. Following the supreme court’s lead regarding “whole text,” or contextual, application of statutory and contractual provisions, we agree with GRU and reverse.
City of Gainesville, supra (internal citations omitted.)
As you can tell from the start of this opinion, the First District reversed because the trial court did not apply meaning or application to the Wherefore clauses. The contract itself, here, does not matter. What matters is that contract interpretation requires a review of the entire contract, not just sections in isolation. See City of Gainesville, supra (“Our objective ‘is to ascertain the meaning and intent of the parties as expressed in the language used.” As mentioned in the beginning, when we do so, we cannot read a textual provision in isolation-something the trial court erroneously did here.’) (citation omitted). Here, the trial court did not consider the Wherefore clauses, and this was a big no-no the First District:
In construing the [Agreement], the trial judge zeroed in on paragraphs nine and ten and expressly read them without considering the prefatory text or the circumstances surrounding the contract’s execution. The judge explained in her order that the prefatory text “may not be relied upon if they will cause ambiguity in an otherwise unambiguous contract.” This approach incorrectly treated the question of ambiguity as strictly binary—so making the decision whether to look at any other text in the contract at all wholly dependent on whether the text in question, by itself, is ambiguous in the first place. Construction canons are not to operate this way. “Viewed properly as rules of thumb or guides to interpretation, rather than as inflexible rules,” these canons “can aid the interpretive process from beginning to end,” so “[i]t would be a mistake to think that … interpreters [must] make a threshold determination of whether a term has a ‘plain’ or ‘clear’ meaning in isolation, without considering the statutory context and without the aid of whatever canons might shed light on the interpretive issues in dispute.”
City of Gainesville, supra (internal citations omitted).
Remember, the language in contracts matter, including language uses in the prefatory Wherefore clauses.
Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.