shutterstock_368505233There are cases where I honestly do no fully understand the insurer’s position because it cannot have its cake and eat it too.  The recent opinion in Houston Specialty Insurance Company v. Vaughn, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D1828a (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) is one of those cases because on one hand it tried hard to disclaim coverage and on the other hand tried to intervene in the underlying suit where it was not a named party.


This case dealt with a personal injury dispute where a laborer for a pressure washing company fell off of a roof and became a paraplegic.  The injured person sued the pressure washing company and its representatives.  The company and representatives tendered the case to its general liability insurer and the insurer–although it provided a defense under a reservation of rights—filed a separate action for declaratory relief based on an exclusion in the general liability policy that excluded coverage for the pressure washing company’s employees (because the general liability policy is not a workers compensation policy).   This is known as the employer’s liability exclusion that excludes coverage for bodily injury to an employee.  The insurer’s declaratory relief action sought a declaration that there was no coverage because the injured laborer was an employee of the pressure washing company.  The pressure washing company claimed he was an independent contractor, in which the policy did provide limited coverage pursuant to an endorsement.


The insurer also moved to intervene in the underlying action for the purpose of getting special interrogatories on the verdict form relative to the injured plaintiff’s employment status.  The pressure washing company objected because they did NOT want to inflate the damages by having the jury learn that insurance was involved, thereby prejudicing it, particularly if it was determined that there was no insurance coverage.  You cannot blame the insured in this instance, particularly because the injured plaintiff was probably all for having the insurer intervene so that the jury learned about the insured’s insurance. 


While the trial court granted the motion to intervene, after a number of events occurred (not discussed here), the trial court ultimately dismissed the intervention. The insurer appealed.


The appellate court affirmed the denial / dismissal of the insurer’s intervention in the underlying action.  The bottom line is that the insurer was not sued in the underlying action. It could not be sued by the injured plaintiff based on Florida’s non-joinder statute (Florida Statute 627.4136) that would prevent the injured plaintiff from suing the liability insurer directly until it gets a judgment against the insured.  Thus, the insurer had no direct and immediate interest in the dispute. Any judgment entered in the case would not be against the insurer—it would be entered against its insured.  Further, if the insured obtained a judgment and then sued the insurer, the insurer would not be deprived of appropriate legal defenses. 


As the appellate court explained, the insurer’s argument, if accepted, would be to eviscerate Florida’s non-joinder statute:


If the possibility of owing up to the policy limits based upon entry of an adverse judgment [against an insured] was itself a sufficient basis to allow intervention, insurers would be permitted the unhindered and unfettered opportunity to intervene in innumerable tort cases. That is exactly what Houston [insurer] wants; it seeks to interject itself directly into Mr. Vaughn’s [injured plaintiff’s] tort lawsuit. We cannot countenance such a result in light of the legislature’s intent [in Florida’s non-joinder statute] to prevent the introduction of such prejudicial information from being introduced to the jury.  After all, courts must continually be concerned that insurance coverage not be introduced to the jury because of its potential to adversely impact the issues of liability and damages. 



Please contact David Adelstein at or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.




shutterstock_251422126In prior articles, I discussed the benefit of workers compensation immunity for contractors.  Arguing around workers compensation immunity under the “intentional tort exception” is really hard – borderline impossible, in my opinion.  Nevertheless, injured workers still make an attempt to sue a contractor under the intentional tort exception to workers compensation immunity.  Most fail based on the seemingly impossible standard the injured worker must prove to establish the intentional tort exception.  A less onerous standard (although certainly onerous), as a recent case suggests, appears to be an injured worker suing a co-employee for the injury.


Florida Statute s. 440.11 discusses the intentional tort exception to workers compensation immunity.   Workers compensation shall be the exclusive remedy to an injured worker UNLESS the injured worker can establish a claim against the contractor or fellow-employee under the intentional tort exception as statutorily set forth below:


440.11 Exclusiveness of liability. — 

(1) The liability of an employer prescribed in s. 440.10 shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability . . . except as follows:

. . . .

(b) When an employer commits an intentional tort that causes the injury or death of the employee. For purposes of this paragraph, an employer’s actions shall be deemed to constitute an intentional tort and not an accident only when the employee proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that:

1.  The employer deliberately intended to injure the employee; or

2. The employer engaged in conduct that the employer knew, based on prior similar accidents or on explicit warnings specifically identifying a known danger, was virtually certain to result in injury or death to the employee, and the employee was not aware of the risk because the danger was not apparent and the employer deliberately concealed or misrepresented the danger so as to prevent the employee from exercising informed judgment about whether to perform the work.


The same immunities from liability enjoyed by an employer shall extend as well to each employee of the employer when the employee is acting in furtherance of the employer’s business and the injured employee is entitled to receive benefits under this statute. Such fellow-employee immunities shall not be applicable to an employee who acts, with respect to a fellow employee, with willful and wanton disregard or . . . with gross negligence when such acts result in injury or death or such acts proximately cause such injury or death . . . .


In Ramsey v. Dewitt Excavating, Inc., 43 Fla. L. Weekly D1366a (Fla. 5th DCA 2018), an employee was cleaning a cement-mixing pugmill with a fellow employee.  An accident happened while the employee was inside the mixing box causing his death.  While he was inside, his fellow-employee turned on the mixing box causing his death.  The employee’s estate sued both the employer and the fellow-employee for the wrongful death and argued under the intentional tort exception to get around workers compensation immunity.  


The trial court granted summary judgment on the issue of workers compensation immunity finding that the immunity barred the estate’s claims against the employer and the fellow-employee.


Intentional Tort Exception as to Employer


The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment as to the employer because the employee could NOT prove the virtually impossible burden in establishing the applicability of the intentional tort exception.


