In a previous article, I discussed the importance of recording a lis pendens in a construction lien foreclosure action.
There is another noteworthy point relating to the impact of lis pendens that can provide quite a bit of consternation.
Florida Statute 48.23(1)(d) provides:
Except for the interest of persons in possession or easements of use, the recording of such notice of lis pendens, provided that during the pendency of the proceeding it has not expired pursuant to subsection (2) or been withdrawn or discharged, constitutes a bar to the enforcement against the property described in the notice of all interests and liens, including, but not limited to, federal tax liens and levies, unrecorded at the time of recording the notice unless the holder of any such unrecorded interest or lien intervenes in such proceedings within 30 days after the recording of the notice. If the holder of any such unrecorded interest or lien does not intervene in the proceedings and if such proceedings are prosecuted to a judicial sale of the property described in the notice, the property shall be forever discharged from all such unrecorded interests and liens. If the notice of lis pendens expires or is withdrawn or discharged, the expiration, withdrawal, or discharge of the notice does not affect the validity of any unrecorded interest or lien.
The language in this statute requires persons with unrecorded interests / liens to intervene in a lawsuit subject to a lis pendens within 30 days or else they are barred from proceeding against the property (unless the property subject to the lis pendens is not foreclosed on or the lis pendens is discharged). This is a harsh outcome because such a person’s (unrecorded) interest may not accrue until it is already too late—beyond the 30 days of the recording of the lis pendens.
The best way to explain the potentially harsh application of this statute is to examine its application in a few cases.
In Adhin v. First Horizon Home Loans, 44 So.3d 1245 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010), a lender recorded mortgages associated with a construction loan. The borrower entered into an agreement to sell parcels and any homes currently built on the parcels. The parcels were sold, however, the closing agent failed to record the deeds and mortgages associated with the closing, and failed to secure any release from the construction lender as to the parcels that had been sold. Subsequently, the construction lender foreclosed on its mortgage which included a foreclosure that applied to the parcels that had been sold. A lis pendens had been recorded. Approximately two months after the lis pendens was recorded, the purchasers of the parcels recorded their deeds and corresponding mortgages and moved to intervene in the construction lender’s foreclosure lawsuit. The construction lender opposed the motion to intervene arguing that the purchasers of the parcels failed to timely intervene pursuant to s. 48.23(1)(d) since the lender’s foreclosure action impacted their rights to the parcels they purchased. The appellate court agreed with the lender finding that the language operates as a nonclaim statute that bars enforcement against the property by a holder of an unrecorded interest (such as the purchasers of the parcels in this case) after the prescribed statutory period (30 days), provided the litigation proceeds to a final judgment and judicial sale of the foreclosed property. This meant the purchasers of the parcels could not intervene and their rights as it related to their parcels were entirely dependent on whether the construction lender’s foreclosure action proceeded to a final foreclosure judgment and judicial sale of the property (inclusive of their property). Ouch!!!
In Jallali v. Knightsbridge Village Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 2016 WL 3548843 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), a homeowner’s lender filed a mortgage foreclosure action and recorded a lis pendens. While the mortgage foreclosure action was pending, the homeowner’s association recorded a lien for unpaid assessments and moved to foreclose its assessment lien. The issue was whether the lender’s notice of lis pendens barred the homeowner’s association’s subsequent foreclosure action based on its lien for unpaid assessments. The appellate court held it did not because the lien was based on a recorded Declaration of Covenants that was recorded prior to the filing of the lis pendens—thus, s. 48.23(1)(d) did not apply because the Declaration was an interest recoded prior to the lis pendens.
In Ober v. Town of Lauderdale-by-the-Sea, 2016 WL 4468134 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), a lender filed a foreclosure action and recorded a lis pendens. The lender obtained a final judgment in foreclosure. Subsequent to the final judgment in foreclosure, but before any foreclosure sale, the Town of Lauderdale-by-the-Sea recorded liens against the property for code violations that occurred post-final judgment. The property was sold at a foreclosure sale and the new owner filed suit to quiet title and remove the Town’s liens. The appellate court held that s. 48.23(1)(d) does not operate to bar liens that accrue and are recorded AFTER the final judgment. Hence, recording a lis pendens does not operate to bar liens that occur (accrue) and are recorded post-final judgment but before a foreclosure sale.
When it comes to construction projects, sometimes there are multiple construction lien foreclosure actions relating to the same property. All of these foreclosure actions are routinely accompanied by a lis pendens. Some of these actions could arguably be barred under s. 48.23 since they may be based on liens recorded outside of the 30-day window of the first lis pendens that was recorded. So, if the initial foreclosure action results in a judicial sale of the property, the subsequently recorded liens on the property whose holder’s failed to timely intervene may be out of luck – they would not be able to foreclose on the same property that was already sold at a judicial sale. On the other hand, under Jallali, liens relate to a notice of commencement, and similar to a Declaration of Covenants (or Condominium), could be considered a recorded interest. The notice of commencement would be recorded prior to any construction lien, meaning that any construction lien is not based on an unrecorded interest at the time a lis pendens is recorded. If this is true, than s. 48.23(1)(d) arguably would not apply to bar any liens that accrue and/or are recorded after 30 days from the initial lis pendens. To preserve this argument, it is important that liens are recorded within the effective period of a notice of commencement so that the liens can relate back to the date the notice of commencement is recorded.
Please contact David Adelstein at firstname.lastname@example.org or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.