imagesMany construction contracts contain arbitration provisions.  Instead of litigating a dispute arising out of the contract, the parties will arbitrate the dispute per the arbitration provision.  There are advantages to arbitration and certain disputes bode well for arbitration.  The key is you want to make sure you select the RIGHT arbitrator or arbitrators.  Do your homework regarding the arbitrator list presented to you by, say, the American Arbitration Association.  Strike out those on the list that either do not have the requisite experience you need to decide the dispute or you believe they are not going to be impartial.  For instance, if you want an arbitrator that you think will specifically follow the letter of the law or the precise terms of a contract, select those on the list that meet this requirement; strike out others that do not.  The same philosophy would apply if you want an arbitrator to have specific factual knowledge or a factual understanding regarding a driving issue in the dispute.  Do not neglect the homework required to select –or try to select — the arbitrator you believe is the most qualified to understand the issues.


Now, why is this important?  It is important because you need to arbitrate a dispute with the understanding that the arbitrator’s award (decision) is FINAL.  There are no appellate rights.  None.  Vacating an arbitrator’s award is very challenging and the bases to vacate an award are limited and, most of the time, will NOT apply.


In a recent decision, a party tried to vacate an arbitration award.  One of the arguments was that the arbitration panel failed to follow  Florida law.   Well, guess what?  An arbitrator does not necessarily have to comply with Florida law.  Legal error by an arbitration panel is not a basis to vacate an arbitration award.  See Managed Care Ins. Consultants, Inc. v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 42 Fla. L. Weekly D1599b (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).


Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.


shutterstock_17206660Buying a new home from a homebuilder is an exciting time.  How could you not be excited about buying and moving into a new home?   It is a big milestone.  When buying a new home from a homebuilder, it is common that you are provided a limited warranty agreement to sign that outlines your rights if there is a “warranty” claim, the length of the warranty period, what constitutes a valid warranty claim, and includes an arbitration provision requiring you to arbitrate claims arising out of the agreement or home.  It is also common that such limited warranty agreement contains important disclaiming language.  Homeowners should always consider what they sign, but the reality is that most homeowners are going to absolutely sign what the homebuilder wants them to sign (and the homebuilder may even be unwilling to sell a home without certain signatures that offsets their risks).   


A recent case, Anderson v. Taylor Morrison of Florida, Inc., 42 Fla. L. Weekly D1232a (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), potentially changes certain business practices of a large homebuilder, and perhaps many homebuilders, when the arbitration provision in its limited warranty agreement was deemed void against public policy.  The homebuilder’s limited warranty agreement is likely a standard form agreement that all of its homeowners sign with identical language.  Thus, this ruling impacts not only the enforceability of the arbitration provision in this case, but of any claim by a homeowner that signed the same limited warranty agreement.  This is certainly not what the homebuilder wanted when it thought it was containing disputes to arbitration and not litigation.


In this case, homeowners sued the homebuilder years after completion for a defect in the stucco system of their home.  One of the claims was a statutory violation of building code claim.  The homebuilder moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the limited warranty agreement that contained in material portion:


This Dispute Settlement provision sets forth the exclusive remedy for all disputes, claims or controversies arising out of, or in any manner related to, this Warranty or any alleged issues in your home or property. All disputes, claims or controversies which cannot be resolved between TM [the Builder] and you shall be submitted by you, not later than ninety (90) days after the expiration of the applicable warranty period, to the American Arbitration Association (“Arbitrator”) for resolution in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Arbitrator. The final decision of the Arbitrator shall be binding on all parties and shall include final decisions relating to enforcement of the terms and provisions of this Warranty. 




The trial court compelled arbitration per the limited warranty agreement.  On appeal, however, the Second District Court reversed finding that the arbitration provision was unenforceable against public policy because it prohibited the homeowners from pursing a statutory building code violation claim (i.e., that the stucco system was not installed as required by the governing building code).  See Anderson, supra (“The arbitration provision in the Warranty indicates that all issues related to the Warranty, the home, or the property are to be arbitrated. But read in context with other provisions in the Warranty, particularly the disclaimer provision, it is evident that the alleged building code violations cannot be remedied through arbitration because the claims are not covered by the Warranty and all non-Warranty claims are waived… Simply put, the arbitration provision here effectively limits the Andersons’ [homeowner] remedies to Warranty claims, as defined in the documents, and does not just substantially diminish the Andersons’ statutory remedy for a violation of the building code but totally eliminates it.”). 



