Category Archives: Uncategorized

DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROVISION IN SUBCONTRACT THAT SAYS OWNER, ARCHITECT OR ENGINEER’S DECISION IS FINAL

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In subcontracts, it is not uncommon to see a provision that says something to the effect:

Should any dispute arise between the parties respecting the true construction or interpretation of the Plans, Specifications and/or the Contract Requirements, the decision of the Owner or the Owner’s designated representative as set forth in the General Contract shall be final.

This is a provision in a subcontract dealing with dispute resolution, typically when there is a dispute as to whether the subcontractor is performing extra-contractual or base contract work regarding an “interpretation of the Plans, Specifications, and/or the Contract Requirements.” It is not uncommon for there to be a dispute as to whether certain work is within the subcontractor’s scope of work or outside the subcontractor’s scope of work and subject to a change order.

This language, however, is not a get out of jail free card for a contractor just because the owner or the architect render a decision adverse to the subcontractor.

For instance, in F.H. Paschen, S.N. Nielsen & Associates, LLC v. B&B Site Development, Inc., 2021 WL 359487 (Fla. 4thDCA 2021), the subcontract contained the same provision discussed above.  During construction, a dispute arose as to whether a 561 square yard asphalt area was required to be demolished by the subcontractor and replaced with concrete.  The subcontractor claimed this area was not within its base scope of work that only required it to demolish concrete areas and replace such areas with new concrete. The subcontractor was directed to perform this disputed work and submitted its costs to the contractor.  The contractor submitted the subcontractor’s costs to the architect and the architect decided that the 561 square yard asphalt area was included in the contractor’s scope of work.  The contractor used the architect’s decision to argue the subcontractor was not entitled to the additional costs because the asphalt area was included in the subcontractor’s scope of work.

Unfortunately for the contractor, the court disagreed based on the express terms of the subcontract.    The subcontract did not use the term asphalt or require the subcontractor to demolish asphalt areas.  It did require the subcontractor to demolish concrete or pavement areas.  The court found that:

[T]he only reasonable interpretation of the subcontract is that the scope of work did not include the removal and replacement of asphalt [area] of the parking lot. ‘Asphalt’ and ‘concrete’ are not synonymous terms.  Nothing in the subcontract stated that the Sub was required to remove any asphalt from the parking lot.  The subcontract did not say that the Sub was required to remove pavement from the ‘entire’ parking lot.  Nor did the subcontract describe the specific square footage of pavement that the Sub was to remove.

B&B Site Development, supra, at *3.

Well, what about the validity of the decision of the architect that found the demolition and replacement of this asphalt area to be within the contractor’s scope of work?

While there are certainly times such a provision is governing, “construction contracts cannot leave the arbitrary or fraudulent decision of an architect or engineer or the like to operate as a conclusive settlement of matters in controversy.” B&B Site Development, supra, at *4 (quotation and citation omitted).  Stated differently, “[t]he law does not allow a third party’s arbitrary decision concerning the scope of a contract’s specifications ‘to operate as a conclusive settlement of matters in controversy.’” Id. (citation omitted).

Here, the court found that the subcontract was clear as to the subcontractor’s scope and allowing the architect’s decision to be conclusive would “unfairly allow the revision of the explicit scope of a subcontract after work has commenced, to the detriment of the subcontractor.”  B&B Site Development, supra, at *4.

It was clear that the 561 square yard asphalt area was included in the contractor’s scope of work.  However, it was also clear that this scope of work was not clearly included in the subcontractor’s scope of work.  As a result, it would be arbitrary for the architect to find this scope of work was included in the subcontract (when the architect never reviewed the subcontract) just because the contractor was always responsible for this work.   Clearly defined scopes of work are important.  This case illustrates why because had the subcontract included language that suggested the asphalt area was within the subcontractor’s scope of work, the ruling would have been different because the architect’s decision as to what was included in the contractor’s scope of work would have presumably been passed to the subcontractor.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR A CHATTEL INCLUDING LOSS OF USE

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In a non-construction case, but an interesting case nonetheless, the Second District Court of Appeals talks about the measure of damages when dealing with chattel (property) including loss of use damages.  Chattel, you say?   While certainly not a word used in everyday language, a chattel is “an item of tangible movable or immovable property except real estate and things (such as buildings) connected with real property.”  Equipment, machinery, personal items, furniture, etc. can be considered chattel.

