MAKE SURE YOU HAVE THE SUBCONTRACTOR EXCEPTION TO THE “YOUR WORK” EXCLUSION

Posted on February 15, 2016February 15, 2016 by Edward Garber

I previously discussed the importance of the subcontractor exception to the “your work” exclusion in CGL policies (exclusion l) for contractors and subcontractors that subcontract out scopes of work. Without this exception, the CGL policy provides minimal (and I mean minimal) coverage for property damage associated with construction defects. If you are involved in construction, you categorically need to make sure there is a subcontractor exception to the “your work” exclusion in your CGL policy. The subcontractor exception to the “your work” exclusion is the language bolded below that negates the application of the exclusion:

This insurance does not apply to:

l. Damage to Your Work

“Property damage” to “your work” arising out of it or any part of it and included in the “products-completed operations hazard”.

This exclusion does not apply if the damaged work or the work out of which the damage arises was performed on your behalf by a subcontractor.

The Middle District in Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Elite Homes, Inc., 2016 WL 409577 (M.D.Fla. 2016) recently issued an opinion involving the application of the “your work” exclusion in a homebuilder’s CGL policy that did not have the subcontractor exception (the language bolded above). Ouch!!!! Without this exception, the policy excluded from coverage “property damage to your work arising out of it or any part of it and included in the products-completed operations hazard.” Elite Homes, supra, at *2. But again,there was no subcontractor exception that negated the application of this provision to work performed by a subcontractor.

What is the impact of not having the subcontractor exception to the “your work” exclusion? This case explains. The owners sued the homebuilder for water intrusion and damage from window defects. The complaint alleged that the leaky window(s) caused damage to drywall, insulation, interior finishes, wood frame, and sheathing. The homebuilder’s CGL insurer denied the homebuilder a defense and coverage based on the “your work” exclusion—the owner alleged damage to the homebuilder’s work (the structure of the home) but nothing else. The Middle District concurred that the water damage alleged in the owner’s complaint arose out of the homebuilder’s work and was damage to the homebuilder’s work (the home). Hence, the “your work” exclusion barred coverage for the owner’s construction defect lawsuit against the homebuilder.

This opinion is painful because it illustrates the non-value the CGL policy provided to the homebuilder for property damage associated with defective windows. This outcome was the result of a CGL policy that eliminated the subcontractor exception to the “your work” exclusion. If the policy had this subcontractor exception, then there would have been coverage for the water damage caused by the defective windows and the homebuilder’s CGL insurer would have been obligated to defend the homebuilder in the owner’s lawsuit. The homebuilder would have been able to say that it hired a glazer (subcontractor) that performed the window installation and the glazer’s defective window installation caused damage to other subcontractors’ work.

Make sure to review your CGL policy. If you do not have the subcontractor exception to the “your work” exclusion, the outcome in this case could likely be the outcome in your case dealing with property damage caused by defective construction. Consult with your insurance broker because this subcontractor exception to the “your work” exclusion is a must in construction!

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

QUICK NOTE: HAVE YOU SEEN THE “SEPARATION OF INSUREDS” PROVISION IN YOUR CGL POLICY?

Posted on February 14, 2016August 1, 2020 by Edward Garber

Have you ever looked at your CGL policy and seen the “Separation of Insureds” provision? You must have seen it but perhaps it does not ring a bell. If you are an additional insured under another’s policy or have additional insured under your policy, this is an important provision. Check out this article to understand the application of the “Separation of Insureds” provision in your CGL policy.

CGL INSURER LIABLE FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES JUDGMENT AGAINST INSURED

Posted on January 3, 2016January 3, 2016 by Edward Garber

Commercial general liability (CGL) policies contain a section called “Supplementary Payments – Coverages A and B.” This section states in relevant part:

1. We [insurer] will pay, with respect to any claim we investigate or settle, or any “suit” against an insured we defend:

e. All costs taxed against the insured in the “suit.”

