shutterstock_617053133Destructive testing is a routine investigatory procedure in construction defect disputes.   The destructive testing is necessary to determine liability (causation), the extent of damage, and the repair protocol.   Destructive testing is designed to answer numerous questions:  Why did the building component fail?  Was the building component constructed incorrectly?  What is the magnitude of the damage caused by the failure? What specifically caused the damage?  What is the most effective way to fix the failure and damage?  There are different iterations to the same questions, but in many instances, destructive testing is necessary to answer these questions.


Claimants sometimes prohibit destructive testing.  Of course, destructive testing is intrusive.  In many instances, it is very intrusive.  But, this testing is a necessary evil.  Without this testing, how can a defendant truly analyze their potential exposure and culpability?  They need to be in a position to prepare a defense and figure out their liability.  This does not mean destructive testing is warranted in every single construction defect dispute.  That is not the case.   However, to say it is never warranted is irrational. 


Florida Statutes Chapter 558 (the pre-suit notice of construction defects process) addresses the issue of destructive testing when parties are participating in this obligatory pre-suit notice of construction defect process:


(a) If the person served with notice under subsection (1) determines that destructive testing is necessary to determine the nature and cause of the alleged defects, such person shall notify the claimant in writing.

(b) The notice shall describe the destructive testing to be performed, the person selected to do the testing, the estimated anticipated damage and repairs to or restoration of the property resulting from the testing, the estimated amount of time necessary for the testing and to complete the repairs or restoration, and the financial responsibility offered for covering the costs of repairs or restoration.

(c) If the claimant promptly objects to the person selected to perform the destructive testing, the person served with notice under subsection (1) shall provide the claimant with a list of three qualified persons from which the claimant may select one such person to perform the testing. The person selected to perform the testing shall operate as an agent or subcontractor of the person served with notice under subsection (1) and shall communicate with, submit any reports to, and be solely responsible to the person served with notice.

(d) The testing shall be done at a mutually agreeable time.

(e) The claimant or a representative of the claimant may be present to observe the destructive testing.

(f) The destructive testing shall not render the property uninhabitable.

(g) There shall be no construction lien rights under part I of chapter 713 for the destructive testing caused by a person served with notice under subsection (1) or for restoring the area destructively tested to the condition existing prior to testing, except to the extent the owner contracts for the destructive testing or restoration.

If the claimant refuses to agree and thereafter permit reasonable destructive testing, the claimant shall have no claim for damages which could have been avoided or mitigated had destructive testing been allowed when requested and had a feasible remedy been promptly implemented.

Florida Statute s. 558.004(2).


Under this pre-suit process, if a claimant refuses to permit reasonable destructive testing, the claimant shall have no claim for damages which could have been mitigated or avoided had destructive testing been allowed and had a feasible remedy been promptly implemented.  In my opinion, this has very little teeth as it raises too many factual issues such as 1) was the destructive testing reasonable, 2) what damages could have realistically been mitigated and how do you prove this, 3) what is a feasible remedy and how is one to know whether the defendant would have even proposed or implemented a feasible remedy, 4) is the feasible remedy a remedy that mitigates future damage or fully addresses the root of the problem, and 5) what is the quantum of damages that could have been mitigated or avoided.   Establishing the reasonableness of the destructive testing is likely easy as an expert would support this.  But the same expert would have to establish the other requirements as a basis to establish an affirmative defense that some of the claimed damages the plaintiff is seeking could have been mitigated had the claimant allowed pre-suit destructive testing.


Oftentimes, however, a defendant wants to undertake certain destructive testing after a lawsuit has been initiated.  What happens if the plaintiff refuses such testing in this scenario?  In a recent products liability case, Westerbeke Corp. v. Atherton, 42 Fla.L.Weekly D1741c (Fla. 2d DCA 2017), a defendant wanted to perform destructive testing on a gas generator that caused an explosion on a boat.  The plaintiff did not want this testing to be performed.   In support of the testing, the defendant relied on a federal district case that applied four factors to consider whether the destructive testing is warranted:


1) Whether the proposed testing is reasonable, necessary, and relevant to proving the movant’s case; 2) Whether the non-movant’s ability to present evidence at trial will be hindered, or whether the non-movant will be prejudiced in some other way; 3) Whether there are any less prejudicial alternative methods of obtaining the evidence sought; and 4) Whether there are adequate safeguards to minimize prejudice to the non-movant, particularly the non-movant’s ability to present evidence at trial.


 Westerbke Corp., supra, quoting Mirchandani v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 235 F.R.D. 611, 614 (D.Md. 2006).