With respect to the measure of damages for a chattel:

“Where a person is entitled to a judgment for harm to chattels not amounting to a total destruction in value,” the plaintiff may make an election out of two theories of recovery in addition to compensation for the loss of use. Badillo v. Hill, 570 So. 2d 1067, 1068 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (quoting Restatement of Torts § 928 (Am. Law Inst. 1939)). In addition to compensation for the loss of use, the plaintiff may elect either “the difference between the value of the chattel before the harm and the value after the harm” or “the reasonable cost of repairs or restoration where feasible, with due allowance for any difference between the original value and the value after repairs.” Id. (quoting Restatement of Torts § 928).

Sack v. WSW Rental of Sarasota, LLC, 45 Fla.L.Weekly D2306a (Fla. 2d DCA 2020).

Sack is a good example of a case dealing with the measure of damages with a chattel, here, an aircraft, including loss of use damages.

An owner rented its aircraft to a pilot.  The pilot had an accident landing the aircraft causing damage to the aircraft and resulting in it resting in mud.  The owner of the aircraft and its managing member sued the pilot for damage to the aircraft including loss of use of the aircraft.  At trial, there was evidence that the aircraft incurred $219,106.81 in damages of which $40,000 remained unpaid (the balance being paid by insurance).  Furthermore, there was evidence that the value of the aircraft before the accident was $550,000 and the value of the aircraft after repairs was $350,000.   Thus, the appellate court held the measure of damages was $240,000 ($40,000 in unpaid repair costs + $200,000 associated with the diminution in value of the pre-accident aircraft to the repaired post-accident aircraft) plus loss of use damages.  (Loss of use damages was awarded at trial of $165,000 calculated “by multiplying the reasonable hourly rate of renting the [a]ircraft ($1500) by the reasonable length of time [the owner] was without the [a]ircraft (11 months) by the reasonable number of hours per month [the owner] used the [a]ircraft (10).”  Sack, supra.)

Of interest, loss of use damages were properly awarded “despite the fact that [the owner] testified that he had never chartered or rented another aircraft while this aircraft was out of use.”  Sack, supra.  Hence, the fact that the owner did not rent or charter another aircraft during the eleven months its aircraft was out of use did NOT preclude the owner from pursuing and being awarded loss of use damages.  The Second District did, however, state that loss of use damages was properly awarded to the owner—the entity that owned the aircraft—but not the managing member that was not the registered owner.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

“OTHER INSURANCE” PROVISIONS TO LIMIT INSURER’S RISK

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Insurance policies often contain an “Other Insurance” provision to limit or control an insurer’s risk if another insurer covers the same risk / loss.  See Pavarini Construction Co. (Se) Inc. v. Ace American Ins. Co., 161 F.Supp.3d 1227, 1234 (S.D.Fla. 2015) (“Other Insurance” provisions apply “when two or more insurance policies are on the same subject matter, risk, and interest.”).  This is an important provision to insurers and may be modified by an endorsement to your insurance policy.  It is designed to determine whether the policy, as discussed below, should serve as a primary policy or excess policy.  It is important to understand this “Other Insurance” provision and its application because it will come up, particularly in a multi-party construction defect dispute.

An example of an “Other Insurance” provision in a commercial general liability (CGL), subject to any modification through an endorsement to the policy, may provide something to the effect:

 

 

 

 

4. Other Insurance

If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the insured for a loss we cover under Coverages A or B of this Coverage Part, our obligations are limited as follows:

a. Primary Insurance

This insurance is primary except when b. below applies.  If this insurance is primary, our obligations are not affected unless any of the other insurance is also primary.  Then we will share with all that other insurance by the method described in c. below.

b. Excess Insurance

This insurance is excess over:

1. Any of the other insurance, whether primary excess, contingent, or on any other basis:

(a) That is Fire, Extended Coverage, Builder’s Risk, Installation Risk or similar coverage for “your work”;

2. Any other primary insurance available to you covering liability for damages arising out of the premises or operations for which you have been added as an additional insured by attachment of an endorsement.

c. Method of Sharing

If all of the other insurance permits contribution by equal shares we will follow this method also.  Under this approach, each insurer contributes equal amounts until it has paid its applicable limit of insurance or none of the loss remains, whichever comes first.

If any of the insurance does not permit contribution by equal shares, we will contribute by limits.  Under this method, each insurer’s share is based on the ratio of its applicable limit of insurance to the total applicable limits of insurance of all insurers.