In the recent decision, Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Treace, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D60c (Fla. 5^th DCA 2015), an owner obtained a judgment against its contractor in a construction defect case. The court then entered a judgment for attorney’s fees and costs in favor of the owner. The owner then initiated a proceeding against the contractor’s CGL insurer to recover the judgments. The trial court refused to allow the owner to recover its attorney’s fees against the insurer and the owner appealed. On appeal, the Fifth District examined the above language in the contractor’s CGL policy that said the insurer would pay for “[a]ll costs taxed against the insured in the ‘suit.’” In examining this language, the court found that the language “‘all court costs’ could be read to include attorney’s fees, especially since there was no definition of that term in the policy…[T]he insurer did not, but could have, defined ‘court costs’ to specifically exclude attorney’s fees.” Treace, supra. For this reason, the court held that the attorney’s fees judgment was recoverable by the owner against the contractor’s CGL insurer.

This case provides a strong argument for a claimant that recovers a judgment against an insured in a construction defect lawsuit that includes attorney’s fees that attorney’s fees are recoverable under the insured’s CGL policy.

BE COGNIZANT OF THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION IN YOUR CGL POLICY

Posted on December 30, 2015December 30, 2015 by Edward Garber

Be cognizant of the pollution exclusion in your commercial general liability (CGL) policy.

The non-construction decision in Evanston Insurance Co. v. Haven South Beach, LLC, 2015 WL 9459979 (S.D.Fla. 2015) illustrates the affect of the pollution exclusion.

In this case, the plaintiff was at a catered event and suffered injuries consuming a liquid nitrogen infused alcoholic beverage. The plaintiff sued the vendor. The vendor’s CGL policy contained the pollution exclusion and further defined pollutants as follows:

f. Pollution

(1) “Bodily injury” or “property damage” which would not have occurred in whole or part but for the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of “pollutants” at any time.

***

“Pollutants” mean any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditions or reclaimed.

The vendor’s CGL insurer argued that the liquid nitrogen constituted a pollutant; thus, there was no coverage under the vendor’s policy for plaintiff’s injuries. The Southern District Court of Florida agreed. The Court held that liquid nitrogen is an irritant (a substance causing irritation) falling into the definition of a pollutant. The Court further held that the irritant liquid nitrogen was discharged by the vendor into the plaintiff’s alcoholic beverage falling into the pollution exclusion, i.e., injury or damage which would not have occurred but for the actual discharge of a pollutant / irritant.

If you are working with products that could potentially fall within the definition of a pollutant and the pollution exclusion within your CGL policy, consider procuring pollution liability insurance to cover you for damages / injuries caused by that product.

INTERACTION BETWEEN CGL INSURANCE, OCIP, AND SUBCONTRACTOR DEFAULT INSURANCE

Posted on November 14, 2015November 14, 2015 by Edward Garber

Here is a great opinion and insurance coverage dispute about the interaction between a CGL policy, and particularly one provided under an Owner’s Controlled Insurance Program, and a subcontractor default insurance policy / subguard policy.

In Pavarani Construction Co. v. Ace American Insurance Co., 2015 WL 6555434 (S.D.Fla. 2015), a general contractor constructed a high-rise condominium project. The general contractor and subcontractors were enrolled in the Owner’s Controlled Insurance Program (“OCIP”). This meant the general contractor and the subcontractors had the same CGL insurer. In addition, and outside of OCIP, the general contractor had subcontractor default insurance which is insurance a general contractor maintains to insure the risk of subcontractor default (and, really, catastrophic subcontractor default).

Post-construction, it was discovered that that the structural shell subcontractors the general contractor hired to (a) install the concrete masonry units and (b) the cast-in-place concrete, performed their work defectively. Specifically, reinforcing steel required to be installed within the concrete masonry units or cast-in-place concrete was omitted or improperly installed. These deficiencies resulted in excessive movement of building components. This movement caused stucco to debond, cracking in the walls, cracking of cast-in-place columns, beams, and shearwalls, and cracking in the mechanical penthouse enclosure on the roof that then resulted in water intrusion.

Upon discovering the deficiencies and/or resulting damage, the owner of the Project put the general contractor on notice. The general contractor notified its subcontractors. The general contractor (and subcontractors) sought indemnification under the CGL policy within OCIP. (Remember, with an OCIP policy, it is the same CGL insurer that covers all enrolled entities.) The CGL carrier, however, denied coverage. This resulted, applicable to the case, in the concrete masonry unit subcontractor defaulting on its subcontract because it was unable to perform repairs to its deficient work and cover the resulting damage without the CGL insurance proceeds. As a consequence, the general contractor submitted a claim to its subcontractor default insurance policy to recover money to fund the repairs that were in excess of $25 Million. The general contractor also worked out a deal with its subcontractor default insurance policy that it would pursue the CGL carrier for reimbursement.