The trial court did not apply these four factors and denied the defendant’s request to perform destructive testing on the gas generator.  On appeal (through a petition for writ of certiorari), the appellate court reversed.  Unfortunately, the appellate court punted without providing specific guidance as to what standard the trial should follow when granting or denying a request for destructive testing.  The appellate court simply held that the four factors above may provide guidance to the trial court, but are not controlling in Florida.  The appellate court further summarily pointed to the Florida’s Rules of Civil Procedure to address the issue:


The Florida law regarding discovery in general provides that a party in a civil case is entitled to discover evidence that is relevant to the subject matter of the case and that is admissible or reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(1); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So. 2d 91, 94 (Fla. 1995). In addition, “[a]ny party may request any other party . . . to inspect and copy, test, or sample any tangible things that constitute or contain matters within the scope of rule 1.280(b) and that are in the possession, custody, or control of the party to whom the request is directed.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.350(a)(2). “The discovery rules . . . confer broad discretion on the trial court to limit or prohibit discovery in order to ‘protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.‘ ” Rasmussen v. S. Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla. 1987) (citing Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c)). We conclude that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law in failing to apply the proper discovery standard…..



The four factors outlined above are reasonable factors that comport with Florida law – whether the testing is relevant to the subject matter of the case. The factors provide guidance as to how to determine relevancy of destructive testing during the course of a lawsuit.  Plus, the court can always impose limitations or restrictions to reduce any intrusion and protect the claimant’s interests while allowing testing to be performed.   By the appellate court punting and not even ruling on whether the destructive testing would be relevant in the underlying action, the court is simply inviting another appeal.


Please contact David Adelstein at or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.




shutterstock_306317915Construction projects can lead to insurance coverage disputes.  One such dispute arises when a general contractor is sued for construction defects and resulting property damage and it tenders the defense of the claim / lawsuit to an implicated subcontractor’s liability insurer.  A general contractor does this because it (hopefully) will be an additional insured under the subcontractor’s liability policy.  Being identified as an additional insured under a subcontractor’s liability policy is imperative for a general contractor as part of its normal risk assessment. The issue will typically come up in any construction defect lawsuit because if the general contractor is an additional insured it will, and should, tender the defense of the lawsuit to implicated subcontractors’ insurers. 


Sometimes, a subcontractor’s liability insurer will deny the duty to defend the general contractor.  Yes, this happens.  When it does, the general contractor’s insurer will provide a defense to the general contractor but may pursue the subcontractor’s insurer for reimbursement of fees and costs based on the general contractor being an additional insured under the subcontractor’s liability policy.


For example, in Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 161 F.Supp.3d 113 (N.D.Fla. 2015), the general contractor’s liability insurer (Travelers) sued a stucco subcontractor’s liability insurer (Amerisure) where the underlying issue was whether the general contractor was an additional insured under the subcontractor’s liability policy.  The subcontractor’s insurer refused to defend the general contractor in an underlying construction defect lawsuit.  The general contractor’s insurer provided a defense in the underlying lawsuit and sued the subcontractor’s insurer for reimbursement.  


Under Florida law, a liability insurer’s duty to defend extends to an entire lawsuit if any claim in the lawsuit may come within the policy’s coverage.”  Travelers Property Casualty Co., 161 F.Supp.3d at 1137.    The underlying complaint against the general contractor alleged property damage caused by defective stucco installation.  This meant that the complaint triggered the duty to defend and the Court held the general contractor was an additional insured under the subcontractor’s liability policy.  For this reason, the Court maintained that the subcontractor’s insurer (Amerisure) owed the general contractor’s insurer (Travelers) the reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in the defense of the general contractor in the underlying lawsuit:


When Amerisure [subcontractors’ insurer] failed to step up, Travelers [general contractor’s insurer] did what Amerisure should have done: Travelers provided Yates [general contractor] a defense. The attorneys Travelers hired chose to defend the case not only by answering the claims but also by asserting third-party claims against subcontractors, including Jemco [stucco subcontractor]. Travelers paid the fees and costs incurred in connection with the third-party claims, apparently concluding that this was the best strategy for defending the claims and that its duty to defend Yates thus obligated it to pay for the third-party claims as well. There is support for that view. 


Had Amerisure provided a defense as it should have done, the attorneys it hired might or might not have made the  same strategic decision as the attorneys hired by Travelers. But now Amerisure can complain, at most, about unreasonable decisions, not about decisions that reasonably could have gone either way. As a leading commentator has put it, when an insurer breaches its duty to defend,

the insured is justified in assuming the defense of the action and is released from the contractual obligation to leave the management of the case to the insurer. Not only does the insurer lose the power to control the defense or dictate to the insured how the case should be handled, but the insurer cannot complain about the conduct of the defense by the insured or the negligent handling of the case by the insured’s attorney.


Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America, 161 F.Supp.3d at 1138-39 (internal citations omitted).