If a policy is deemed as excess coverage, than “liability attaches only after a predetermined amount of primary coverage has been exhausted.”  Tudor Ins. Co. v. American Casualty Co. of Reading Pennsylvania, 274 F.Supp.3d 1278, 1283 (N.D.Fla. 2017) (quotation and citation omitted).  Hence, the “Other Insurance” provision allows an insurer to limit or control its risk by turning the policy into an excess policy.  Id. (when excess provision applies than limits of the primary policy need to first be exhausted).

When deciding the priority of coverage among multiple insurers, Florida courts generally rely on the language of the several policies, with careful attention to the other insurance clauses.  Where two insurance policies contain conflicting excess other insurance clauses, those clauses cancel one another out….  [W]here a court must allocate between two policies at the same level that contain incompatible excess clauses, the majority rule is that the two excess clauses cancel each other out, and the loss is pro-rated between the two policies. The proper method of allocation is to disregard the other insurance clauses, treat the two excess insurers as co-excess insurers, and pro-rate the loss between the two policies.

***

Florida law recognizes an exception to the rule governing competing “Other Insurance” provisions where a right of indemnification exists between the parties insured under the respective policies of insurance, especially where … one of the policies happens to cover the indemnity obligation. In this circumstance, a clear majority of jurisdictions give controlling effect to the indemnity obligation of one insured to the other insured over the ‘other insurance’ or similar clauses in the policies of insurance.  Florida cases have consistently recognized that where a loss is covered by two or more primary policies of insurance, the operation of an indemnification agreement between the common insureds has the result of shifting responsibility for the entire loss to the carrier for the indemnitor. [U]nder Florida law an indemnity agreement control[s] all the rights and obligations of the parties and their privies (the insurers), and the fact that the parties carried insurance did not ‘detract from or modify’ their indemnity agreement.

Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Auchter Company, 2017 WL 3601387, *24 (M.D.  2017) (internal quotations and citations omitted).   See also Pavarini Construction Co. (Se) Inc., 161 F.Supp.3d at 1235 (“Courts disregard “Other Insurance” provisions where…there is a contractual right or indemnification.”).

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

CONSIDER THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH AN EXCULPATORY CLAUSE

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An exculpatory clause in a contract is a clause aimed at relieving another party from certain liability. A disclaimer and insulation from liability.   Obviously, if you are the party relieving the other party from liability, you want to consider this risk including the potential enforceability of this risk if something goes wrong.  If you are the party asking for the insulation from liability, you do not want to create an exculpatory provision that disclaims and insulates you of all liability arising from the contract as it may create an illusory effect – that the agreement is nothing but a naked promise on your end because your promise is fully disclaimed and you are insulated from liability if you break your promise.  This could result in an unenforceable contract.

 

The validity of such an exculpatory clause was at-issue in Pier 1 Cruise Experts v. Revelex Corp., 2019 WL 3024618 (11thCir. 2019).   Although not a construction dispute, the exculpatory clause in this case was with two fairly sophisticated parties and expressly insulated one of the contracting parties from “any…damages regardless of kind or type…whether in contract, tort (including negligence), or otherwise.”  Pier 1 Cruise Experts, 2019 WL at *7.   This is a powerful exculpatory clause because it could be broadly construed to insulate that party from its own breaches of the contract.

In Florida:

[A]n exculpatory clause is enforceable so long as (1) the contracting parties have equal bargaining power and (2) the clause’s provisions are clear and unambiguous. With respect to the latter requirement, ‘the intention to be relieved from liability [must be] made clear and unequivocal and the wording must be so clear and understandable that an ordinary and knowledgeable person will know what he is contracting away.”  In the same vein, exculpatory clauses are ‘strictly construed against the party seeking to be relieved of liability.’

Pier 1 Cruise Experts, 2019 WL at *7 (internal citations omitted).

Here, the exculpatory clause was clear and was entered into with parties that had equal bargaining power.  The issue turned on the enforceability under Florida law and how the clause should be construed.

One interpretation is that the clause is enforceable and fully bars all of the parties’ claims against the other party that received this immunity from liability.  Period.

Another interpretation is that because of the broad sweeping application of the clause, it renders the entire contract illusory and void ab initio (i.e., void from the beginning).

A final interpretation could be that the clause will be construed to bar all negligence claims, but not breach of contract claims as it is the insulation from breach of contract claims that creates the illusory nature of the contract.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal certified this issue to the Florida Supreme Court with the following questions:

Is a contractual ‘exculpatory clause’ that purports to insulate one of the signatories from ‘any…damages regardless of kind or type…whether in contract, tort (including negligence), or otherwise’ enforceable?  Or, alternatively, does the clause confer such sweeping immunity that it renders the entire contract in which it appears illusory?  Or, finally, might the clause plausibly be construed so as to bar some but not all claims and thus save the contract from invalidation?