The general contractor then sued the CGL insurer for indemnification by asserting a breach of contract claim and a declaratory relief claim against the insurer.

RESULTING DAMAGE

The insurer argued that there was no coverage because there is no coverage under the CGL policy for the general contractor repairing defective work. This is true, BUT “if the defective work causes damage to otherwise nondefective completed product, i.e., if the inadequate subcontractor work caused cracking in the stucco, collapse of the [mechanical] penthouse enclosure, and cracking in the critical concrete structural elements…[the general contractor] is entitled to coverage for the repair of that non-defective work.” Pavarani, supra, at *4. In other words, while repairing the defective work would NOT be covered, repairing damage resulting from the defective work WOULD be covered.

In discussing coverage for resulting damage, the court relied on a recent Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals case, Carithers v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., 782 F.3d 1240 (11^th Cir. 2015). This case is actually a very important case because it held “the complete replacement of defective subcontractor work may be covered when necessary to effective repair ongoing damage to otherwise non-defective work.” Pavarani, supra, at *4. (Please review the specifics of this case here). Basically, if replacement of potentially defective work is necessary to repair resulting damage, then such replacement of the defective work would be covered under the policy. For instance, if you had to remove (or rip-and-tear out) defective work in order to fix the resulting damage, then such removal would be covered.

Here, it was clear that the defective work caused resulting damage triggering the CGL policy’s obligation to indemnify the general contractor and applicable subcontractors.

“OTHER INSURANCE” PROVISION

The CGL policy contained an “Other Insurance” provision. This provision means that the policy will operate as excess (not primary) insurance over any other available insurance. This provision is in virtually every CGL policy and in many other types of insurance policies such as a subcontractor default insurance policy. The “Other Insurance” provision applies “when two or more insurance policies are on the same subject matter, risk and interest.” Pavarani, supra, at *5.

The CGL insurer argued that based on this “Other Insurance” provision, the general contractor’s subcontractor default insurance should operate as the primary insurance with it serving as any excess insurance. The court correctly dismissed this argument since a CGL policy and subcontractor default insurance policy insure completely different business risks. Besides, the subcontractor default insurance policy insures the general contractor for a subcontractor default and does not insure a subcontractor for its default.

Furthermore, the court held:

Courts disregard ‘Other Insurance’ provisions where, as here, there is a contractual right of indemnification between the parties insured by the relevant policy. Here, AWS [concrete masonry subcontractor] contracted to indemnify Plaintiff [general contractor] for damages resulting from its work and Defendant [CGL insurer] insured AWS [per OCIP] for claims of property damage. Therefore, Defendant cannot utilize the ‘Other Insurance’ provision to shift the loss.

Pavarani, supra, at *5 (internal citation omitted).

ATTORNEY’S FEES

Florida Statute s. 627.428 authorizes attorney’s fees against an insurer in an insurance coverage case. Since the general contractor (insured) prevailed, it was entitled to its reasonable attorney’s fees.

THE (j)(5) and (j)(6) DAMAGE TO PROPERTY EXCLUSIONS IN CGL POLICY

Posted on August 25, 2015August 25, 2015 by Edward Garber

The case of Essex Ins. Co. v. Kart Const., Inc., 2015 WL 4730540 (M.D.Fla. 2015) is an insurance coverage dispute. In this case, a fire started after a contractor’s welding operations to the metal exterior of a tower that damaged components of the tower. (In addition to the welding, the contractor was responsible for fire prevention measures to, among other things, monitor the welding during the welding and for a couple of hours after the welding.)

The contractor had a CGL policy. The CGL carrier denied coverage.

The policy contained the (j)(5) and (j)(6) exclusions:

j. Damage To Property

“Property damage” to:

…

(5) That particular part of real property on which you or any contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your behalf are performing operations, if the “property damage” arises out of those operations; or

(6) That particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because “your work” was incorrectly performed on it.

The Middle District of Florida gave a great explanation regarding the application of the (j)(5) and (j)(6) exclusions in a CGL policy:

(j)(5)

In sum, Section (j)(5) excludes from coverage damage to “that particular part” of the real property on which the insured [contractor] is operating at the time of the accident [the moment of the accident]…..

Kart Const., supra, at *6.