Please contact David Adelstein at or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.


images-1The Spearin doctrine, referred to as the implied warranty of constructability doctrine, is oftentimes utilized as an affirmative defense by a contractor being sued for construction defects.  Under the Spearin doctrine (recognized in the government contract setting), a contractor is NOT liable for defects in the plans and specifications furnished by the owner if the contractor constructs the project pursuant to the plans and specifications.  This is because the owner impliedly warrants the constructability of the plans and specifications it furnishes to the contractor.  Hence, the contractor should not be liable for defective construction caused by the owner furnishing defective plans and specifications.


As with any affirmative defense, the contractor asserting the Spearin doctrine has the burden to prove the merits of the defenseSpecifically, the contractor has the burden to prove that there was an error in the plans or specifications and that such error was the proximate cause of the defective construction.  The contractor needs to prove this in order to sustain the Spearin doctrine as an affirmative defense.  See, e.g., Underwater Engineering Services, Inc. v. Utility Board of the City of Key West, 194 So.3d 437, n. 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (“By raising this defense [of the Spearin Doctrine] Underwater [contractor] had the burden to prove not only that there was a defect in the specifications, but that the defect in the specifications was the proximate cause of the failure of the eight [concrete] collars.”); see also Rick’s Mushroom Service, Inc. v. U.S., 521 F.3d 1338, 1344-45 (Fed.Cir. 2008) (“‘When the government provides a contractor with defective specifications, the government is deemed to have breached the implied warranty that satisfactory contract performance will result from adherence to the specifications, and the contractor is entitled to recover all of the costs proximately flowing from the breach.’”) quoting Essex Electro Eng’rs, Inc. v. Danzig, 224 F.3d 1283, 1289 (Fed.Cir.2000).


Asserting the Spearin doctrine as an affirmative defense is one thing, but proving it is another.  If relying on this defense, make sure to prove through expert testimony that there was (i) a defect in the plans or specifications furnished by the owner and (ii) that this defect proximately caused the defects or failures being asserted by the plaintiff (e.g., owner).   


Please contact David Adelstein at or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.



unknownRecently, I read an informative article from another attorney addressing considerations of an owner when it receives a repair protocol in response to a Florida Statutes Chapter 558 notice of defect letter.   This is a well-written article and raises two important issues applicable to construction defect disputes: 1) how is an owner supposed to respond to a repair protocol submitted by a contractor in accordance with Florida’s 558 notice of construction defects procedure and 2) irrespective of Florida’s 558 procedure, how is an owner supposed to treat a contractual notice to cure / notice of defect requirement that requires the owner to give the contractor a notice to cure a defect. This article raises such pertinent points that I wanted to address the issues and topics raised in this article.  


 558 Procedure–Owner’s Receipt of Contractor’s Repair Protocol


When a contractor submits a repair protocol to an owner in response to a notice of construction defects letter per Florida Statutes Chapter 558, the owner should seriously consider that protocol.   The owner does this by discussing with counsel and any retained expert.   The owner needs to know whether the protocol is a reasonable, cost-effective protocol to repair the asserted defects or, alternatively, whether the protocol is merely a band-aid approach and/or otherwise insufficiently addresses the claimed defects.  Every scenario is different. 


Oftentimes, I want my client’s expert (if I represent the owner) to analyze the protocol and opine as to the deficiencies in the repair protocol, as well as problems concerning the actual logistics of implementing the protocol.  The objective would be that these opinions would come out down the road (say trial) when the contractor argues that the owner failed to mitigate damages by not promptly implementing the contractor’s repair protocol.    Sometimes, I want a tolling agreement (an agreement to extend the statute of limitations where the other side agrees not to raise the statute of limitations as a defense) so that if the repairs do not work, the owner’s rights are not prejudiced and the owner can still pursue the defect claim. 


 As the article correctly pointed out, every scenario is fact-specific, however, in each scenario, the owner should consider the repairs being proposed by the contractor in response to a Florida Statutes Chapter 558 notice of construction defects letter.


Contractual Notice to Cure / Opportunity to Repair


The article further discussed the case of Underwater Engineering Services, Inc. v. Utility Board of the City of Key West, 194 So.3d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016).  Without getting into all of the technical facts, a public owner hired a contractor to perform certain structural repairs and, applicable here, the contract provided:



A. Replace the Work, or portions of the Work, not conforming to specified requirements.

B. If, at the request of the Contractor and in the opinion of the Engineer, it is not Practical to remove and replace the Work, the Engineer will direct one of the following remedies:

1. The defective Work may remain, but the Unit Price will be adjusted to a new price as agreed to by the Owner and Engineer.

2. The defective Work will be partially repaired to the instructions of the Engineer, and the Unit Price will be adjusted to a new price.


