DID THE INSURED FORFEIT PROPERTY INSURANCE COVERAGE BY FAILING TO COMPLY WITH POST-LOSS POLICY OBLIGATIONS?

Posted on June 30, 2019 by David Adelstein Posted in Insurance | Tagged forfeiture of coverage, insurance forfeiture, insurer prejudice, post-loss, post-loss obligation, property insurance

Have you complied with your property insurance policy’s post-loss policy obligations? Has your property insurer argued that your failure to comply with post-loss policy obligations has resulted in you forfeiting insurance coverage? Have you filed a lawsuit against your property insurer for coverage and the property insurer has asserted affirmative defenses based on your material breach of the policy by failing to comply with post-loss policy obligations?

These are common questions when an insured submits a claim under a property insurance policy. Knowing how to address these questions (and a property insurer’s coverage defenses relating to these questions) is important when pursuing a property insurance claim.

The Third District Court of Appeal in American Integrity Insurance Company v. Estrada, 44 Fla. L. Weekly D1639a (Fla. 3d DCA 2019), does a good job addressing these questions in a property insurance coverage dispute involving vandalism. The property insurer in this case raised various forfeiture of coverage affirmative defenses relating to its insured’s failure to comply with post-loss policy conditions, e.g., (i) failure to appear for an examination under oath, (ii) failure to promptly notify the insurer of the vandalism (the loss), (iii) failure to submit a sworn proof of loos, (iv) failure to provide all requested records, and (v) failure to protect the property from further damage by making repairs. These are fairly routine affirmative defenses raised by a property insurer. The procedural argument in this case is not relevant; what is relevant is the Court’s discussion of an insurer’s affirmative defenses based on its insured’s failure to comply with post-loss policy obligations.

As shown below, an insured’s breach of a post-loss policy obligation MUST be material and MUST prejudice the insurer. An insured’s material breach of a post-loss obligation will result in a presumption of prejudice to the insurer, however, an insured can REBUT the presumption by showing the insurer was not prejudiced, which is a question of fact for the trier of fact.

1. Breach of Post-Loss Obligations Must be “Material”

The Third District explained:

Florida law “abhors” forfeiture of insurance coverage. See Axis Surplus Ins. Co. v. Caribbean Beach Club Ass’n, Inc., 164 So. 3d 684, 687 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). “Moreover, ‘[p]olicy provisions that tend to limit or avoid liability are interpreted liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the drafter who prepared the policy . . . .’ ” Bethel v. Sec. Nat’l Ins. Co., 949 So. 2d 219, 223 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (quoting Flores v. Allstate Ins. Co., 819 So. 2d 740, 744 (Fla. 2002)).

With these basic principles in mind, it is, unsurprisingly, well settled that, for there to be a total forfeiture of coverage under a homeowner’s insurance policy for failure to comply with post-loss obligations (i.e., conditions precedent to suit), the insured’s breach must be material. See Drummond, 970 So. 2d at 460 (concluding that the insured’s failure to comply with a post-loss obligation “was a material breach of a condition precedent to [the insurer’s] duty to provide coverage under the policy”) (emphasis added); Starling, 956 So. 2d at 513 (“[A] material breach of an insured’s duty to comply with a policy’s condition precedent relieves the insurer of its obligations under the contract.”) (emphasis added); Goldman v. State Farm Fire Gen. Ins. Co., 660 So. 2d 300, 303 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (“An insured’s refusal to comply with a demand for an examination under oath is a willful and material breach of an insurance contract which precludes the insured from recovery under the policy.”) (emphasis added); Stringer v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 622 So. 2d 145, 146 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (“[T]he failure to submit to an examination under oath is a material breach of the policy which will relieve the insurer of its liability to pay.” (quoting 13A Couch on Insurance 2d (Rev. 3d) § 49A:361 at 760 (1982) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added))).

Further, while the interpretation of the terms of an insurance contract normally presents an issue of law, the question of whether certain actions constitute compliance with the contract often presents an issue of fact. See State Farm Fla. Ins. Co. v. Figueroa, 218 So. 3d 886, 888 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (“Whether an insured substantially complied with policy obligations is a question of fact.”) (emphasis added); Solano v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 155 So. 3d 367, 371 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (“A question of fact remains as to whether there was sufficient compliance with the cooperation provisions of the policy to provide State Farm with adequate information to settle the loss claims or go to an appraisal, thus precluding a forfeiture of benefits owed to the insureds.”) (emphasis added).

Estrada, supra.

2. If the Breach was Material, was the Property Insurer “Prejudiced”

Although there is a split between Florida’s Fourth and Fifth District Courts of Appeal on this prejudicial element (the Fourth District has taken a more pro-insurer friendly approach), the Third District agreed with the Fifth District’s more insured-friendly approach that “the insurer must be prejudiced by the insured’s non-compliance with a post-loss obligation in order for the insured to forfeit coverage.”

3. Party Bearing Burden to Establish Property Insurer was “Prejudiced”

The Third District held that while prejudice to an insurer will be presumed when an insured materially fails to comply with a post-loss policy obligation, the insured can rebut this presumption by showing the insurer was not prejudiced:

[W]hen an insurer has alleged, as an affirmative defense to coverage, and thereafter has subsequently established, that an insured has failed to substantially comply with a contractually mandated post-loss obligation, prejudice to the insurer from the insured’s material breach is presumed, and the burden then shifts to the insured to show that any breach of post-loss obligations did not prejudice the insurer.

Estrada, supra.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

QUICK NOTE: TIMELY RECORDING CONSTRUCTION LIEN

Posted on June 24, 2019 by David Adelstein Posted in Lien | Tagged 90 days, construction lien, final furnishing date, lien, recording lien

A construction lien needs to be recorded within 90 days from a lienor’s final furnishing date. This date is exclusive of punchlist or warranty-type work (i.e., repairs to lienor’s own work). A lienor’s final furnishing date will be included in the construction lien as the lienor’s last date on the job.