(j)(6)

Unlike the “operations” under Section (j)(5), the “work” under Section (j)(6) need not occur at a specific time (e.g., the moment of the accident) for the exclusion to apply. Section (j)6) excludes damage to a “particular part of … property” if the insured [contractor] “incorrectly performed” work (at any time) on that part and the “incorrectly performed” work caused, or contributed to, damage to that part.

In sum, under Section (j)(6), the policy might exclude the damage to the tower if Kart [the contractor] incorrectly performed fire-prevention work on the tower (that is, incorrectly removed debris from the tower or incorrectly wet the tower) and that incorrect work caused, or contributed to, the tower’s damage.

Kart Const., supra, at *6, 7.

CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY EXCLUSION IN CGL POLICIES AND “INSURED CONTRACT” EXCEPTION

Posted on July 16, 2015July 16, 2015 by Edward Garber

Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies contain a CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY EXCLUSION (see adjacent picture). The contractual liability exclusion operates to BAR personal injury and property damage claims “which the insured is obligated to pay by reason of the assumption of liability in a contract or agreement.” Think indemnification claims which are assumption of liability claims and common in construction.

But, and this is an important but, there are two exceptions to this exclusion.

First, the contractual liability exclusion does not apply to liability for damages “that the insured would have in the absence of the contract or agreement.” Think tort claims.

Second, the contractual liability exclusion does not apply to liability for damages “assumed in a contract or agreement that is an ‘insured contract’.” The key to this exception is the definition of an “insured contract.”

Applicable to construction, a key definition of an “insured contract” is “that part of any contract…pertaining to your business…under which you assume the tort liability of another party to pay for bodily injury or property damage to a third person or organization.” This portion of the “insured contract” definition should ideally bring contractual indemnification claims back into play so that contractual indemnification claims are not barred by the contractual liability exclusion.

Be careful, though. There are endorsements to CGL policies that have modified the definition of “insured contract” to either remove the aforementioned definition all together, meaning contractual indemnification claims would be excluded. This is a bad endorsement to the definition of “insured contract” if you are involved in construction.

Or, this key definition of “insured contract” has been narrowed to include the following underlined language “that part of any contract…pertaining to your business…under which you assume the tort liability of another party to pay for bodily injury or property damage to a third person or organization, provided the bodily injury or property damage is caused, in whole or in part, by you or those acting on your behalf.” This means that if you contractually agree to indemnify another for that person’s negligence, this would not meet the definition of “insured contract” since you are agreeing to indemnify another for negligence not caused in whole or in part by you.

For example, the opinion in Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Royal Crane, LLC, 2015 WL 3609062 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2015), discusses this narrowed definition of “insured contract” with the underlined language above. In this case, a subcontractor leased a crane and crane operator from a rental company. The rental agreement between the subcontractor and rental company contained the following contractual indemnification language:

“Lessee [subcontractor] agrees to indemnify, defend and hold harmless Lessor [rental company], its employees, operators and agents from any and all claims for damage to property, damage to the work or bodily injury (including death) resulting from the use, operation, or possession of the crane and operator whether or not it be claimed or found that such damage or injury resulted in whole or in part from Lessor’s negligence, from a defective condition of the crane or operator or from any act, omission or default of Lessor.”

In other words, the subcontractor was agreeing to indemnify the rental company for the rental company’s negligence. This is known as a broad form indemnification provision.

During construction, a worker was hurt when a truss fell from the crane. The worker sued the rental company and the crane operator for negligence. The rental company and operator third-partied in the subcontractor based on the contractual indemnification provision in the rental agreement. However, the subcontractor’s CGL insurer denied coverage (and, thus, a defense in the lawsuit) based on the contractual liability exclusion.

As a consequence of the CGL insurer’s immediate denial of coverage, the subcontractor entered into a Coblentz settlement agreement with the rental company that allowed the rental company to sue the subcontractor’s CGL’s insurer for its wrongful refusal to deny the subcontractor a defense and for coverage under the subcontractor’s policy.