Pier 1 Cruise Experts, 2019 WL at *12.

Any answer to these questions can have worthy implications.  Notwithstanding, you need to consider that the intent of a clear exculpatory clause is to relieve and insulate another party from liability and that party will rely on the clause if a potential issue or claim arises.  The clause operates as a full disclaimer of sort.  Consider the enforceability of the provision and clearly negotiate the parameters of the provision and appreciate any corresponding risk associated with the provision.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

Release Language Extended to Successor Entity But Only Covered “Known” Claims

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A recent case contains valuable analysis that has impact on whether a “successor” entity will be bound by a settlement agreement it was not a direct party to. This case contains arguments for contractors that can be raised in a number of different contexts if it is sued by a successor or related entity.

The same case discusses the difference between releasing a party for “known” claims without releasing the same party for “unknown” claims. This is an important distinction because unknown claims refer to latent defects so a release that only releases a party for known claims is not releasing that party for latent defects.

In MBlock Investors, LLC v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 44 Fla. L. Weekly D1432d (Fla. 3d DCA 2019), an owner hired a contractor to construct a project. At completion, the owner transferred the project to an affiliated entity (collectively, the “Owner”). The contractor sued the Owner for unpaid work, the Owner claimed construction defects with the work, and a settlement was entered into that released the contractor for KNOWN claims. Thereafter, the Owner defaulted on the construction loan and agreed to convey the property through a deed in lieu of foreclosure to an entity created by the lender (the “Lender Entity”).

The Lender Entity sued the contractor for construction defects – in negligence (negligent construction) and a violation of Florida’s building code. The contractor argued that such claims should be barred by its settlement agreement with the Owner. There were two driving issues:

First, did the settlement agreement with the Owner extend to the Lender Entity because the Lender Entity was a successor entity to the Owner?

Second, even if the Lender Entity was a successor entity to the Owner, were the construction defects latent defects because the settlement agreement only provided a release of KNOWN (or patent) defects?

As to the first issue, the appellate court held that the Lender Entity was a successor entity to the Owner.

[I]t is rather clear that [Lender Entity] is in fact, [Owner’s] ‘successor’ for purposes of the settlement agreement with [contractor] because [Lender Entity] took over the Property and all of [Owner’s] rights with regard to the Property. Thus, [Lender Entity] clearly met the privity requirement for the application of res judicata in this case: it has a mutual or successive relationship to the same right that [Owner] had when it settled with [contractor]: a reduction in the amount owed to [contractor] for its services in exchange for releasing [contractor] from any claims of construction defects as provided for in the [settlement agreement].

As to the second issue, and really the driving issue whether or not the Lender Entity was a successor, was whether the release even protected the contractor from the types of construction defect claims sought. This is a question of fact because the settlement agreement only included a release of “known” claims and did NOT release the contractor for “unknown” claims, i.e., latent defects. Hence, the Lender Entity will establish such claims were unknown or could not reasonably have been discovered at the time of the settlement (a latent defect). The contractor will try to argue otherwise creating an issue of fact as to whether the settlement agreement released the contractor for the construction defects the Lender Entity is asserting.

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

RELEASE OF “UNKNOWN” CLAIM DOES NOT BAR RELEASE OF “UNACCRUED” CLAIM: FAIR OR UNFAIR?

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A general release of “unknown” claims through the effective date of the release does NOT bar “unaccrued” claims.   This is especially important when it comes to fraud claims where the facts giving rise to the fraud may have occurred prior to the effective date in the release, but a party did  not learn of the fraud until well after the effective date in the release.  A recent opinion maintained that a general release that bars unknown claims does NOT mean a fraud claim will be barred since the last element to prove a fraud had not occurred, and thus, the fraud claim had not accrued until after the effective date in the release.  See Falsetto v. Liss, Fla. L. Weekly D1340D (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (“The 2014 [Settlement] Agreement’s plain language released the parties only from “known or unknown” claims, not future or unaccrued claims. Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the fraud claim had accrued — that is, whether Falsetto [party to Settlement Agreement] knew or through the exercise of due diligence should have known about the alleged fraud at the time the 2014 Agreement was executed — the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on those fraud claims.”).  

 

Fair or unfair?  In certain contexts, perhaps fair — such as when the facts giving rise to the fraud took place after the effective date of the release.   In other contexts, perhaps unfair — such as when the facts giving rise to the fraud occurred prior to the effective date in the release but were unknown.  