Here, the import of the issue, in my opinion, is not necessarily the arbitration provision, but the capitalized disclaiming language that ultimately operates to disclaim liability for latent defects – or defects not readily observable, particularly at the time of closing.  A latent defect is a defect oftentimes discovered beyond the warranty period.  A warranty period really pertains to the period where the contractor or builder agrees to show back up to the property to address post-punchlist related items.  When this period expires (whether it is a contractual warranty period or statutory warranty period in the case of condominiums) does not mean a homeowner no longer has any recourse.  That recourse is based on whether the defect is a latent defect.    The disclaiming language in the limited warranty agreement limits a homeowner’s remedies for certain latent defects.  When this language is read in conjunction with the arbitration provision, the homeowner is waiving rights for claims unrelated to true warranty claims, such as a statutory building code violation claim, while agreeing to arbitrate “permissible” claims under the limited warranty agreement arising out of the home.   This has the effect of preventing homeowners from arbitrating certain, valid claims.


It is uncertain how a trial court or appellate court will treat such disclaiming language other than any dispute arising out of the home needs to be litigated and not arbitrated.


Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.


imagesStrategy is important.  This is especially true if you are trying to avoid arbitration.  In a recent federal district court case, a subcontractor sued the prime contractor and the Miller Act payment bond surety.  The subcontractor, however, had an arbitration provision in its subcontract with the prime contractor.  The prime contractor moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the subcontract and moved to stay the subcontractor’s Miller Act payment bond claim.  The last thing, and I mean the last thing, the subcontractor wanted to do was to stay its claim against the Miller Act payment bond.  However, the district court compelled the subcontractor’s claim against the prime contractor to arbitration and stayed the subcontractor’s Miller Act payment bond claim pending the outcome of the arbitration.  See U.S. v. International Fidelity Ins. Co., 2017 WL 495614 (S.D.Al.  2017).  This is not what the subcontractor wanted. 


The outcome of this ruling may have been different if the subcontractor never sued the prime contractor and only sued the Miller Act payment bond surety.  The Miller Act payment bond surety did not move to compel the Miller Act claim to arbitration evidently meaning there was nothing in the subcontract that would support such an argument.  Had only the Miler Act payment bond surety been sued, the subcontractor may have likely been able to proceed with its payment dispute against the surety in federal district court without having to worry about arbitrating the same dispute with the prime contractor. 


Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.


imagesAs you know from prior postings, arbitration is a creature of contract.  Hence, if you want your disputes to be resolved through arbitration, as opposed to litigation, make sure to include an arbitration provision in your agreement that covers all disputes arising out of or relating to the agreement


Under certain circumstances, a non-signatory to an agreement wants to invoke an arbitration clause in the agreement.   The non-signatory will move to compel a signatory to the agreement (with an arbitration provision) to arbitrate a dispute with the non-signatory.  Can a non-signatory do this?   Yes, under certain circumstances. 


This issue was raised by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal’s ruling in Kroma Makeup EU, LLC v. Boldface Licensing + Branding, Inc., 2017 F.3d 192690 (11th Cir. 2017).   In this case, a defendant moved to compel arbitration based on a licensing agreement it was not a party too.  The Eleventh Circuit explained that Florida’s doctrine of equitable estoppel gives a non-signatory an argument in certain circumstances that it can invoke an arbitration provision in a contract it is not a signatory too:


Under that doctrine [of equitable estoppel], a defendant who is a non-signatory to an agreement containing an arbitration clause can force arbitration of a signatory’s claims when “the signatory … must rely on the terms of the written agreement in asserting its claims against the nonsignatory.…” A non-signatory, however, cannot invoke the doctrine to compel arbitration of claims that are not within the scope of the arbitration clause. Equitable estoppel does not allow a nonsignatory to an agreement to alter and expand an arbitration clause that would not otherwise cover the claims asserted.

Kroma Makeup, supra, at *2 (internal citations omitted). 


This ultimately means the non-signatory must show 1) the signatory is relying on the underlying contract (with the arbitration provision) to assert claims and 2) the scope of the arbitration provision in the contract covers the dispute.  The non-signatory news to show both to compel arbitration.


In Kroma Makeup, although the defendant was being sued based on issues relating to the underlying contract, the arbitration provision in the contract stated that “the Parties agree that the disputes arising between them concerning the validity, interpretation, termination or performance” of the Agreement will be arbitrated.”  However, the defendant was not a “party” to the agreement; thus, the scope of the arbitration provision did not cover the dispute at-issue.


Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.