Coblentz Settlement Agreement

In a nutshell, a Coblentz settlement agreement is an agreement between an insured and a third-party claimant where the insurer denied coverage and, thus, the duty to defend its insured in an underlying lawsuit. The insured agrees to give the claimant a consent judgment to resolve the lawsuit and an assignment of its rights under its CGL policy to the claimant in exchange for the claimant not enforcing the consent judgment against the insured. This allows the claimant to now sue the insured’s CGL insurer directly to enforce the consent judgment. In doing so, the claimant must still prove: (a) the insurer wrongly refused to defend its insured, (b) there is coverage under the policy, and (3) the negotiated consent judgment was made in good faith and is reasonable. But, the consent judgment prevents the insurer from trying to argue the liability of the insured since that could have been argued in the underlying lawsuit that the insurer refused to defend its insured in. See Royal Crane, supra, at *4-5. (For more information on Coblentz settlement agreements, check out this presentation that discusses this in detail.)

“Insured Contract”

But, the heart of the case really pertained to the contractual liability exclusion and the definition of an “insured contract” as narrowed by endorsement. With respect to the definition of “insured contract” in the policy (see above language), the Fourth District Court of Appeals importantly held:

“[A]n indemnity agreement can be an ‘insured contract’ under the policy where the injury is caused by the indemnitee’s negligence, so long as the named insured ‘caused’ some part of the injuries or damages or is otherwise vicariously liable.”

Royal Crane, supra, at *7.

In other words, taking the above fact pattern, the indemnity agreement could constitute an “insured contract” to be excepted from the contractual liability exclusion if the worker’s injury was caused by the rental company’s (indemnitee) negligence, so long as the subcontractor (named insured in the CGL policy) caused some part of the injuries or was otherwise vicariously liable to the rental company for the injuries.

Unfortunately for the rental company, even under this favorable definition of an “insured contract”, the rental company’s third-party complaint against the subcontractor still did not trigger a duty of subcontractor’s CGL insurer to defend and cover the subcontractor:

“Hunter Crane’s [indemnitee-rental company] third party complaint did not assert a legal theory under which Cloutier [insured-subcontractor] can be said to have ‘caused’ the injury in whole or in part. No allegation described how Cloutier contributed to causing the accident. No allegation attempted to invoke the borrowed servant doctrine, which dictates that ‘one who borrows and exercises control over the servant or worker of another in effect assumes all liability for the activities of the borrowed servant or worker.’ Nor did the third party complaint cast Cloutier as the employer of an independent contractor who actively participated in or interfered with the job to the extent that it directly influenced the manner in which the work was performed.”

Royal Crane, supra, at *7 (internal quotations omitted).

For this reason, the Fourth District sided with the CGL insurer finding that the contractual liability exclusion barred coverage to the subcontractor such that the CGL insurer had no duty to defend or cover the subcontractor in the underlying litigation. This also meant that the rental company’s Coblentz settlement agreement provided it no value because it already agreed to give up rights to collect against the subcontractor and it could no longer collect against the subcontractor’s CGL insurer. What this case does exemplify, however, is the importance of pleading allegations to maximize insurance coverage as well as a more relaxed definition of an “insured contract” to hopefully prevent the application of the contractual liability exclusion.

CGL INSURANCE AND CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS (DUTY TO DEFEND; TRIGGERING OF CGL POLICY; COVERED RESULTING DAMAGE)

Posted on April 11, 2015April 3, 2023 by Edward Garber

I previously wrote about insurance coverage issues in a construction defect dispute, specifically in the context of the insurer denying coverage outright and refusing to defend its insured.

As a sequel to this posting, a noteworthy opinion was issued by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Carithers v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 2015 WL 1529038 (11^th Cir. 2015) in a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance coverage dispute dealing with construction defects to a house. This opinion discusses central issues to an insurance coverage dispute in a construction defect context: the triggering of a CGL policy, the duty to defend, the duty to indemnify, covered resulting damage stemming from construction defects, and a claimant resolving a dispute with an insured in order to pursue rights against the insured’s CGL carrier (also known as a Coblentz agreement).

In this case, the owners hired a general contractor to build their house. The general contractor had CGL insurance with products completed operations coverage. Upon discovering construction defects, the owners sued the general contractor. The general contractor’s insurer refused to defend the general contractor, meaning the insurer denied coverage (which is the last thing the general contractor ever wants to hear). The insurer denied coverage because the complaint alleged that the damages were not discovered until 2010; however, the general contractor did not have any CGL coverage after 2008. Thus, if the manifestation theory applied to trigger coverage (discussed below), there would be no coverage under the CGL policy.

The general contractor and insurer then entered into a consent judgment in the action for $90,000 in favor of the owners that assigned to the owners the general contractor’s rights under its CGL policy. (This forms the framework for what is known as a Coblentz agreement.) The owners then sued the general contractor’s CGL insurer.