 

What are your thoughts?    However, modifying a release to now include “unaccrued” claims may not be the answer as this could have broad implications relating to future claims, which a party may be cautious about releasing in light of current or future relations between the parties.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

THE CONTINGENCY FEE MULTIPLIER (FOR INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES)

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shutterstock_531182533The contingency fee multiplier: a potential incentive for taking a case on contingency, such as an insurance coverage dispute, where the insured sues his/her/its insurer on a contingency fee basis.

 

In a recent property insurance coverage dispute, Citizens Property Ins. Corp. v. Agosta, 43 Fla.L.Weekly, D1934b (Fla. 3d DCA 2018), the trial court awarded the insured’s counsel a contingency fee multiplier of two times the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees.  The insurer appealed. The Third District affirmed the contingency fee multiplier.

 

Of interest, on appeal—which is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard of appellate review–the Third District analyzed the state of Florida law on contingency fee multipliers.

 

To begin with, Florida has adopted the lodestar approach for determining reasonable attorney’s fees based on the following factors to consider (known the Rowe factors based on the Florida Supreme Court case):

 

(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the question involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.

(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.

(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.

(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.

(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.

(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.

(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.

(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

 Agosta citing Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 473 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 1985).   

 

Based on the consideration of these factors, the trial court determines through an evidentiary hearing a reasonable hourly rate to multiply by a number of reasonable hours expended in the litigation.  This is referred to as the lodestar amount or lodestar figure.  However, the court may add to this lodestar amount by tacking on a contingency fee multiplier.  For example, assume the trial court found 100 reasonable hours were incurred at the reasonable hourly rate of $300.  This would result in an attorney’s fees award of $30,000.  But, with the contingency fee multiplier, the trial court can add to this.  A multiplier of 2 would result in an attorney’s fees award of $60,000, hence the incentive for moving for the multiplier. 

 

In determining whether to add a contingency fee multiplier, the trial court must consider competent, substantial evidence in the record (offered at the evidentiary hearing) of these three factors:

 

(1) whether the relevant market requires a contingency fee multiplier to obtain competent counsel;

(2) whether the attorney was able to mitigate the risk of nonpayment in any way; and

(3) whether any of the factors set forth in Rowe are applicable [the factors mentioned above], especially, the amount involved, the results obtained, and the type of fee arrangement between the attorney and his client.

 

Agosta citing Standard Guarantee Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So.2d 828 (Fla. 1990)

 

 

There has been a debate as to whether the contingency fee multiplier only applies in rare and exceptional circumstances.  The Florida Supreme Court (hopefully) put this issue to bed rejecting the argument that the contingency fee multiplier only applies in rare and exceptional circumstances.  Agosta citing Joyce v. Federated National Ins. Co., 228 So.3d 1122 (Fla. 2017). 

 

Just as important, and perhaps the most important to me, the Florida Supreme Court held that a “fee multiplier ‘is properly analyzed through the same lens as the attorney when making the decision to take the case,’ as it ‘is intended to incentivize the attorney to take a potentially difficult or complex case.’”  Id. quoting Joyce, 228 So.3d at 1133. This is important because the complexity of a case is not determined at looking at a case in hindsight based on the actual outcome of the case, but looking at a case through the same lens as the attorney at the time the decision is made to handle the case.  Id. citing Joyce. 

 

The Florida Supreme Court also stated that the first contingency fee multiplier factor—the relevant market factor—is based on whether there are attorneys in the relevant market who have the skills to effectively handle the case and would have taken the case absent the availability of a contingency fee multiplier.  Id. citing Joyce.

 

Finally, the Florida Supreme Court stated that the third contingency fee multiplier factor that considers the results obtained is not based on the amount of recovery, even a recovery not exceptionally large—“the Florida Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly analyze the ‘outcome’ of that case when it found that ‘[a]lthough the amount involved [$23,500] was ‘not exceptionally large,’ it was material to the Joyces [plaintiffs].”  Id. quoting Joyce, 228 So.3d at 1125.

 

The contingency fee multiplier adds incentive to handle certain insurance coverage disputes on contingency.  If a multiplier is obtained, it definitely rewards the risk of taking a case on contingency (and certainly one of the reasons I explore such contingency fee options!). 