Three elements must be proved to establish the intentional tort exception to worker’s compensation immunity, and the failure to prove any one of the elements will prevent the exception from applying.  The elements are:

1) employer knowledge of a known danger . . . based upon prior similar accidents or explicit warnings specifically identifying the danger that was virtually certain to cause injury or death to the employee;

2) the employee was not aware of the danger . . . because it was not apparent; and

3) deliberate concealment or misrepresentation by the employer . . . preventing employee from exercising informed judgment as to whether to perform the work.


Ramsey, supra (internal citation omitted).


There was no evidence to suggest that the employee was not aware of the danger involved in cleaning the inside of the cement mixing box and that he had to be aware based on working on the machine in the past, which was inherently dangerous in of itself.  This alone supported the application of the workers compensation immunity and there likely would have been a lot more facts (or facts the employee’s estate would not be able to prove) supporting the immunity.


Intentional Tort Exception as to Fellow-Employee


The appellate court, however, reversed the summary judgment as to the fellow-employee finding that a jury could find that the fellow-employee acted with gross negligence causing the death of the employee.


In order to establish that Gubbins [fellow-employee] acted with gross negligence when he turned on the pug mill while Ramsey [employee] was still inside, the parents [representatives of estate] were required to present evidence as to each of the following three elements:

1) circumstances constituting an imminent or clear and present danger amounting to a more than normal or usual peril [;]

2) knowledge or awareness of the imminent danger on the part of . . . [Gubbins;] and

3) an act or omission [on the part of Gubbins] that evinces a conscious disregard of the consequences. 

Ramsey, supra.




The estate had evidence that the fellow-employee directed the decedent-employee inside the cement mixing box and then activated the box without utilizing any safety system or checking to see if the decedent-employee was still inside.  Based on this evidence, a jury could conclude that the fellow-employee was grossly negligent in activating the mixing box.



Please contact David Adelstein at or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.



shutterstock_153987515You want to hear more on the POWER of statutory workers compensation immunity?  Well, here it is, because as I have mentioned in the past, workers compensation immunity is powerful reinforcing the importance for contractors to ensure the subcontractors they hire absolutely have workers compensation insurance.  Likewise, subcontractors want to ensure the subcontractors they hire also have workers compensation insurance.


In the case of Fisk Construction, Inc., v. Obando, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D2501b (Fla. 3d DCA 2017), a general contractor hired a roofer.  The roofer subcontracted a portion of its work to a sub-subcontractor.  A foreman of the sub-subcontractor than orally hired a laborer to perform a portion of the work the sub-subcontractor was responsible for performing.  The laborer got hurt and a lawsuit was filed.  The trial court ruled that the sub-subcontractor could not rely on workers compensation immunity as an affirmative defense finding that the sub-subcontractor waived and/or was estopped from asserting this defense.  There appeared to be an initial denial of workers compensation benefits that was later remedied by the sub-subcontractor’s workers compensation insurer agreeing to pay the laborer’s hospital bills and medical visits.  (Since the laborer was hired in an oral, handshake-type of deal, it could have been that executives of the sub-subcontractor had to investigate the laborer’s involvement at the project since he was not an employee of the company.)


On appeal, the Third District reversed holding that the sub-subcontractor could rely on workers compensation immunity as an affirmative defense.  “[A]n initial denial of liability or [workers compensation] benefits does not automatically estop an employer from asserting workers’ compensation immunity [as an affirmative defense].”  Fisk Construction, supra


Please contact David Adelstein at or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.


shutterstock_104939294On construction projects, workers compensation immunity is real and it is powerful.  (See also this article.)  Workers compensation immunity is why all general contractors should have workers compensation insurance and they should ensure the subcontractors they hire have workers compensation insurance.  Workers compensation insurance becomes the exclusive form of liability for an injured worker thereby immunizing an employer (absent an intentional tort, which is very hard to prove as a means to circumvent workers compensation immunity).


If a general contractor, with workers compensation insurance, hires a subcontractor without workers compensation insurance, the general contractor’s workers compensation insurance will be responsible in the event an injury occurs to a subcontractor’s employee.  The general contractor becomes the statutory employer. 


If a general contractor, with or without workers compensation insurance, hires a subcontractor with workers compensation insurance, the subcontractor’s workers compensation insurance will be responsible in the event of an injury to that subcontractor’s employee (including any sub-subcontractor’s employees). This is a main reason why the general contractor wants to ensure the subcontractors it hires has workers compensation insurance.


An example of the benefit of workers compensation immunity can be found in the recent case of Gladden v. Fisher Thomas, Inc., 42 Fla. L. Weekly D2441a (Fla. 1st DCA 2017), dealing with a statutorily exempt corporate officer of a sub-subcontractor.  In this case, a general contractor hired two applicable subcontractors.  One of the subcontractors was a flooring subcontractor that subcontracted out a portion of its flooring work to an entity whose owner was statutorily exempt from workers compensation insurance.  This owner claimed he was injured through the actions of the other subcontractor and filed a lawsuit against the general contractor and the other subcontractor for negligence.  He claimed that workers compensation immunity should not apply because he was statutorily exempt from workers compensation.  Both the trial court and appellate court did not buy the owner’s argument.  The owner’s exemption from workers compensation insurance does not equate to an exemption from workers compensation immunity.  He is still bound by workers compensation immunity even if he is statutorily exempt.  His only recourse is confined to a claim against his company that did not procure workers compensation coverage.  That’s it.  “Since the corporate employer reaps the benefit of reduced workers’ compensation premiums for the exempt officer, it makes sense that there is a risk associated with the benefit.” Gladden, supra.


Please contact David Adelstein at or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.