A lienor’s final furnishing date is a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact. In other words, if an owner (or party challenging the enforcement of the lien) argues that the lien was untimely recorded, the party will be arguing that the lienor failed to timely record its lien within 90 days of its final furnishing date. The application of this fact-driven issue, as further discussed in this article, is: whether the work was: 1) performed in good faith; 2) performed within a reasonable time; 3) performed in pursuance of the lienor’s contract; and 4) necessary for a completed project. Just remember, a final furnishing date will not include punchlist or warranty work a lienor is performing on the project. If a lien is recorded outside of this 90-day window, the lien will be deemed unenforceable. It is always a good practice to ensure a lien is recorded, at a minimum, weeks before the 90-day period expires to avoid any issue or argument with the lien being untimely recorded.

“LABOR” THAT CAN BE PURSUED AGAINST A MILLER ACT PAYMENT BOND

Posted on June 23, 2019 by David Adelstein Posted in Miller Act | Tagged labor, manual labor, Miller Act, Miller Act labor, payment bond

It is important to ensure you consult with counsel when it comes to Miller Act payment bond rights and defenses. One consideration is the type of “labor” that can be pursued against a Miller Act payment bond. The opinion in Prime Mechanical Service, Inc. v. Federal Solutions Groups, Inc., 2018 WL 6199930 (N.D.Cal. 2018) contains a relevant and important discussion on this topic.

In this case, a prime contractor on a federal construction project hired a subcontractor to prepare and install a new HVAC system. The subcontractor was not paid and filed a lawsuit against the prime contractor’s Miller Act payment bond. The prime contractor moved to dismiss the claim, with one argument being that design work the subcontractor was suing for was NOT “labor” that can be pursued against a Miller Act payment bond. The Court agreed:

As used in the Miller Act, the term “labor” primarily encompasses services involving “manual labor,” see United States ex rel. Shannon v. Fed. Ins. Co., 251 Fed. Appx. 269, 272 (5th Cir. 2007), or “physical toil,” see United States ex rel. Barber-Colman Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., No. 93-1665, 1994 WL 108502, at *3 (4th Cir. 1994). Although “work by a professional, such as an architect or engineer” generally does not constitute “labor” within the meaning of the Miller Act, see United States ex rel. Naberhaus-Burke, Inc. v. Butt & Head, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 (S.D. Ohio 1982), some courts have found “certain professional supervisory work is covered by the Miller Act, namely, skilled professional work which involves actual superintending, supervision, or inspection at the job site” see United States ex rel. Olson v. W.H. Cates Constr. Co., 972 F.2d 987, 990-92 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation and citation omitted) (citing, as examples, “architect … who actually superintends the work as it is being done” and “project manager … [who] did some physical labor at the job site” (internal quotation and citation omitted)).

Here, plaintiff alleges it “attended 4 or 5 on-site field meetings … to determine the location and layout of the new equipment, … performed on-site field coordination with the existing equipment, … took on-site field measurements for fabrication of duct work and support hangers, … scheduled the start date and while on-site planned site access and crane locations, prepared product and equipment submittals, and obtained security passes.” (See FAC ¶ 12.) The above-listed services are, however, “clerical or administrative tasks which, even if performed at the job site, do not involve the physical toil or manual work necessary to bring them within the scope of the Miller Act.” See United States ex rel. Constructors, Inc. v. Gulf. Ins. Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 593, 597 (E.D. Va. 2004) (holding subcontractor did not furnish “ ‘labor’ within the contemplation of the Miller Act” where subcontractor’s duties entailed paying invoices, reviewing subcontractor and vendor proposals, supervising the hiring of site personnel, and providing site coordination services). Although taking “on-site field measurements” (see FAC ¶ 12) may have involved some minor physical activity, it does not amount to the physical “toil” required by the Miller Act.

Prime Mechanical Service, 2018 WL 6199930, at *3.

QUICK NOTE: A CONSTRUCTION LIEN IS NOT INTENDED TO LAST INDEFINITELY

Posted on June 16, 2019 by David Adelstein Posted in Lien | Tagged construction lien, lien, notice of contest, notice of contest of lien

A construction lien is not intended to last forever. A construction lien must be recorded within one year from its recording date because a construction lien only lasts for one year by operation of law. You will not be able to foreclose a construction lien after this one-year period expires. This is why it is always good practice to calendar the expiration of this one-year period when a construction lien is recorded. There is never a good reason to engage in a last minute scramble to file a foreclosure lawsuit on the expiration date (or shortly before). While I always believe a lienor should work with counsel to record a construction lien, regardless, I would certainly recommend a lienor to work with counsel to ensure lien rights are properly perfected so that when it becomes necessary to foreclose the lien, the strategy is in place to file the foreclosure lawsuit.

Importantly, an owner can shorten the one-year period for a lienor to foreclose its construction lien by properly recording a Notice of Contest of Lien. A Notice of Contest of Lien will shorten the period for a lienor to foreclose its construction lien to sixty days. It is always beneficial to record the Notice of Contest of Lien sooner than later because it puts the onus on the lienor to either foreclose the construction lien or lose its lien and ability to foreclose its lien by operation of law. That’s right – if the lienor does not foreclose its lien within the sixty-day window, it will have lost its lien rights. There are times where an owner of real property records a Notice of Contest of Lien without the use of counsel. I do not suggest this for a couple of reasons. First, you want to ensure this is done right and, second, there may be other strategic decisions that may be better implemented based on the circumstances of the dispute.