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

STATUTORY BAD FAITH AND AN INSURED’S 60-DAY NOTICE TO CURE

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shutterstock_262750391A recent case came out in favor of an insured and against a first-party property insurer in the triggering of a statutory bad faith action.   Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal in Demase v. State Farm Florida Insurance Company, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D679a (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) held that if an insurer pays a claim after the 60-day notice to cure period provided by Florida Statute s. 624.155(3), this “constitutes a determination of an insurer’s liability for coverage and extent of damages under section 624.155(1)(b) even when there is no underlying action.” 

 

Before a statutory bad faith claim is brought, an insured must file a Civil Remedy Notice giving the insurer written notice of the violation and 60 days to cure the claimed violation. 

 

There are three requirements to sue for a statutory bad faith claim: “1) a determination of the insurer’s liability for coverage; (2) a determination of the extent of the insured’s damages; and (3) the required notice is filed pursuant to section 624.155(3).”    The third requirement is the filing of the Civil Remedy Notice pursuant to s. 624.155 giving the insurer a safe harbor to cure the claimed violation.

 

The first and second requirement are oftentimes determined in litigation, arbitration, or settlement in a coverage lawsuit against an insurer.  However, as this court demonstrates, that does not always have to be the case.  If the insurer pays a claim outside of the 60-day cure period, this establishes (1) a determination of the insurer’s liability for coverage and (2) a determination of the extent of the insured’s damages.  In other words, if an insurer is going to pay a claim, they really need to think carefully about doing so within the 60-day statutory bad faith cure period. Paying afterwards supports the first two requirements of a statutory bad faith claim.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

 

BAD FAITH IN THE CONTEXT OF PROPERTY INSURANCE CLAIMS (WEBINAR)

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Recently, I participated in a national webinar involving insurance bad faith in the property insurance context.  My section of the webinar dealt with the elements and burden of proof in demonstrating bad faith by an insurer in various jurisdictions.  If you are dealing with a property insurance claim, or believe there may have been bad faith by the insurer, make sure you are working with counsel equipped to handle the jurisdictional nuances in advising you of your rights and proving such a claim.

 

[gview file=”https://floridaconstru.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Bad-Faith-Presentation.pdf”]

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.

CGL INSURER’S DUTY TO DEFEND INSURED DURING PRE-SUIT 558 PROCESS: MAYBE?

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shutterstock_287900015In earlier postings, I discussed the issue of whether Florida Statutes Chapter 558’s pre-suit construction defects process triggers a CGL insurer’s duty to defend.  The issue was whether Florida’s 558 pre-suit notice of a construction defect and repair process met the definition of “suit” within a standard CGL policy.

 

A standard CGL policy defines the term “suit” as:

 

“Suit” means a civil proceeding in which damages because of “bodily injury,” “property damage” or “personal and advertising injury” to which this insurance applies are alleged. “Suit” includes:

a. An arbitration proceeding in which such damages are claimed and to which the insured must submit or does submit with our consent; or

b. Any other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in which such damages are claimed and to which the insured submits with our consent.

 

The Florida Supreme Court in Altman Contractors, Inc. v. Crum & Forster Specialty Ins. Co., 42 Fla. L. Weekly S960b (2017) held that Florida’s 558 process is an “alternative dispute resolution proceeding” within the definition of suit in a CGL policy.  However,  since it falls within an “alternative dispute resolution proceeding,” the insurer’s consent is required to invoke its duty to defend its insured during this pre-suit process.  This is especially true since a recipient’s participation in the pre-suit 558 process is voluntary and not mandatory and this process does not produce any binding results.

 

Accordingly, an insured-contractor or subcontractor that receives a 558 notice of a construction defect should absolutely tender the notice to its CGL insurer.  No doubt about it.  In doing so, the insured should inquire and perhaps encourage the insurer to participate in the process and defend the insured’s interests.  If the insurer is not willing to participate in this process, this does not mean the insured should refuse too.  Rather, the insured simply needs to recognize that it will be responsible for its own fees and costs in doing so.  The insurer’s consent is required to invoke its duty to defend the insured during this process.

 

This opinion, unfortunately, doesn’t provide a whole lot of value (in my opinion) because if an insurer does not consent to participating in the process and defending its insured, it puts the insured in a position where it may be better off being sued where the insurer will now defend it and engage the consultants to investigate the claimed defects.  Many insurers, however, will capitalize on the 558 process by providing a defense to its insured as opposed to simply waiting for the inevitable construction defect lawsuit.

 

Please contact David Adelstein at dadelstein@gmail.com or (954) 361-4720 if you have questions or would like more information regarding this article. You can follow David Adelstein on Twitter @DavidAdelstein1.