The public owner claimed that the contractor defectively constructed eight concrete collars.  However, the public owner failed to give the contractor an opportunity to cure / replace the defectively constructed concrete collars.   In other words, the contractor was never given an opportunity to actually cure or replace the asserted defect pursuant to the terms of the contract.  As a consequence of the public owner violating this opportunity to cure requirement, the appellate court reversed an award of damages in favor of the public owner and remanded with directions to enter judgment in favor of the contractor as to the owner’s defect claim.  Thus, by the public owner failing to give the contractor a contractual opportunity to cure–and  unilaterally fixing the defects–the owner recovered nothing from the contractor due to the defective work.


Irrespective of the requirements of Florida Statutes Chapter 558, an owner should absolutely comply with a contractual notice to cure / repair requirement.  Otherwise, the contractor has the argument that the owner’s failure to comply with this contractual requirement should preclude the owner from recovering any damages for fixing the defect.


Further, if an owner receives a repair protocol, whether in response to a contractual notice to cure requirement or Florida Statutes Chapter 558, the owner should consider the repair protocol and consult with counsel and any retained expert to analyze the reasonableness and logistics of the protocol.


Please contact David Adelstein at or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.



UnknownDoes a CGL insurer have a duty to defend its insured-contractor during Florida Statutes Chapter 558 notice of construction defects pre-suit process?  This answer is currently undecided and will be up to the Florida Supreme Court to decide.  (It is on appeal stemming from a federal district court saying that an insurer does not have a duty to defend its insured-contractor in the 558 process based on the definition of the word “suit” in the CGL policy.)


Why is this an important issue?


The 558 pre-suit notice of construction defects process is designed to facilitate an avenue for construction defect lawsuits to get resolved without having to file a lawsuit or, at least, have issues narrowed before a lawsuit needs to be filed.  (Check here for a summary of the 558 process.)  It requires pre-suit notifications so that implicated parties can become aware of the defects and have an opportunity to inspect the defects / damage, test the defects / damage, and respond to the notice of construction defects; it provides an avenue for beneficial pre-suit discovery.  Through participating in the 558 process, the contractor and/or design professional (and those downstream from them) can:  (i) offer to remedy the defect, (ii) settle the defect, whether through money or a combination of money and repairs, (iii) dispute the defect, or (iv) advise that available insurance proceeds will be determined by its  liability insurer.  See Fla. Stat. s. 558.004.


There are definitely some pros and cons to the 558 pre-suit process.  There is no doubt about this.  But, if the insured-contractor’s insurer is not on board with the process, then it invariably will fail (unless the defects are relatively minor in nature).  Why will it fail?  Because 558 notice of construction defect letters can contain an extensive laundry list of defects–some minor, some major and complicated.  This means that the insured-contractor really needs an expert or experts on board to truly analyze these issues from a liability and damages standpoint including the most cost effective approach to remedy the defects and corresponding damage.  This, as you can imagine, is costly.  The insured-contractor also wants to know that if a monetary settlement is made, the settlement includes insurance proceeds for damages covered by the CGL policy.  


All of this can really only effectively take place if the insurer defends the insured-contractor in this process to best assess its risk and any forthcoming lawsuit that should (hopefully) nevertheless trigger the insurer’s duty to defend its insured-contractor.   Hence, there is no reason for the insurer not be engaged in the process and defend its insured-contractor, at least under a reservation of rights.  Unfortunately, if the liability insurer disengages from the process and is not willing to defend its insured in the process, then the insured-contractor in many instances is best-off waiting for that lawsuit that will then (a) trigger the insurer’s duty to defend and (b) require the insurer to now incur the costs of the defense, including experts, to defend its insured.  By the insurer not defending its insured-contractor earlier, such as the 558 process, all it is doing is inviting an expensive multi-party lawsuit and not educating itself of the nature of the defects and damage (i.e., its risk assessment) so that efforts can be made to resolve the defect claim, narrow the issues, or develop the framework of the defense.



Please contact David Adelstein at or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.





imagesIn construction defect disputes, oftentimes the owner (or developer or association, as may be applicable) will assert a claim against the general contractor, and perhaps, subcontractors for a violation of the building code.  Such a claim is authorized pursuant to Florida Statute s. 553.84 that provides:


Notwithstanding any other remedies available, any person or party, in an individual capacity or on behalf of a class of persons or parties, damaged as a result of a violation of this part or the Florida Building Code, has a cause of action in any court of competent jurisdiction against the person or party who committed the violation; however, if the person or party obtains the required building permits and any local government or public agency with authority to enforce the Florida Building Code approves the plans, if the construction project passes all required inspections under the code, and if there is no personal injury or damage to property other than the property that is the subject of the permits, plans, and inspections, this section does not apply unless the person or party knew or should have known that the violation existed.