The issues in this case were (a) the insurer’s duty to defend its general contractor-insured, (b) the triggering of an occurrence under a CGL policy, and (c) resulting damage covered under the CGL policy.

(A) Duty to Defend

The insurer’s duty to defend is triggered by the allegations in the complaint. Here, the Eleventh Circuit held that the insurer had a duty to defend because the duty to defend is broader than the insurer’s duty to indemnify and “all doubts as to whether a duty to defend exists in a particular case must be resolved against the insurer and in favor of the insured.” Carithers, supra, at *4 (quotation and citation omitted). “An insurance company must defend an action where the facts alleged against the insured would give rise to coverage, even if those facts are not ultimately proven at trial.” Id.

(B) Triggering of an Occurrence Under CGL Policy

The insurer wanted the manifestation theory to trigger CGL coverage. Under this theory, the CGL policy is triggered if the damage is discovered (manifests itself) during the policy period.

The reason the insurer wanted this theory to apply is because the owners admitted that they discovered the damage / defects in 2010 when the general contractor’s CGL policy was no longer in effect.

Conversely, the owners wanted the injury-in-fact theory to apply to trigger coverage. Under this theory, the policy is triggered when the damage occurs even if the damage is not discovered until sometime later. Here, the trial court found that the damage occurred in 2005 when the general contractor’s CGL carrier was in effect (although the damage was not discovered until 2010). Because there was evidence and a finding as to when the damage occurred, the Eleventh Circuit held that the injury-in-fact theory was the correct theory to trigger CGL coverage.

(C) Resulting Damage Covered Under a CGL Policy

The cost of repairing damage to other work resulting from faulty workmanship would be covered under the CGL policy. In other words, repairing damage to another trade’s work would be covered but repairing / replacing damage to the trade’s own work would not be covered. The Eleventh Circuit analyzed this application to determine whether the trial court appropriately determined that certain items were resulting damage.

(1) Brick

The trial could found that the defective application of exterior brick coating caused resulting damage to the brick itself. If the exterior brick coating was applied by the subcontractor that installed the brick, then the brick should not be covered since the brick was the subcontractor’s own work as opposed to other work. However, there was no evidence at the trial level whether the brick coating and installation of the brick was done by the same subcontractor or different subcontractors. Because the plaintiff owners (who were assigned rights under the policy by the general contractor insured) had the burden of proof on this issue, which they failed to meet, the Eleventh Circuit reversed any damage awarded associated with the brick.

(2) The Tile and Mud Base

The trial court found that defective adhesive and an inadequate base caused damage to the tile. The trial court awarded damage to replace the tile and mud base. Similar to the brick, the issue turned on whether the installation of the tile and mud base was done by the same subcontractor or different subcontractors. And, similar to the brick, no evidence was offered on this point so the Eleventh Circuit reversed any damage awarded associated with the tile and mud base.

(3) Balcony

The trial court found that defects in the construction of the balcony resulted in damage to the garage. However, because the balcony had to be rebuilt in order to repair the garage, the trial court held that this work was resulting damage covered by the CGL policy. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the trial court holding that the cost of repairing damage resulting from defective work is covered and since repairing the balcony was part of repairing the garage, these costs would be covered.

Important take-aways:

This case provides strong arguments to an insured when its CGL carrier denies coverage, specifically based on the argument that its policy was never triggered. Remember, the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify so any doubts must be resolved in favor of the insured.

Don’t forget about the injury-in-fact theory to trigger CGL coverage. If you have evidence, such as an expert opinion, as to when the damage started to occur, this theory can be valuable if the owner discovered the latent defects after the expiration of your CGL policy. This helps an owner maximize CGL coverage and a general contractor maximize coverage under its CGL policy.

Make sure to meet your burden of proof to establish resulting damage or other damage caused by faulty workmanship. Make sure to prove that the resulting damage was work performed by a different subcontractor and not the subcontractor that performed the faulty workmanship. And, to this point, make sure to include appropriate language in the consent judgment.

Make sure you know how to couch your coverage arguments to an insurer in order to maximize insurance coverage.

If your insurer denies coverage, consider entering into what is known as a Coblentz agreement with the claimant where a consent judgment is entered against you and rights under your policy are assigned to the claimant. The benefit is that in consideration of the consent judgment and assignment of rights, the claimant gives up any rights to collect that judgment against you.

