FORECLOSING JUNIOR LIENHOLDERS AND RECORDING A LIS PENDENS

Posted on May 16, 2020May 16, 2020 by Edward Garber

When you foreclose on a construction lien, there are a couple of pointers to remember.

First, you want to make sure you include junior lienholders or interests you are looking to foreclose (or you want to be in a position to amend the foreclosure lawsuit to identify later). The reason being is you want to foreclose their interests to the property. “[J]unior interest holders are a narrow class of mortgagees whose interest in the underlying property is recorded after the foreclosing contractor’s claim of lien is filed. This class is routinely joined to the construction lien enforcement action under section 713.26 to allow the construction lienor to foreclose out the junior lienholder’s interest in the property encumbered by the construction lien.” See Decks N Sunch Marine, infra.

Second, you want to record a lis pendens with the lien foreclosure lawsuit. Failure to do so could be problematic because Florida Statute s. 713.22(1) provides in part, “A lien that has been continued beyond the 1-year period by the commencement of an action is not enforceable against creditors or subsequent purchasers for a valuable consideration and without notice, unless a notice of lis pendens is recorded.”

A recent case, Decks N Such Marine, Inc. v. Daake, 45 Fla.L.Weekly D1168b (Fla. 1^st DCA 2020), discusses these pointers. In this case, a contractor filed a construction lien foreclosure action in 2006 against residential real property. However, the contractor did not record a lis pendens until 2013. The lis pendens, however, was recorded after the owner had a mortgage recorded on the property. The contractor amended its construction lien foreclosure action to foreclose the mortgagee claiming the mortgagee was a junior lienholder. The mortgagee moved for summary judgment pursuant to Florida Statute s. 713.22 arguing the lien was “not enforceable against creditors or subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration and without notice, unless a notice of lis pendens is recorded.” In other words, the mortgagee was not a lienholder that could be foreclosed in light of the untimely recording of the lis pendens. The mortgagee prevailed on this issue.

The mortgagee then sought its attorney’s fees against the contractor as the “prevailing party” under Florida Statute s. 713.29 (in Florida’s Lien Law). The trial court agreed. The appellate court did not. The appellate court held that a junior lienholder is not entitled to attorney’s fees under Florida Statute s. 713.29 when prevailing in a construction lien enforcement action. The contractor is not enforcing its lien against the junior lienholder but “joining it to the underlying action to ensue determination of superiority of liens or security interests upon a foreclosure sale.” Decks N Sunch Marine, supra.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

APPELLATE ATTORNEY’S FEES AND THE SIGNIFICANT ISSUES TEST

Posted on June 25, 2017June 25, 2017 by Edward Garber

The significant issues test to determine the prevailing party in construction lien actions (which, by the way, also applies to breach of contract actions) applies to appellate attorney’s fees too! Under this test, the trial court has discretion to determine which party prevailed on the significant issues of the case for purposes of attorney’s fees. The trial court also has discretion to determine that neither party was the prevailing party for purposes of attorney’s fees.

In a recent decision, Bauer v. Ready Windows Sales & Service Corp., 42 Fla. L. Weekly D1417a (Fla. 3d DCA 2017), there were competing motions for appellate attorney’s fees. Both parties believed they should be deemed the prevailing party under Florida Statute s. 713.29 (statute that authorizes prevailing party attorney’s fees under Florida’s Construction Lien Law). The appellate court held that neither party was the prevailing party under the significant issues test: “[W]e conclude that each party lost on their appeal, while each party successfully defended that part of the judgment in their favor on the other party’s cross-appeal. Because both parties prevailed on significant issues, this Court finds that appellate fees are not warranted for either party.” Bauer, supra.

Attorney’s fees can very easily drive construction lien and bond disputes. Just remember, the significant issues test to determine the prevailing party for purposes of attorney’s fees applies to fees incurred at the trial court and appellate court levels. This test has a subjective component that gives a court an easy out—determine that neither party prevailed on the significant issues or, as in the above case, both parties prevailed on the significant issues, meaning neither party is entitled to attorney’s fees.

FURTHER CONFUSION TO RECOVERING ATTORNEYS’ FEES IN A LIEN ACTION

Posted on November 23, 2012November 23, 2012 by Edward Garber

Recovering attorneys’ fees in a lien action is becoming more and more convoluted. Recent caselaw has made it more challenging for a party prevailing in a lien action to recover their attorneys’ fees. Now, the test to recover attorneys’ fees is the “significant issues test,” i.e., which party prevailed on the significant issues in the case. In other words, a party could win the lien action yet still not be entitled to recover their attorneys’ fees. Plus, the determination of the significant issues is in the discretion of the judge, meaning it is very difficult to predict whether a party will recover any attorney fees even if they prevail on the lien action.

The case of GMPF Framing, LLC v. Villages at Lake Lily Associates, LLC, 100 So.3d 243 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), illustrates the challenges in recovering attorneys’ fees. In this case, a lienor recorded a claim of lien and filed a lien foreclosure action. However, instead of just suing to foreclose the lien, the lienor also sued for unjust enrichment and for an equitable lien (both counts which are difficult counts for a lienor / contractor to prevail on against an owner). The owner prevailed on the lien claim and the trial court awarded the owner attorneys’ fees. However, on appeal, the Fifth District Court of appeal reversed because it was undetermined which party won on the significant issues because the equitable lien and unjust enrichment claims remained pending even though the trial court discharged the lien. In particular, the Fifth District found that it is possible that the lienor could prevail on these remaining counts and be deemed the prevailing party by prevailing on the significant issues in the case.