A violation of the building code serves as evidence of negligence by the offending party.  See Russ v. Wollheim, 915 So.2d 1285, n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (“A building code is designed to protect the general public rather than a particular class of individuals, and therefore, violation of a building code is merely evidence of negligence.” )


But who determines whether an asserted defect, error, or omission constitutes a violation of the building code?  Is this a question of law for the judge?  Or, is this a question of fact for the jury (in a jury trial)?  Remarkably, cases have held that a violation of a building code, a complicated and rather specialized issue, is a question of law for the judge to determine.


In Edward J. Seibert, A.I.A. Architect and Planner, P.A. v. Bayport Beach and Tennis Club Ass’n, Inc., 573 So.2d 889 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), a condominium association filed suit against the architect among others.  The jury found that the architect was liable for violating the building code in the fire exit design even though the design had been approved by the building department upon the issuance of the building permit. To support this violation, the association had an expert testify regarding his interpretation regarding the building code. The architect testified that his design complied with the building code and had two supporting expert opinions.  The verdict form asked the jury if the fire exist design complied with the applicable code.  The Second District held that the interpretation of the code was a question of law that should not have been submitted to the jury.


They [the parties] instead presented conflicting opinions as to how the code should be interpreted. The jury was allowed to determine the meaning of the code and then whether Seibert [architect] violated the code by designing only one fire exit. This was error. An expert should not be allowed to testify concerning questions of law, and the interpretation of the building code presented a question of law.



It was the duty of the trial court to interpret the meaning of the code and instruct the jury concerning that meaning. Any conflicts in interpretation were for the court to resolve and their resolution was not a jury issue.

Edward J. Seibert, 573 So.2d at 891-9 (internal citations omitted).


Further, in Lindsey v. Bill Arflin Bonding Agency, Inc., 645 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), a personal injury plaintiff sued an owner for slipping on a wet spot on stairs.  The plaintiff claimed that the stairs lacked handrails in violation of the building code.  The owners relied on testimony from a building department official opining that handrails were not required based on his interpretation of the code / ordinance at-issue.   The First District, however, found:


Expert testimony as to the meaning of an ordinance is not appropriate when the disputed language consists of “ordinary words susceptible to being given plain effect consistent with their ordinary meaning.” The legal effect of a building code presents a question of law for the court, not a question of fact for the jury. While expert testimony may be relevant and helpful to the court where a statute or ordinance contains words of art or scientific and technical terms, even then such testimony cannot dictate the court’s construction of the enactment.

Lindsey, 645 So.2d at 568 (internal citations omitted).



Please contact David Adelstein at or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.




images-2You bought a house.  Congratulations! You are all excited.  You move in, get settled, and then the dreadful happens.  You discover that the new house you bought contains water intrusion or other significant construction defects.   You begin to think about the money pit you just bought; hilarious movie, by the way, so I digress with a funny scene from the movie:








Back to the issue.  What do you do with the perceived money pit that you know or anticipate will cost you substantial sums to repair.  First, assuming this was not new construction, you pull up the seller’s disclosure to see whether the seller (former owner) disclosed any of the water intrusion or construction defects.  The seller did not.  You believe the seller knew or reasonably should have known of these construction defects. How could they not?  So you consult a lawyer (always a good first step) to explore what is known as the Johnson v. Davis line of cases that stand for the proposition that a seller has a duty to disclose known defects with the house they are selling. See Johnson v. Davis, 480 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1985).


A new case, Bowman v. Barker, 40 Fla. L. Weekly D2091b (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), bolsters a buyer’s claims against a seller for not disclosing known defects in their house.  In this case, the sellers apparently purchased a dilapidated house (cheaply) and renovated the house with the intent on flipping the house to another buyer.  The house was sold.  Defects were not disclosed.  After the sale, the buyer discovered numerous construction defects.  The buyer sued the seller, amongst others, for failing to disclose these defects that the buyer contended the seller knew about or should have reasonably known about.


The First District explained:


The duty to disclose known defects under Johnson v. Daviscontinues to exist for a home sold “as is.” The sellers do not dispute this principle. Despite selling this house “as is,” the sellers had a duty to disclose what they knew about its condition, and they undertook to make disclosures to Appellant [buyer] about the condition of the house. The record demonstrates triable issues of fact about what that condition was, what the sellers knew about it, what disclosures were made, and whether those disclosures were accurate.


This means the buyer is able to let the trier of fact (jury or judge) determine the issue of whether the seller knew of the construction defects but failed to disclose them to the buyer.  This is a good case for a buyer since it supports the argument that these are issues to be determined by the trier of fact, putting pressure on the seller based on how the trier of facts may interpret the facts knowing the house they just sold contains numerous construction defects. For instance, in this case, the First District noted: “This evidence raises a question of fact about the appellees’ [seller’s] knowledge, as well as questions about their credibility and the plausibility of their denying knowledge of the property’s substantial defects and what repairs it needed.”


Consult an attorney if you purchase a house and discover construction defects, especially if you believe you just bought a money pit.  An attorney can assist you with potential recourse under the law.  