REQUESTING LIABILITY INSURANCE INFORMATION FROM RESPONSIBLE PARTIES FOR CONSTRUCTION OR DESIGN DEFECTS (FLA. STAT. s. 627.4137)

Posted on March 28, 2015March 28, 2015 by Edward Garber

If you are an owner and discover construction or design defects, you are going to want consult with a lawyer to make sure you know your rights under Florida Statutes Chapter 558. This includes sending a written notice of the construction or design defects identifying the defects with sufficient detail to the potentially responsible parties. Likewise, if you are a contractor and receive this written notice, you are going to want to make sure you forward that letter to potentially responsible parties (subcontractors or suppliers).

Coupled with this written notice of defects letter should be a written request on the parties and their known insurance agents and insurers for their liability insurance information. Start with culling Certificates of Insurance you have on these parties to obtain (some) of this information as to whom to send the request to. This request can be in a separate letter or the same letter (as the notice of defects letter) and should reference Florida Statute s. 627.4137 and request the information in the below statutory language:

(1) Each insurer which does or may provide liability insurance coverage to pay all or a portion of any claim which might be made shall provide, within 30 days of the written request of the claimant, a statement, under oath, of a corporate officer or the insurer’s claims manager or superintendent setting forth the following information with regard to each known policy of insurance, including excess or umbrella insurance:

(a) The name of the insurer.

(b) The name of each insured.

(c) The limits of the liability coverage.

(d) A statement of any policy or coverage defense which such insurer reasonably believes is available to such insurer at the time of filing such statement.

(e) A copy of the policy.

In addition, the insured, or her or his insurance agent, upon written request of the claimant or the claimant’s attorney, shall disclose the name and coverage of each known insurer to the claimant and shall forward such request for information as required by this subsection to all affected insurers. The insurer shall then supply the information required in this subsection to the claimant within 30 days of receipt of such request.

As discussed in prior articles, insurance is an important aspect of construction and design defect disputes.

If you are an owner, you want to understand potential insurance coverage so that you know how to best maximize any claim for insurance coverage against potentially liable parties. This includes knowing the limits of liability in any commercial general liability (CGL) or professional liability / errors & omissions policy, as applicable, and whether there is any umbrella / excess policy. This also includes understanding the exclusions in the policies and whether there are endorsements that add or modify exclusions in the policy.

If you are a general contractor, you also want to understand potential insurance coverage from subcontractors and other entities you are looking to flow-down an owner’s defect claims (ideally, through contractual indemnification language in your subcontract). Also, you are going to want to make sure you have additional insured status under these parties’ liability policies so that they contribute to the fees and costs incurred in your defense. For this reason, you also want to obtain copies of subcontractor insurance polices including all endorsements. Besides the limits of liability, you want to see the additional insured endorsement in the policy, and any endorsements that add or modify exclusions in the policy.

If you are a subcontractor, if you subcontracted aspects of your scope of work or there is a claim associated with deficient material you furnished, you also want to obtain this insurance information from these potentially liable entities because you are also going to try to flow-down liability (ideally, through contractual indemnification language in your subcontract).

And, if you are a manufacturer, if a claim is asserted against you arising out of the installation of that product, you also want to obtain insurance information from any authorized dealer or installer (perhaps through any agreement you have with that dealer or installer that would require this entity to indemnify you and name you as an additional insured).

One of the underlying reasons for s. 627.4137 is so that parties can obtain insurance coverage information and make reasonably informed decisions about settling a matter. In other words, you don’t want to settle a dispute for policy limits if you have damages that may exceed policy limits and find out the responsible party has additional or excess insurance to cover the excess damages. See, e.g., Schlosser v. Perez, 832 So.2d 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (in non-construction case, noncompliance with s. 627.4137 rendered settlement unenforceable). But, this statute does not create a private cause of action by a third-party if an insurer fails to timely provide this information. Any potential recourse the third-party would have, if any, against the insurer would have to be after the third-party obtains a judgment against the underlying insured. Lucente v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 591 So.2d 1126, 1127-28 (4^th DCA 1992) (“[T]he statute does not contain an implicit cause of action for a third-party against an insurance company.”); see also Brannan v. Geico Indemnity Co., 569 Fed.Appx. 724, 728 (11^th Cir. 2014) (“But Brannan fails to point to any legal authority to show that s. 627.4137 creates a first-party private cause of action against an insurer [for failure to comply with the statute.]”).