This decision complicates how attorneys’ fees are awarded in a lien action and, to that end, which party will be deemed the prevailing party. A lien action is a statutory action that statutorily entitles a party to prevailing party attorneys‘ fees. See Fla.Stat. s. 713.29. The other counts in this lawsuit (unjust enrichment and equitable lien) have no statutory or contractual basis for attorneys‘ fees. Thus, they really should not factor in as to which party won on the significant issues of the lien action–the action that entitles a party to attorneys‘ fees. Unfortunately, this is not how the GMPF Framing Court ruled (nor does it appear to be how other Florida appellate courts will rule), which may have the undesirable effect of motivating lienors to sue on otherwise improper liens by simply coupling their lien claim with another claim and hope they are still able to prevail on the significant issues even if the lien claim is discharged.

DO NOT BANK ON RECOVERING YOUR ATTORNEYS’ FEES IN A CONSTRUCTION LIEN FORECLOSURE ACTION

Posted on August 7, 2011August 7, 2011 by Edward Garber

A party should never bank on recovering their attorneys’ fees when prosecuting or defending a construction lien foreclosure action.

In a construction lien action, the prevailing party has been statutorily entitled to recover their reasonable attorneys’ fees. Fla.Stat. §713.29. This is important since a party can only recover their attorneys’ fees if there is a statutory or contractual basis to do so.

The Florida Supreme Court in Trytek v. Gale Indus., Inc., 3 So.3d 1194 (Fla. 2009), analyzed what it meant to be a prevailing party for purposes of attorneys’ fees in a construction lien action and held that that the significant issues test is the test to determine the prevailing party. Under this test, the prevailing party is not necessarily the party that wins a sum of money at trial, but, rather, the party that wins the significant issues in the case. Hence, it is more than possible that the party that wins the significant issues based on the circumstances of the case is not the party that wins money. The Florida Supreme Court further held that a court can rule that no party is the prevailing party in this case.

The decision in Trytek has led to confusion, as well as consternation, because there is no objective or qualitative standard to determine the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys’ fees under the significant issues test. Instead, a pure subjective standard is used to determine the prevailing party that is not necessarily tied to the outcome of the case; and, importantly, this decision permits the trial court to find no prevailing party. This is noteworthy because the recovery of attorneys’ fees oftentimes drives the outcome of a case because the fees can be more than the amount in controversy. Now, with a subjective test used to determine whether a party can recover their attorneys’ fees, a party must consider that they may not be entitled to their attorneys’ fees when deciding how to pursue or defend a construction lien foreclosure action.

The recent case of Sheppard v. M&R Plumbing, Inc., 36 Fla. L. Weekly D1697b (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), elaborates on the confusion of the significant issues test and the reason why a party should not bank on recovering their attorneys’ fees in a construction lien foreclosure action. In this case, a plumber installed a water treatment system in a house. Apparently, there was no written contract and there was no meeting of minds with respect to the costs to install this water treatment system. The plumber recorded a construction lien and foreclosed the lien and, as an alternative cause of action, sued the owner for quantum meruit (unjust enrichment) for the reasonable value of labor, services, and materials it provided to the owner.

The reason the plumber sued the owner to foreclose a construction lien and for quantum meruit is because there was uncertainty as to whether a contract existed between the owner and the plumber. A construction lien, however, can only arise if there is a contract (oral or written)—no contract means no lien rights. Under a quantum meruit action, there is an acknowledgment that a contract does not exist, but because value was allegedly provided, the party should be entitled to the reasonable cost of that value.

Whether the plumber prevailed on its construction lien action or alternative quantum meruit action should have been crucial for a determination of which party should be deemed a prevailing party for purposes of recovering its attorney fees. The reason being that a party does not have any legal basis to recover their attorneys’ fees in a quantum meruit action since there is no statutory or contractual basis to recover fees in this type of action.

At trial, a jury decided that a contract did not exist between the plumber and the owner. Because a contract did not exist, the plumber could not prevail on its construction lien action. However, the jury did decide that the plumber did provide value to the owner of approximately $13,000 and ruled in favor of the plumber on its alternative quantum meruit action.

The issue on appeal to the First District was whether the owner or the plumber should be deemed the prevailing party for purposes of fees. From a practical standpoint, it would make sense that the owner prevailed on the significant issues test because the owner prevailed in entirety on the construction lien foreclosure action, importantly, the only count that entitled a party to recover attorneys’ fees. But, this rationale is not the rationale employed by the First District. Instead, the First District maintained:

“While we agree the Shephards [owner] must now be deemed the prevailing parties on the lien foreclosure count, entry of the money judgment in favor of M&R [plumber] on the quantum meruit count made M&R, not the Shephards, the prevailing party in the litigation, viewing the entire ‘action brought’ as a whole.”

Neither party was deemed the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys’ fees. This ruling, unfortunately, leads to further confusion and frustration on when a party will be deemed the prevailing party in a construction lien action. Here, the plumber lost in entirety its lien action despite being awarded some money in its quantum meruit action (again, an equity action that does not afford the prevailing party to attorneys’ fees). This was overlooked by the First District leaving an owner that prevailed on the significant issues of the lien action to bear all of its attorneys’ fees. The only conclusion that can be reached from this decision is that, again, there is no objective or qualitative way to determine the prevailing party in a construction lien foreclosure action, especially given the ruling in this case where a party can win the lien action but lose an alternative equity action and still not be deemed the prevailing party.