Please contact David Adelstein at or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.



UnknownI previously wrote an article regarding Florida Statutes Chapter 558 and its pre-lawsuit application to construction defects.  In particular, I discussed a claimant’s (e.g., owner) requirement to submit a written notice of construction defects to potentially responsible parties and those parties rights under Chapter 558


When a party (e.g., contractor, subcontractor, design professional) receives a written notice of construction defects pursuant to Chapter 558, that party should notify its insurer (CGL or professional liability, as applicable) of a construction defect claim.  This is generally the prudent avenue to ensure timely notice is given to the insurer and that the insurer starts to pay defense costs as a party participates in the Chapter 558 pre-lawsuit process. 


But, what if the CGL insurer refuses to pay a party’s defense costs in participating in the pre-lawsuit process set out in Chapter 558?  The recent opinion in Altman Contractors, Inc. v. Crum & Foster Specialty Ins. Co., 2015 WL 3539755 (S.D.Fla. 2015) deals with this very issue.


In this case, a general contractor received written notices of construction defects from a condominium association per Chapter 558. The general contractor notified its CGL insurer of the written notices of defects and demanded that its insurer defend and indemnify it in connection with the notices.  The CGL insurer denied it had any duties with respect to a written notice of defects under Chapter 558 since the matter was “not in suit.”  Subsequently, the insurer claimed it would participate in the pre-lawsuit Chapter 558 process, but that it was going to hire its preferred counsel to represent the general contractor.  The general contractor objected and filed a lawsuit against its CGL insurer seeking a declaration of rights under the policy that (a) the CGL insurer’s duty to defend the general contractor was triggered upon the general contractor’s receipt of the written notice of defects per Chapter 558 and (b) the CGL insurer was responsible for paying the general contractor’s private counsel’s defense costs from the time the CGL insurer was placed on notice of the written notice of defects claim.


In analyzing this issue, the court examined the following language in the general contractor’s CGL policy (common language in CGL policies):


We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any “suit” seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to defend the insured against any “suit” seeking damages for “bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this insurance does not apply. We may, at our discretion, investigate any “occurrence” and settle any claim or “suit” that may result.




Suit” means a civil proceeding in which damages because of “bodily injury,” “property damage” or “personal and advertising injury” to which this insurance applies are alleged. “Suit” includes:

a. An arbitration proceeding in which such damages are claimed and to which the insured must submit or does submit with our consent; or

b. Any other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in which such damages are claimed and to which the insured submits with our consent.

Altman Contractors, supra, at *5, 6.



As reflected by the CGL policy’s language, the policy required the CGL insurer to defend the general contractor against any “suit,” and the term “suit” was defined as a “civil proceeding.”  The court looked at the ordinary definition / meaning of a civil proceeding and determined that the ordinary meaning was a judicial proceedingSince the court determined that a Chapter 558 written notice of defects claim did NOT constitute a “civil proceeding” under the CGL policy, it concluded that the CGL insurer had NO duty to defend or indemnify the general contractor under the Chapter 558 pre-lawsuit process.




  • If your CGL policy contains analogous language to the policy in this case regarding the definition of “suit,” there is a strong chance that your CGL insurer has NO duty to defend or indemnify you in the Chapter 558 notice of defects pre-lawsuit process. This means a party has to incur its own defense costs in participating in Chapter’s 558 pre-lawsuit process. This also means any decision a party makes in Chapter’s 558 pre-lawsuit process is probably not reimbursable.
  • If your CGL insurer has no duty to defend or indemnify you in connection with a written notice of defects under Chapter 558, this means you need to be sued for the alleged defects in order to trigger the CGL insurer’s duty to defend and indemnify you under the policy.
  • It is still good practice to notify your insurer of a written notice of defects under Chapter 558.  And, if you are a claimant, it is still good practice to notify potentially responsible parties’ insurers of the written notice of defects.  There are insurers that will assume the defense obligation at this point even though a lawsuit has not been initiated.  But, as reflected in this case, the insurer may hire their own counsel instead of the insured’s preferred choice of counsel to do so (which also means that the insurer plans on using its preferred choice of counsel if/when a lawsuit is filed against the insured).


Please contact David Adelstein at or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.


imagesI previously wrote about insurance coverage issues in a construction defect dispute, specifically in the context of the insurer denying coverage outright and refusing to defend its insured.


As a sequel to this posting, a noteworthy opinion was issued by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Carithers v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 2015 WL 1529038 (11th Cir. 2015) in a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance coverage dispute dealing with construction defects to a house.   This opinion discusses central issues to an insurance coverage dispute in a construction defect context: the triggering of a CGL policy, the duty to defend, the duty to indemnify, covered resulting damage stemming from construction defects, and a claimant resolving a dispute with an insured in order to pursue rights against the insured’s CGL carrier (also known as a Coblentz agreement).