SUING FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON A CONTRACT CLAIM; EQUITABLE SUBROGATION CLAIM BY LIABILITY INSURER AGAINST GOVERNMENT NOT ALLOWED

Posted on November 22, 2014November 22, 2014 by Edward Garber

Equitable subrogation is a doctrine that liability insurers rely on when paying a claim on behalf of an insured. Under this doctrine, the insurer equitably subrogates—steps in the shoes—to the rights of the insured and sues as an equitable subrogee of the insured in order to seek reimbursement for the claim it paid.

What if the liability insurer tried to pursue an equitable subrogation claim against the federal government? In other words, what if the insurer paid out insurance proceeds on behalf of its insured-prime contractor and then tried to recoup the insurance proceeds from the federal government as an equitable subrogee of the prime contractor? The United States Court of Federal Claims in Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters v. U.S., 2014 WL 6491835 (Fed.Cl. 2014) explained that a liability insurer CANNOT sue the federal government as an equitable subrogee of the prime contractor in order to recoup insurance proceeds paid out on a claim.

In this case, the government hired a prime contractor to abate asbestos at a post office. The prime contractor was having difficulty obtaining CGL liability insurance to specifically cover asbestos removal for a reasonable premium and the government, through the contracting officer, agreed to execute an addendum to the prime contract that required the government to save harmless and indemnify the contractor from personal injury claims attributable to the asbestos removal work.

More than ten years later, a former government employee sued the prime contractor claiming he contracted cancer from his exposure to asbestos while it was being removed and abated at the project. The prime contractor demanded that the government defend and indemnify it for this claim; however, the government refused. The prime contractor then tendered the claim to its CGL liability insurer and its insurer settled the claim. After the settlement, the prime contractor once again demanded that the government reimburse it by honoring the indemnification language in the addendum; again, the government refused.

The prime contractor’s liability insurer then filed suit against the federal government as the equitable subrogee of the prime contractor in order to recoup the insurance proceeds it paid to the former government employee. The thrust of the claim was that the government breached the indemnification provision. The government moved to dismiss the lawsuit contending that the Court of Federal Claims does not have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the lawsuit because the liability insurer is not in privity with the government and, therefore, cannot sue the government. The Court of Federal Claims agreed and dismissed the lawsuit. Why? Because a plaintiff suing the federal government on a contract claim must be in privity of contract with the federal government with limited exceptions to this rule:

“The Federal Circuit has recognized limited exceptions to the requirement that parties seeking relief for breach of contract against the government under the Tucker Act must be in privity of contract with the United States. These limited exceptions include (1) actions against the United States by an intended third-party beneficiary; (2) pass-through suits by a subcontractor where the prime contractor is liable to the subcontractor for the subcontractor’s damages; and (3) actions by a Miller Act surety for funds that the government improperly disbursed to a prime contractor [after the surety financed completion of a defaulted subcontractor]. As the court of appeals has observed, the common thread that unites these exceptions is that the party standing outside of privity by contractual obligation stands in the shoes of a party within privity.“

Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, supra(internal quotations and citations omitted).

Since none of the limited exceptions applied to allow a liability insurer to sue the government as an equitable subrogee of its insured-prime contractor, the Court of Federal Claims lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

This ruling does not prevent the prime contractor from suing the government directly for breaching the indemnification provision; it simply prevents the liability insurer from suing as an equitable subrogee of the prime contractor. Even though the insurer paid the claim, perhaps it can enter into an agreement with the prime contractor whereby the prime contractor sues the government directly for breach of contract.

The case demonstrates the limited exceptions available to a claimant on a construction project that wants to pursue a claim directly against the government when the claimant is not the prime contractor hired by the government. While prime contractors can sue the government for breach of contract, subcontractors, in particular, that want to pursue a claim against the government can only do so as a pass-through claim, meaning they are suing in the name of the prime contractor and will require the cooperation of the prime contractor.

Also, as an aside, the indemnification provision from the government and the prime contractor required the government to save harmless and indemnify the prime contractor. I always like to include the word “defend” in an indemnification provision so it is crystal clear that the indemnitor’s indemnification obligations extend to its contractual obligation to defend the indemnitees for any claim.