In this case, the owners hired a general contractor to build their house.  The general contractor had CGL insurance with products completed operations coverage.  Upon discovering construction defects, the owners sued the general contractor.  The general contractor’s insurer refused to defend the general contractor, meaning the insurer denied coverage (which is the last thing the general contractor ever wants to hear).  The insurer denied coverage because the complaint alleged that the damages were not discovered until 2010; however, the general contractor did not have any CGL coverage after 2008.  Thus, if the manifestation theory applied to trigger coverage (discussed below), there would be no coverage under the CGL policy.


The general contractor and insurer then entered into a consent judgment in the action for $90,000 in favor of the owners that assigned to the owners the general contractor’s rights under its CGL policy.  (This forms the framework for what is known as a Coblentz agreement.)  The owners then sued the general contractor’s CGL insurer.


The issues in this case were (a) the insurer’s duty to defend its general contractor-insured, (b) the triggering of an occurrence under a CGL policy, and (c) resulting damage covered under the CGL policy.


(A) Duty to Defend


The insurer’s duty to defend is triggered by the allegations in the complaint.  Here, the Eleventh Circuit held that the insurer had a duty to defend because the duty to defend is broader than the insurer’s duty to indemnify and “all doubts as to whether a duty to defend exists in a particular case must be resolved against the insurer and in favor of the insured.” Carithers, supra, at *4 (quotation and citation omitted). “An insurance company must defend an action where the facts alleged against the insured would give rise to coverage, even if those facts are not ultimately proven at trial.”  Id


(B) Triggering of an Occurrence Under CGL Policy


The insurer wanted the manifestation theory to trigger CGL coverage.  Under this theory, the CGL policy is triggered if the damage is discovered (manifests itself) during the policy period.  


The reason the insurer wanted this theory to apply is because the owners admitted that they discovered the damage / defects in 2010 when the general contractor’s CGL policy was no longer in effect.


Conversely, the owners wanted the injury-in-fact theory to apply to trigger coverage.  Under this theory, the policy is triggered when the damage occurs even if the damage is not discovered until sometime later.  Here, the trial court found that the damage occurred in 2005 when the general contractor’s CGL carrier was in effect (although the damage was not discovered until 2010).  Because there was evidence and a finding as to when the damage occurred, the Eleventh Circuit held that the injury-in-fact theory was the correct theory to trigger CGL coverage.


(C) Resulting Damage Covered Under a CGL Policy


The cost of repairing damage to other work resulting from faulty workmanship would be covered under the CGL policy.  In other words, repairing damage to another trade’s work would be covered but repairing / replacing damage to the trade’s own work would not be covered.  The Eleventh Circuit analyzed this application to determine whether the trial court appropriately determined that certain items were resulting damage.


(1)  Brick


The trial could found that the defective application of exterior brick coating caused resulting damage to the brick itself.  If the exterior brick coating was applied by the subcontractor that installed the brick, then the brick should not be covered since the brick was the subcontractor’s own work as opposed to other work.  However, there was no evidence at the trial level whether the brick coating and installation of the brick was done by the same subcontractor or different subcontractors.  Because the plaintiff owners (who were assigned rights under the policy by the general contractor insured) had the burden of proof on this issue, which they failed to meet, the Eleventh Circuit reversed any damage awarded associated with the brick.


(2)  The Tile and Mud Base


The trial court found that defective adhesive and an inadequate base caused damage to the tile.  The trial court awarded damage to replace the tile and mud base. Similar to the brick, the issue turned on whether the installation of the tile and mud base was done by the same subcontractor or different subcontractors.  And, similar to the brick, no evidence was offered on this point so the Eleventh Circuit reversed any damage awarded associated with the tile and mud base.


(3)  Balcony


The trial court found that defects in the construction of the balcony resulted in damage to the garage. However, because the balcony had to be rebuilt in order to repair the garage, the trial court held that this work was resulting damage covered by the CGL policy.  The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the trial court holding that the cost of repairing damage resulting from defective work is covered and since repairing the balcony was part of repairing the garage, these costs would be covered.


Important take-aways:


  • This case provides strong arguments to an insured when its CGL carrier denies coverage, specifically based on the argument that its policy was never triggered.  Remember, the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify so any doubts must be resolved in favor of the insured.


  • Don’t forget about the injury-in-fact theory to trigger CGL coverage.  If you have evidence, such as an expert opinion, as to when the damage started to occur, this theory can be valuable if the owner discovered the latent defects after the expiration of your CGL policy.  This helps an owner maximize CGL coverage and a general contractor maximize coverage under its CGL policy.


  • Make sure to meet your burden of proof to establish resulting damage or other damage caused by faulty workmanship.  Make sure to prove that the resulting damage was work performed by a different subcontractor and not the subcontractor that performed the faulty workmanship. And, to this point, make sure to include appropriate language in the consent judgment.


  • Make sure you know how to couch your coverage arguments to an insurer in order to maximize insurance coverage.


  • If your insurer denies coverage, consider entering into what is known as a Coblentz agreement with the claimant where a consent judgment is entered against you and rights under your policy are assigned to the claimant.  The benefit is that in consideration of the consent judgment and assignment of rights, the claimant gives up any rights to collect that judgment against you. 


Please contact David Adelstein at or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.


images-1If you are an owner and discover construction or design defects, you are going to want consult with a lawyer to make sure you know your rights under Florida Statutes Chapter 558.  This includes sending a written notice of the construction or design defects identifying the defects with sufficient detail to the potentially responsible parties.  Likewise, if you are a contractor and receive this written notice, you are going to want to make sure you forward that letter to potentially responsible parties (subcontractors or suppliers). 


Coupled with this written notice of defects letter should be a written request on the parties and their known insurance agents and insurers for their liability insurance information.  Start with culling Certificates of Insurance you have on these parties to obtain (some) of this information as to whom to send the request to.  This request can be in a separate letter or the same letter (as the notice of defects letter) and should reference Florida Statute s. 627.4137 and request the information in the below statutory language:


(1) Each insurer which does or may provide liability insurance coverage to pay all or a portion of any claim which might be made shall provide, within 30 days of the written request of the claimant, a statement, under oath, of a corporate officer or the insurer’s claims manager or superintendent setting forth the following information with regard to each known policy of insurance, including excess or umbrella insurance:

(a) The name of the insurer.

(b) The name of each insured.

(c) The limits of the liability coverage.

(d) A statement of any policy or coverage defense which such insurer reasonably believes is available to such insurer at the time of filing such statement.

(e) A copy of the policy.

In addition, the insured, or her or his insurance agent, upon written request of the claimant or the claimant’s attorney, shall disclose the name and coverage of each known insurer to the claimant and shall forward such request for information as required by this subsection to all affected insurers. The insurer shall then supply the information required in this subsection to the claimant within 30 days of receipt of such request.


As discussed in prior articles, insurance is an important aspect of construction and design defect disputes. 


If you are an owner, you want to understand potential insurance coverage so that you know how to best maximize any claim for insurance coverage against potentially liable parties.  This includes knowing the limits of liability in any commercial general liability (CGL) or professional liability / errors & omissions policy, as applicable, and whether there is any umbrella / excess policy.  This also includes understanding the exclusions in the policies and whether there are endorsements that add or modify exclusions in the policy.


If you are a general contractor, you also want to understand potential insurance coverage from subcontractors and other entities you are looking to flow-down an owner’s defect claims (ideally, through contractual indemnification language in your subcontract).  Also, you are going to want to make sure you have additional insured status under these parties’ liability policies so that they contribute to the fees and costs incurred in your defense.  For this reason, you also want to obtain copies of subcontractor insurance polices including all endorsements.  Besides the limits of liability, you want to see the additional insured endorsement in the policy, and any endorsements that add or modify exclusions in the policy. 


If you are a subcontractor, if you subcontracted aspects of your scope of work or there is a claim associated with deficient material you furnished, you also want to obtain this insurance information from these potentially liable entities because you are also going to try to flow-down liability (ideally, through contractual indemnification language in your subcontract).


And, if you are a manufacturer, if a claim is asserted against you arising out of the installation of that product, you also want to obtain insurance information from any authorized dealer or installer (perhaps through any agreement you have with that dealer or installer that would require this entity to indemnify you and name you as an additional insured).  


One of the underlying reasons for s. 627.4137 is so that parties can obtain insurance coverage information and make reasonably informed decisions about settling a matter.  In other words, you don’t want to settle a dispute for policy limits if you have damages that may exceed policy limits and find out the responsible party has additional or excess insurance to cover the excess damages. See, e.g., Schlosser v. Perez, 832 So.2d 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (in non-construction case, noncompliance with s. 627.4137 rendered settlement unenforceable). But, this statute does not create a private cause of action by a third-party if an insurer fails to timely provide this information. Any potential recourse the third-party would have, if any, against the insurer would have to be after the third-party obtains a judgment against the underlying insured. Lucente v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 591 So.2d 1126, 1127-28 (4th DCA 1992) (“[T]he statute does not contain an implicit cause of action for a third-party against an insurance company.”);  see also Brannan v. Geico Indemnity Co., 569 Fed.Appx. 724, 728 (11th Cir. 2014)  (“But Brannan fails to point to any legal authority to show that s. 627.4137 creates a first-party private cause of action against an insurer [for failure to comply with the statute.]”).


Please contact David Adelstein at or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.